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Abstract 
 
This single case study examines how stakeholders of a local education agency (LEA) understand 
and implement state turnaround policy for its chronically underperforming schools. While there is ample 
research on how to improve chronically underperforming schools, a research gap exists specifically 
around addressing implementation of mandated turnaround policy. This qualitative study uses the theory 
frame of policy sense-making to identify how implementers come to understand turnaround policy and 
to explore how that sense-making impacts their implementation decisions.  
 This study seeks to understand the role of central office in turnaround policy sense-making by 
collecting data on superintendent and central office administrator sense-making and its impact on policy 
implementation. While recent research on school improvement has focused on school improvement 
actions and responsibilities of principals and teachers, this study seeks to address the research gap of the 
essential role of school district offices in school turnaround.  In seeking to understand how district 
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leaders make sense of turnaround policy implementation to support school turnaround, the findings 
revealed that the superintendent and central office administrators identified strong superintendent 
leadership, monitoring and supporting schools, strategic distribution of resources, and management of 
human capital as key implementer actions and areas of influence.  
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CONTEXT OF THE STUDY 
 Improving chronically underperforming schools has been identified as one of the 
nation's top priorities. Reforming schools has required not only a significant 
investment of federal, state and community tax dollars but has also served as a 
lightning rod for issues of accountability and equity for underserved students.  The 
successful implementation of education reform policies leading to “turning around” 
schools or the entire Local Education Agency (LEA) can significantly influence student 
lives.   
Raising student achievement is the goal of education reform policy 
implementation, but implementing school reform policy, is a complex and multi-layered 
endeavor that involves multiple stakeholders.  As the consequences for failing to meet 
state driven accountability measures increases, it is critical that LEA leaders and 
communities understand how to navigate successfully from policy intent to policy 
implementation in the local context.  Data from this study can inform leaders as to 
where potential gaps exist and how to develop strategies to accomplish the stated 
goals. 
This research examined how multiple stakeholder groups in a LEA viewed their 
roles in the implementation of turnaround policies.  Additionally, the research 
examined what factors influenced policy implementer understanding.  The implementer 
groups studied included; school board members, superintendent/central office 
personnel, building leaders and teachers.   
The LEA in this study is a semi-urban school system serving ten-thousand 
students who represent an increasingly diverse population.  The community is 
challenged by high unemployment, poverty, limited local financial resources to support 
education and a LEA that is precariously balanced between maintaining local control of 
its schools or risk takeover by a state entity.  During the time of this study, the LEA 
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was engaged in an aggressive campaign to turnaround its most recently designated 
underperforming schools and was under state mandate to address the growing 
student achievement gap. The LEA had successfully turned around two of its schools 
in the last year and was about to embark on a planning process to develop a strategy 
for turning around another underperforming school. 
LEA leadership had identified a few important strategies that it felt were needed 
to turnaround a failing school based on previous turnaround experiences.  Many of 
those strategies had been implemented after the school had been designated by the 
state as underperforming.  The superintendent/central office staff, teachers, school 
leaders and school board members each had policy roles in turning around schools in 
the LEA. Through interviews, document analysis, and observations of meetings these 
interwoven studies examined how each implementer group understood their role and 
whether their understanding ultimately affected implementation of the policy itself.   
The study focused the initial research on four key areas. It first examined the 
current legislation and the process for designating underperforming schools. Then the 
study examined research on the characteristics of underperforming schools and 
effective turnaround practices.  Researchers reviewed the current literature on policy 
implementation and identified sense-making as a theoretical lens and finally, reviewed 
the literature for internal and external factors that might affect policy sense-making. 
 As the researchers assessed and analyzed the study data, several ideas began to 
emerge.  Factors such as role definition, data, communication, resources, context, 
culture, trust, social and political capital all contribute to how implementers go about 
the business of making sense of what they are being asked to do. The results of this 
study are intended to offer guidance and recommendations to the LEA and 
community leaders who are responsible for implementing turnaround policies. This 
study is also intended to add to the theoretical and practical research literature on 
TURNING AROUND SCHOOLS: A VIEW FROM IMPLEMENTERS 
  vii 
how turnaround policies are implemented in the local context and what factors 
influence local implementers. 
RESEARCH  
SCHOOL EFFECTIVENESS, POLICY IMPLEMENTATION AND SENSE MAKING 
In reviewing the literature, researchers explored the intersection between 
chronically underperforming schools, turnaround policy intent, policy implementation 
and the overarching factors that influence implementers as they create meaning in 
turnaround situations. 
The researchers began by looking at the literature that examines how 
turnaround schools are defined by Kutash, Nico, Gorin, Rahn & Tallant (2010) and 
then related it to the work of Murphy & Meyers (2008) Duke, Tucker, Salmonowicz, 
Levy & Saunders, (2005), Corallo & McDonald (2001), Gezi (1990) and Clubine, 
Knight, Schnieider & Smith (2001) on the challenging conditions that contribute to 
chronically underperforming schools such as poverty, stress, student mobility, low 
parent involvement and poor home-school collaborations. The strengths or 
weaknesses of leadership, teacher quality and teacher morale were also cited as 
factors in chronically underperforming schools.  To examine these concepts further, 
researchers reviewed the work of Fullan (2006), Hargreaves (2004), Leithwood 
(2010) Murphy & Meyers (2008) and McQuillan & Salomon-Fernandez (2008).   
Turning around schools requires knowing not only what contributes negatively 
to underperforming schools but also identifying the conditions that contribute 
positively to creating an effective school environment. The research of Mintrop 
(2004), and Bryk et.al, (2010) speaks to the importance of shared vision, goals and 
shared values as one way in which to improve schools.  
The purpose of our research was to examine how specific state legislation, 
which outlines policy requirements for school turnaround, is put into practice by 
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identified implementers. To understand the theoretical framework behind policy 
implementation research we turned to a review of the work of researchers who argue 
that successful policy implementation of systemic reform is complex and may be 
influenced by the politics of the policy adoption, how the policy problem is framed and 
even the language and symbols used to communicate the intent of the policy  (Hess, 
1999; Honig, 2006; Malen, 2006; McLaughlin, 2006; Hill, 2006, Smylie & Evans, 
2006). To provide a theoretical construct for understanding how individual policy 
implementers understand and interpret policies and their intended meaning, what the 
study will define as “sense-making,” the researchers referred to the work of Weick 
(1995) and Honig et. al, (2006). 
METHODOLOGY 
This research examined how turnaround work is implemented according to the 
state turnaround legislation. Looking at the research questions through a single case 
study design, the research team was able to gain a deeper understanding of how each 
stakeholder group made sense of the turnaround policy and how that sense-making 
influenced their decisions and actions around policy implementation. The LEA selected 
was one that had already been engaged in the process of implementing turnaround 
policy, with at least one level D school in the LEA, and with participation in the 
turnaround work by the four implementer groups that were the focus of this study, 
school board, superintendent/central office, school leadership and teachers. In this 
LEA, there are total of 16 schools (with one school closed in spring 2013).  In 
addition to the one high school, there are nine elementary schools, three middle 
schools, one pre-K through grade 7 school, one therapeutic high school, and one 
therapeutic middle school.  The LEA is considered a Level D district by the state, a 
designation that resulted from one or more schools in the LEA failing to meet student 
achievement goals relative to student performance on the state assessment system. 
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Presently there are four level A schools, one level B school, seven level C schools and 
one level D school. 
Once the LEA was selected, the research team utilized several data collection 
tools in order to have multiple sources of data and use triangulation in our analysis 
(Yin, 2009). These included observations, document review, and interviews. 
Participants were selected purposefully for interviews based on their participation in 
turnaround policy implementation (Creswell, 2012). Teachers came from level D 
schools and school leaders came from level C as well as level D schools. Participants 
also included the superintendent, central office personnel and school board members. 
This participant sampling allowed the research team to gather data from each of the 
four implementer groups. 
Once data was collected, the team coded and analyzed to look for themes. 
Using Dedoose coding software, the team coded the interviews, both collaboratively, 
for the purposes of calibration, and individually (Hill, et. al, 1997). Codes were 
modified as part of the coding process and as suggested by the data. From there, 
each of the research team members identified the major themes for their implementer 
group. That was followed by an analysis of the themes across the implementer groups 
that led to recommendations for the district. Below summarizes these themes and 
recommendations. 
FINDINGS 
SCHOOL LEADERS 
The findings in this study show that there are influences on school leaders’ 
sense-making and that this sense-making occurs primarily around three areas, policy 
requirements, diagnosis, and effective practice.  This sense-making then leads school 
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leaders to exercise specific strategies and leadership moves when they take on the 
tasks of turning around a chronically underperforming school. 
Sense-making begins with the elements that influence school leaders’ 
understanding of the turnaround policy and process. There were three primary 
influences on sense-making, which led to implementation decisions: 1) previous 
experience, which generated background knowledge around school turnaround, 2) 
communication with other stakeholders and implementers, and 3) consideration of 
school context all factored into how school leaders understood the policy. Each one of 
these influences impacted specific areas of sense-making.  
Table 1: The Relationship Between Sense-making Influences and Areas and 
Implementation Decisions 
Influences on 
Sense-making 
Areas of 
Sense-making 
Implementation Decisions 
Communication   Policy Requirements 
[1. What does the policy 
say about staffing and 
resources?] 
Organize Staff 
Utilize Resources 
Communication 
School Context 
Diagnosis 
[2. What are the strengths 
and weaknesses of the 
school?] 
Use Data to Diagnose 
Communication 
Background Knowledge 
Effective Practices 
[3. What practice will 
leverage strengths and 
address weaknesses?] 
Focus on Instruction 
Communicate a Vision 
Build Capacity 
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 Working in tandem with each other, these three influences shaped how school 
leaders thought about their current turnaround situation. Context had a role in the 
diagnosis of the school. Previous experience had a role in decisions about practices 
that would be effective in targeting the needs of the school. Communication was the 
one influence that impacted all areas of sense-making as school leaders were able to 
hear input from other stakeholders and implementers. Table 1 shows the relationship 
between the influences on sense-making, the areas of sense-making and the 
implementation decisions. With each of the areas of sense-making there were key 
questions that school leaders asked. This table depicts the questions in a certain 
order. While there is not necessarily a clean division between each of these questions 
in terms of their order, generally, school leaders asked about the policy requirements 
early on in the process. Questions about the school’s strengths and weaknesses then 
quickly followed. Once diagnosis was underway, they then began to look at the 
effective practices for turnaround implementation. These then led to a range of 
implementation decisions and actions. 
These implementation actions aligned with specific areas of sense-making. From 
the questions about policy requirements came decisions about how to organize staff 
and utilize resources. Staffing decisions occurred relative to the staffing authority 
afforded by the regulations to move staff in and out of the building. Yet, school 
leaders that did not have that authority, often looked to reorganizing positions or 
repositioning staff members to put people in places that would maximize their 
strengths. Similarly, decisions about how to use resources were made based on what 
became available through level D designation. School leaders who received additional 
funding, used it to implement programs such as ELT and wraparound. However, 
schools that did not have additional funding focused their school improvement on the 
practices that could be implemented despite a dearth of resources. In this way, 
resources were not only a question of what is available, but also about how best to 
use what is there. 
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The process of diagnosing the school for its strengths and weaknesses led 
school leaders to make data use a critical part of turnaround. In fact, the prevalence 
of data in sense-making and implementation of turnaround is notable. It was at the 
crux of school diagnosis, it helped school leaders explain to their staffs the criteria of 
designation as outlined in the policy, and it became a significant part of 
implementation as school leaders put data at the forefront of teaching and learning in 
their buildings. Data was a driving force in efforts to improve schools in this LEA as it 
guided how implementers changed their practice, and elements of sense-making and 
implementation stemmed from how school leaders interpreted the data. 
Finally, questions about what practices would effectively move the school 
forward led to implementation decisions to focus on instruction, communicate a 
vision, and build capacity. These actions stemmed from two key areas: diagnosis of 
the school and background knowledge. The diagnosis highlighted the areas on which 
to focus improvements and to identify practices to target those areas. Background 
knowledge was applicable particularly where school leaders had turnaround experience. 
They often entered into new turnaround situations already with a body of knowledge 
about effective practices from which to draw. In this LEA, the school leaders saw that 
these three implementation actions, focusing on instruction, communicating a vision 
and building capacity, would prove to be effective in raising student achievement in 
their schools. 
The influences of communication, background knowledge, and context had key 
roles in how school leaders made sense of their turnaround work. They shaped how 
school leaders viewed their schools, how they understood what the turnaround work 
would entail, and how they decided the steps needed to develop a school that is a 
place that facilitates learning among its students. For school leaders approaching 
turnaround work, they should leverage these influences to push their thinking around 
diagnosing and identifying effective ways to raise school performance.  
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TEACHERS          
        Findings in the teacher study not only fit nicely with the literature written about 
turnaround work in general, but went further and drilled into those general findings to 
provide much more specific recommendations for practitioners.   
 The first finding from the literature had to do with the importance of creating a 
shared vision at the school needing turnaround.  Teachers are the most important 
resource in turnaround (Murphy & Meyers, 2008) and the most important thing a 
school leader needs to do with all the teachers and other administrators in their 
building is to clearly articulate a shared vision of how the turnaround will happen. 
Successful leaders in low-performing schools drive the work at hand by communicating 
and maintaining a highly focused vision and mission that is about student learning 
(Clubine, et al., 2001; Duke, 2006; Gezi, 1990; Jacobson, Johnson, Ylmaki, & Giles, 
2005; Leithwood, Harris & Strauss, 2010; Murphy, 2010; Murphy & Meyers, 2008; 
Picucci, Brownson, Kahlert, & Sobel, 2002; Potter, Reynolds, & Chapman, 2002; 
Salmonowicz, 2009; Duke et al., 2005).  The finding of this particular study showed 
that for teachers it was very clear that this vision had to come from the building 
principal, it needed to come at the very beginning of the turnaround process and it 
very likely needed to happen with the help of involuntarily transferring teachers who 
were not on board with the vision out of the building.   
 The creation of a shared vision by changing the staff of a building until all the 
teachers were on board with the principal was a very precise description from the 
teachers of the first step in the turnaround process at both the turned around school 
and the newly designated one.   This first step was necessarily described by teachers 
from both schools and members of the central office as being directive in nature. 
 They talked with great passion and detail about the reassignment process as a part 
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of getting the staff in place that could and would do the work leaders saw as 
necessary for turnaround.  At the turned around school, teachers described the 
principal of the beginning stage of turnaround as “her way or the highway” and went 
on to say that if people didn’t do what that principal said she would make their life a 
“living hell” until they either did change or left.  Another teacher described a second 
principal she had worked for at another turnaround elementary school in the city as 
someone who, “… got what she want(ed) by throwing keys in meetings, slamming 
books against the wall, flipping over chairs.”   Two of the three turnaround principals 
referenced in this study were described as having this type of intimidating and strict 
control at the start of the process.  There was no distribution of leadership during this 
stage of the process. 
        A second stage of the turnaround process for the teachers of these schools 
also fits with one of the second recommendations that came out of the literature 
review that centered on the building of teacher capacity through professional 
development.  Richard Elmore’s famous “reciprocity of accountability,” which asserts 
that teachers need to be provided with additional capacity if schools expect them to 
perform different tasks or familiar tasks at a higher level (Elmore, 2004).  Teachers at 
both these schools stressed the importance of their professional development.  The 
researcher defined this from their comments as internal professional development 
they got from each other through all of their school, grade, and department meetings 
as well as other informal conversations they had with colleagues at lunch, during their 
prep periods, and even in out of work settings.  This was also defined as the external 
professional development they got from outside presenters on topics ranging from 
“guided discipline” to changing the tone of their school to data training that helped 
them develop skills to improve their students’ learning based on findings in their 
assessments.   They specifically identified training on how to use data to improve 
instruction as necessary to move their schools forward and this matches with much of 
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the literature as well (Clubine et al., 2001; Corallo & McDonald, 2001; Duke et al., 
2005; Stein, 2012).  Teachers at these schools both identified extended learning time 
as necessary to be able to engage in both kinds of professional growth.   It is in this 
second stage of turnaround as this study defined it that teachers understand their 
practices have changed and in the turned around school it is where they saw student 
growth through data on internal and external assessments. 
        A second finding from the literature had to do with the importance of teacher 
voice in the turnaround process.  Creating a culture where leadership can be shared 
makes the job doable for the principal, but also makes the work more meaningful for 
the rest of the people being asked to do it.  “Sustainable leadership spreads.  It 
sustains as well as depends upon the leadership of others” (Hargreaves & Fink, 2006). 
 The finding of this study is that teachers in these schools did not recognize they had 
any leadership role in the turnaround process until the principal was certain the shared 
vision for the school had been clearly articulated.   The teachers in this study thought 
it necessary for teacher voice to come after the right people were put into place, and 
the vision of the principal specifically had been clearly articulated as the vision for 
turning around the school. 
        The third stage of the turnaround continuum for these teachers is rooted in a 
fear about the sustainability of their improvement.  This was true of both the turned 
around school who was currently in the third stage and the newly designated school 
that was concerned about what would happen if they ever made it to the stage where 
their data had improved.  Teachers described to me a fear that they could lose 
valuable resources of time, money, and even motivation when the watchful eye of the 
state and its’ grant funds disappeared as result of the school’s improved designation. 
 In the interview done with two teachers from the turnaround school they described 
their fear this way: 
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But how are you going to sustain it?  …We still have wellness but the grant was 
cut this year.  Our professional development was already cut this year.  We had 
separate math and science days in the summer and that was totally cut.  Most 
teachers still participated but it wasn’t paid and they didn’t have the regular 
consultants that we usually do come in.  Look at the amount of PD we had this 
year versus last, all these years, beyond already taken away. 
 
These were two of the most positive teachers we interviewed in terms of being proud 
of what they and their school had been able to accomplish.  They spoke passionately 
about how well the teachers there worked together and how advanced they felt when 
talking to teachers from other places because they had had so much professional 
development.  Yet they still had this fear about how they were possibly going to be 
able to sustain this same improvement they were so proud of. 
        Where the researcher found hope for sustainability in this study had to do with 
the relational trust that was established at the turned around schools.  The creation of 
this culture of trust happened over time when teachers worked together with the 
common goal of improving their students’ achievement.  Here teachers described how 
they sustained each other when they were having bad days, how they could go into 
each other’s classrooms looking for ideas or inspiration and even how they became so 
close they went on vacations together and attended each other’s weddings.  The fear 
for turnaround schools is that the policy will overtake the people when it comes to 
focusing on what is important to do in this work.  “If truth is the first casualty of war, 
then trust is the first fatality of imposed reform” (Hargreaves & Fink, 2006, p. 212). 
 The fact that trust was not dead at the turned around school may be one of their 
greatest successes and their hope for sustaining their improvement.  
 
 
SCHOOL BOARD MEMBERS 
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        The focus of this study was to examine the role of school boards in turnaround 
policy implementation. School boards have an important part to play in the 
implementation of education policy because of their role as democratically elected 
representatives of the community’s voice in determining the education of its children. 
Because of their legislative authority and because they are agents of the community’s 
interests, the school board can influence the ways in which policies are implemented 
(Rice, Delagardelle, Buckton, Jons, Lueders & Vens, 2001; Hess, 2010)  
In general, findings in this study indicate that school boards make sense of their 
roles and responsibilities by responding to internal as well as external factors and 
influences. First, findings indicated that the role of school boards has become 
ambiguous and undefined as their historical roles have evolved, state activism has 
increased and the requirements of education reform legislation and the competing 
interests of turnaround legislation have become intertwined. Second, when faced with 
trying to make sense of their roles in turnaround, school board members reverted to 
the role they most closely identified with and understood best, that of approving 
budgets and allocating resources. School board sense-making was also influenced by 
two factors; communication and the role of a dissenting voice.  
The first finding indicated that the school board’s turnaround role in this LEA 
was undefined and sometimes misunderstood by board members as well as other 
policy implementers. School board members were caught between balancing their 
political roles as elected officials and agents of state policy with their community roles 
as education advocates and community members. The role of school boards described 
in turnaround legislation is inconsistent with education reform legislation and 
contributes to the lack of clarity. For instance, education reform legislation calls for 
school boards to play an active role in approving policy and establishing goals for the 
LEA but turnaround legislation limits the role of the school board. In this LEA, an 
increase in state activism and the superintendent’s influence coupled with a decrease 
in school board authority contributed to the lack of clarity for members trying to 
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make sense of their roles and responsibilities. Opportunities for formal training to help 
school board members clarify and make sense of their specific role in a turnaround 
district were limited. While members were aware of their four areas of legislative 
responsibility they tended to focus primarily on two; selecting and evaluating the 
superintendent and setting the budget, both areas where they felt they had the most 
expertise and influence. District goal setting and policy development and 
implementation were seen as the work of the administration and building level leaders 
with the school board as a supporting actor.  
        As a result of school board members viewing their role in turnaround policy as 
one of budget and resources members focused on how to acquire and allocate 
resources, and how to distribute them equitably. They viewed long-term sustainability 
of turnaround as one of their primary concerns particularly since the district was 
heavily dependent on outside funding sources. Members viewed relationships, alliances 
and their understanding of the political landscape as important levers in solving the 
resource puzzle. In order to prioritize resources school board members relied on the 
direction and guidance of the superintendent. While limited, members benefited from 
opportunities to engage in direct contact with front line implementers who could 
translate the resource needs to board members. Board members used these 
opportunities to create shared understanding of the resource needs and were then 
able to use the information to advocate for additional resources from the community.  
 Board members viewed their resource role in three distinct ways; as facilitators, 
as bridge builders and as  navigators. As facilitators, they brokered internal 
discussions to help them understand the resource needs, as bridge builders they 
interpreted and translated the districts needs to the community and as navigators 
they negotiated their way through the complex budget and finance environment of 
the city and state to access needed resources for the district. 
         A number of influencing factors were identified that also contributed to school 
board turnaround sense-making. Communication with internal and external 
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stakeholders was key. School board members relied on communication from the 
superintendent as the central conduit for distributing, interpreting, clarifying and 
making sense of turnaround policies. The effectiveness of the superintendent’s use of 
data to communicate turnaround information, an influencing factor found with other 
implementer groups, was viewed as mixed by board members. Members understood 
the importance of using data to guide their decision-making, however they often 
lacked the background knowledge, training and expertise to use it successfully. 
Communication from external agents such as the State Education Agency (SEA) was 
also identified as influencing school board sense-making. Members viewed the 
intervention of state monitors from diverse perspectives. While members understood 
that the resources and support that came with state intervention were invaluable to 
the district, they still viewed themselves as the experts of the local context. As such, 
they viewed themselves as the community’s voice when faced with mandates that 
conflicted with the values and beliefs of the community. 
 In addition to communication as an influencing factor in turnaround policy 
sense-making, the role of a dissenting voice also emerged as a factor. Dissenting voice 
in this study was viewed as one way to make sense of turnaround  policies and 
requirements. “Sense-making through arguing” as noted by Wieck is central to 
organizational sense-making. In this study school board members functioned as a 
collective group and made sense of the information before them as part of a social 
process. Their own beliefs, actions and expectations provided the structure through 
which sense-making occurred (Weick, 1995). The role of the dissenting voice 
contributed to sense-making by providing the opportunity for members to challenge 
each other and argue, what researchers have cited as a natural part of the process of 
sense-making. By engaging in sense-making through arguing board members clarified 
strategic ideas, potentially leading to more effective group decision making (Kayes & 
Kayes, 2012).  Constructively engaging rather than suppressing dissenting voices can 
be an important strategy for strengthening rather than weakening sense-making. 
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Turning around schools calls for creative and new ways of thinking, suppressing 
dissent can limit the expression of diverse beliefs, alternative views of the world, and 
ideas for improvement that may be exactly what is needed to increase student 
achievement.  
As elected officials, school board members answer only to the electorate. They 
have an important role to play as representatives of the democratic process. Because 
of this, they may be the only implementers uniquely positioned to contribute to policy 
sense-making by engaging in debate, dissent and arguing as strategies for clarifying 
policy intentions and implementation. 
SUPERINTENDENT/CENTRAL OFFICE 
 The superintendent and selected central office administrators within the LEA 
are often the initial implementers of school and district turnaround policy. This study 
seeks to understand the role of central office in turnaround policy sense-making by 
collecting data on the superintendent and central office administrator sense-making 
and its impact on policy implementation. While recent research on school 
improvement has focused on school improvement actions and responsibilities of 
principals and teachers, this study seeks to address the research gap of the essential 
role of school district offices in school turnaround and improvement.  In seeking to 
understand how district leaders make sense of turnaround policy implementation to 
support school turnaround, the findings revealed the superintendent and central office 
administrators found strong superintendent leadership, monitoring and support to 
schools, strategic distribution of resources, and management of human capital as key 
implementer actions.  
 The first finding encompassed superintendent leadership and its essential role in 
moving forward turnaround work. Multiple interviewees attributed student 
achievement gains and therefore successful policy implementation to the 
superintendent’s ability to effectively communicate with the community and build 
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relationships with key stakeholders. The superintendent also established for central 
office administrators that their purpose is to support schools, and that they work for 
schools, schools don’t work for them. Additionally, central office administrators, 
teachers, and principals noted more of a central office presence within their schools 
and an increased emphasis on teaching and learning during professional development.  
 This case study also revealed that the LEA’s central office staff provided a 
support, monitoring, and accountability framework for its schools. The school review 
partner (SRP) process is created to provide support to the school’s principal and 
teachers and to serve as a thought partner for the school’s improvement processes. 
The SRP process leads to more frequent and better aligned monitoring of student 
achievement data. LEAs are also able to monitor the effectiveness of school-based 
instructional initiatives. Additionally, accountability is provided for principals and 
central office staff to ensure alignment of vision and follow through with instructional 
initiatives. While these practices are not perfectly and fully embedded within every 
facet of the district’s work, there are key shifts that have taken place alongside the 
LEA’s turnaround, and its turnaround of two chronically underperforming schools.  
 The third major area of finding is in the realm of access to financial and human 
resources to support school and system-wide turnaround. The case study LEA has 
limited resources like most urban districts, and often-times resources are key levers in 
school and system-wide turnaround. While some implementers, teachers and 
principals, believed that resource allocation varied across schools, central office 
implementers viewed resource allocation as equitable. For human resources, the 
superintendent provided building principals with latitude and control over the 
management of human capital. The superintendent also provided intentional leadership 
around making it clear to central office staff and principals that they could either join 
the district’s turnaround philosophy or be asked to leave the district.  
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 Recommendations for school system leaders / practitioners include next steps 
for various stakeholders within the turnaround process including, school boards, 
superintendents, and central office administrators. School boards of urban school 
districts with turnaround schools should consider the leadership competencies of 
superintendent candidates and look at some of the leadership moves of the 
superintendent in this case study in developing a profile of their leadership needs. 
Superintendents have a complex and multi-faceted set of responsibilities and could 
reflect on their own leadership competencies to ensure successful implementation of 
turnaround policy. Superintendents also have responsibility for the sense-making of 
central office administrators to ensure alignment with the organizational vision. Finally, 
it’s recommended that central office administrators touch schools in meaningful ways 
to ensure support, monitoring, and accountability.  
RECOMMENDATIONS  
Our study looked at sense-making of policy implementation from the 
perspective of four different implementer groups in a single district’s chronically 
underperforming schools. Examining the four implementer groups, school board, 
superintendent/central office, school leadership, and teachers, we wanted to 
understand the role sense-making played in what the implementers actually did and 
what they thought was effective to improve school performance. The research team 
looked at the findings of each of the implementers groups and identified 
recommendations for the LEA around communication, the importance of data, and the 
use of resources to support turnaround. 
RECOMMENDATION ONE: 
INCREASE COMMUNICATION BETWEEN IMPLEMENTERS 
A common theme that emerged from the findings was that there is a need for 
the turnaround policy to be communicated on a continual basis up and down the 
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implementer chain. With the understanding that increased communication helps to 
facilitate sense-making, we looked at how facilitating communication between all 
parties increased their understanding of what they were being asked to do. We found 
structures in place in the local education agency for this communication to happen. 
Specifically, technical communication between and among the implementers was 
already being done and implementers had a functional understanding of what 
turnaround was and what the school had to do in order to be successful. While this 
technical communication was in place, we found that communication that centered 
implementer sense-making more on their beliefs about their role and expectations 
rather than merely on the technical requirements of the policy was needed. With the 
aim to facilitate sense-making, the research team identified three ways to strengthen 
communication, which focus on better defining the communication that takes place 
within current communication structures. 
The first recommendation concerns utilizing the building principal meetings with 
central office staff to develop a common language around what it means to turn 
around underperforming schools. Because sense-making around expectations and role 
was prevalent in the findings, principal meetings can include discussion about these 
two important elements of sense-making. The common language and wisdom gleaned 
through communication at these principal and central office meetings would also be 
valuable for the principals of schools who are not yet designated as level D schools. 
Explicit communication about what has led to turnaround success in other schools 
would be invaluable for school leaders throughout the district, especially those whose 
schools are level C. Central Office staff can discuss with building leaders the different 
scenarios of schools that resulted or did not result in successful school improvement. 
The second recommendation around communication is to bring community 
involvement into the implementation of turnaround through an extension of the Local 
Stakeholders Group (LSG). Comprised primarily of community members, school staff, 
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and central office staff, the LSG submits recommendations to the superintendent who 
uses those recommendations to develop the turnaround plan for the local education 
agency. The policy does not require further action by the LSG, which means that 
community participation in the work of turning around the school can be reduced. 
Here, there is opportunity to extend the role of the LSG to the implementation phase 
of the turnaround plan, which would increase the engagement and responsibility of the 
community to contribute to turnaround efforts. One way to do this is through 
consistent meetings, possibly through the redesign team. Consistent meetings about 
the progress of the school will help keep everyone informed and would help to 
facilitate sense-making not only for the educators in the school building and district, 
but also for the larger school community. 
Another recommendation pertains to communication with the school board. The 
findings reflect a need for the school board to have an opportunity to have more 
clarification about their expectations and role in turnaround. The school board has four 
areas of authority: budget, policy, evaluation of the superintendent and collective 
bargaining. These areas of authority are impacted by the turnaround legislation in that 
the school board has been grappling with how to make sense of their role in the 
context of the school district’s focus on implementing turnaround policy. More explicit 
communication among the school board may help their understanding of the 
significant questions they have about their role and expectations in turnaround. 
Whether this is done through workshops or other professional development 
opportunities, the school board may benefit from these conversations that allow them 
to further their sense-making about what it means to be a school board member of a 
turnaround district. 
           A final recommendation about communication would be around paying 
special attention to the role of collaboration in the turnaround process at all levels.  In 
our study one of our theoretical lenses was the role of social capital in policy 
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implementation.  This theory posits that what actually gets implemented depends on 
who the implementers know and trust.  Building trust by improving collaborative 
working relationships, between and among all implementer levels, through transparent 
communication will help insure consistency of understanding in terms of what is 
actually to be implemented in the turnaround process. In authentic collaboration there 
is room for working with dissenting voices who may in fact have much to offer in terms 
of improving the work of turnaround along the way.   
 
RECOMMENDATION TWO: SPECIFY A TRANSPARENT PROCESS FOR 
ALLOCATING RESOURCES 
 
The findings indicated that implementers have questions about how resources 
are allocated throughout the LEA. There is confusion about why some schools get 
certain resources that other schools do not. This recommendation to specify a 
transparent process for allocating resources intends to alleviate some of this 
confusion. 
As limited resources challenge the LEA, a process needs to define the priorities 
that guide how resources are distributed to specific programs and schools. By being 
explicit about these priorities for school improvement, all implementer groups, 
including school board, superintendent/ central office, principals, and teachers, would 
have a better understanding of where the resources should go and why. For example, 
the LEA can clarify their framework for resource allocation based on school level, 
programming, and student needs. This framework should include details of funding 
streams for academic programs, extracurricular programs, additional pay for teachers, 
and other areas essential to effective implementation of turnaround policy. Another 
example is to make transparent how staffing is allocated. Staff allocation includes 
teacher excising if they have not union protection and/or staff “opt-out” which means 
teachers choosing to transfer to other schools in the city after the new designation. 
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 Transparency may involve identifying how teacher “opt-out” of level D schools occurs 
with the aim to ensure consistency of implementation of “opt-out” across schools. 
This recommendation involves assessing the time provisioning of central office 
administrator’s delivery of support and monitoring across high priority (level D and C) 
schools. Currently, the perception among some in the LEA is that level D schools 
receive more support and attention from central office than other schools in the 
district. Clarifying this LEA’s system to monitor school-level support from central 
office administrators would ensure clear and equitable support. This would help to 
assuage the concerns that level D schools receive the most attention and support. 
This LEA makes decisions about how resources are allocated to schools and 
programs across the district. The recommendation here is about making these 
decisions more transparent. This would help to alleviate confusion about resource 
allocation and the perception that some schools in the LEA receive more support than 
others. 
RECOMMENDATION THREE: DEVELOP THE CAPACITY OF ALL 
IMPLEMENTERS TO WORK WITH DATA. 
 
An area that became prevalent in the findings across implementer groups was 
the use of data. It is apparent that data is at the crux of school improvement efforts 
as it became one of the most talked-about areas of school improvement by teachers, 
school leaders, central office personnel, and school board members. Indeed, the LEA 
has strengths regarding the capacity of implementers to use data where building and 
LEA leaders, along with numerous teachers, understand the importance using data and 
prioritize its role in school improvement. Although data is a significant part of school 
and LEA improvement planning, findings point to inconsistencies with the level of 
comfort and ability different implementers have with data analysis. The 
recommendation here is to increase capacity so that there is more consistency in 
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terms of how implementers understand and use the data. Central office plays a key 
role in this recommendation in that they would need to set the stage around how to 
use data in school improvement planning. 
One opportunity to build capacity for analyzing data among teachers is to bring 
them together to share data analysis practices. While teachers interact with other 
teachers in their own schools, and perhaps informally with teachers in other schools, 
more formal structures could allow this to occur more prevalently. Giving teachers 
opportunities to collaborate across schools would increase their contact with other 
teachers around best practices of data. This could open up new ideas and ways of 
using data to inform their instruction. 
Sharing of best practices can also occur among school leaders. Currently, school 
leaders meet with central office personnel, along with members of their faculty, to 
analyze data in their data review meetings. In addition, there are meetings that occur 
with central office, including the superintendent, and principals of all the schools in the 
LEA. As school leaders work together to build their own skills around applying data 
analysis to school improvement, there is opportunity here to look more at how they 
can lead their staffs through the process. Findings suggest that there is some 
inconsistency in how school leaders lead their staffs through the process of analyzing 
data and using that analysis to improve practice. School leaders might benefit from 
more in-depth conversations around how to effectively lead faculty in conversations 
about the data. 
Another opportunity for building better understanding of the data is with the 
community of this LEA. This begins with working with school board to promote their 
sense-making of the data. Findings suggest that school board has little interaction 
with data and have fewer opportunities than the educators in the schools to analyze 
the data. Focusing some meetings and/or sessions with school board on looking at the 
data would help to increase their understanding of and how it informs turnaround. 
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These conversations do not necessarily need to be overly cumbersome in detail. 
Rather, they might give an overview of what the data is saying about the LEA and why 
designations occur. This then would put school board members in a position to discuss 
with their constituencies about the turnaround work that is happening in the LEA. 
While school board meetings are perhaps likely places for this communication, and 
indeed discussions around data have occurred there, opportunities offered outside the 
context of a school board meeting may be beneficial. This may lead to a more 
informed community about what the data means in terms of their schools’ 
performance. 
RECOMMENDATION FOUR: COMMUNICATE A CLEAR VISION OF LEADERSHIP 
FOR THE LEA 
 
Looking at the findings across the four implementer groups, it became clear 
that the groups were looking at turnaround differently and focusing on different 
aspects of the turnaround process. They were expressing different priorities about 
what needed to be done to improve the schools. There appeared to be a lack of 
interdependence among the different implementer groups. That is, they tended to 
operate in silos, distinct from each other, and often not in tune to what other 
implementers were thinking or doing with the turnaround work. 
 
There were several places where this lack of interdependence was apparent. 
Central office directors spoke about the importance of their monitoring role and how 
they worked with school leaders to put practices in place to improve school 
performance. Yet, school leaders did not talk much about this and were more focused 
on how they were working with their staffs. Teachers described a style of leadership in 
their schools at the beginning phase of turnaround that was directive, whereas, when 
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school leaders described their approach, it resembled more of an instructional 
leadership approach. The school board was knowledgeable about the responsibilities 
given to them under education reform but they were less clear on their role in 
turnaround. The other three implementer groups rarely mentioned the school board, 
indicating that the school board leadership role was not prevalent in their view. This 
lack of interdependence may be attributed to the fact that a clear vision from the LEA 
about what implementers should be thinking and doing to raise school performance 
was absent. Rather, some implementers were relying on the policy to set their vision 
for them. That is, upon designation, their vision was about doing what was necessary 
to exit turnaround status within a specific timeframe. Implementers did not speak 
about any kind of long-range vision that the LEA established about leading 
turnaround. LEA leaders did not describe whether they saw the LEA as a system 
whose parts should be working together towards a common vision or how they 
envisioned the system supporting learning at the building level. 
For this LEA, a clear vision of leadership is needed to help guide and sustain 
school improvement. When talking about turnaround leadership at the school building 
level, Leithwood et al. (2010) emphasize the importance of vision when they 
recommend turnaround leaders engage their staffs in developing the vision of a school 
as a source of motivation to commit to the work of school turnaround. In 
implementing this suggestion at the LEA level, this LEA would bring implementer 
groups more into alignment with each other and with the LEA in terms of how they 
implement turnaround. Fullan (2006) who also focuses on turnaround leadership at 
the building level, discusses the need to implement systemic reform by using a 
“trilevel development solution” that includes alignment between the state, LEA, and 
school. Establishing this alignment requires conversation, face to face interactions and 
the co-construction of meaning that are integral to the sense-making described by 
researchers (Weick, 1995; Datnow, 2006). In this LEA, the relationships between the 
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district, community and the school is critical where all three work need to work in 
concert with each other. A vision of leadership would strengthen those relationships 
and help to create the interdependence needed for implementers of turnaround policy 
to be working in the same direction. Strengthening the interdependence between 
implementer groups can also be reinforced by making sure that all voices are 
represented, including dissenting voices. This common vision would not be about 
merely exiting or avoiding turnaround status. Rather, it would be about the kinds of 
educational experiences that leadership would create for students that transcend 
what the turnaround policy mandates. 
CONCLUSION 
This research generated insights into what educators in this LEA think and do as 
they implement turnaround policy. Emerging from these insights are recommendations 
that are intended to enhance the turnaround work that is already happening across 
schools in this LEA. Because sense-making relies so heavily on communication, 
increasing communication is suggested here as a way to facilitate understanding of 
turnaround policy. Yet, this understanding goes beyond knowing the policy 
requirements. Communication can help educators in the district better understand 
their role and expectations, which are not necessarily outlined in the policy. This is the 
process of co-construction as implementers' communication with each other helps 
them to make meaning. Also recommended is to specify a transparent process for 
allocating resources.  This LEA makes decisions about how resources are 
distributed across schools and programs. Yet, the findings in this research suggest 
that there is some confusion as to how those decisions are made. Clarifying these 
decisions would help to alleviate confusion and increase trust in the process, which 
can then help to guide implementers' decisions around turnaround implementation. 
The third recommendation about data use comes from a major theme across the 
studies about the prevalence of data in school improvement planning and 
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implementation. This LEA already uses data, but there are some inconsistencies in the 
capacity of implementers to analyze and use data. School leaders, central office 
personnel, and teachers, would benefit from collaborative opportunities for work with 
data. School board members may need more experience with data in order to 
communicate with their constituencies about what the data says about the schools in 
the LEA. Providing more opportunities for implementers to work with data would not 
only help with school improvement efforts, but it would also help the community of 
this LEA to better understand the data that informs turnaround work of their schools.  
        These recommendations aim to outline how this LEA can increase its capacity to 
exercise successful turnaround of its chronically underperforming schools. Increased 
communication can lead to more sense-making, which can help to guide turnaround 
implementation decisions. More transparency about the way resources are distributed 
can offer guidance to implementers throughout the LEA about how to approach 
turnaround work. Increasing capacity to analyze and use data would inform decisions 
that successfully leads to school improvement. As with most advice about school 
improvement, this is not offered as a universal remedy to this LEA's turnaround 
challenges. Rather, it is intended to enhance the thinking that goes into school 
improvement planning and implementation. That is, these suggestions can help 
implementers make sound decisions about what they should do when taking on the 
immense task of turning around a chronically under performing school.  
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Chapter One: Introduction1 
In writing the introduction to the recently released Equity and Excellence Commission Report, 
For Each and Every Child, co-chairs Christopher Edley Jr. and Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar state the 
case for why improving and turning around our nation's chronically underperforming schools is critical. 
The situation is dire, the agenda urgent. From parent associations to Capitol Hill, from 
classroom teachers to the White House—there is work to be done and passion to be spent by all 
of us who appreciate the stakes for our children and for the nation’s future. If we fail in this 
work, we will forfeit our position of economic and moral leadership. We will risk the future of 
our people and of America as we know it (Equity and Excellence Commission Report, 2013, 
p.9). 
According to the 2012 Children's Defense Fund (CDF) Report on the State of America's 
Children, 43% of the children living in poverty live in urban settings where the concentration of 
chronically underperforming schools is the highest. Only 68% of the students who enter 9th grade 
graduate with a high school diploma. African American and Hispanic males have the most dismal 
graduation rates of all, just 43% for Black males and 48% for Hispanic males (Orfield, Losen, Wald, 
Swanson, 2001). Education reform is one of the levers, which can be used to ensure that every school is 
equipped to provide a high quality education to every student.  We contend that the development and 
implementation of effective education policy that aligns with education reform goals is one way to 
increase achievement for all students. 
Reforming chronically under-performing schools has been identified as one of the nation's top 
priorities. In a May 2009 policy speech, Arne Duncan, U.S. Secretary of Education, articulated his 
                                                       
1 This chapter was jointly written by the authors listed and reflects the team approach of this project: 
Jamie Chisum, Anna Cross, and Jill Geiser.  
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“turnaround” policy initiative and his intent to aggressively move to improve 5000 under-performing 
schools over five years. In School Year (SY) 2010-2011, the federal government allocated 14.3 billion 
dollars via state grants and allocations dedicated to school improvement. Reforming schools has 
required not only a significant investment of tax dollars but has also served as a lightning rod for issues 
of accountability and equity for all underserved students.  The successful implementation of education 
reform policies can significantly impact student lives. Yet implementing education reform policy is 
neither a simple nor linear process. 
Some researchers argue that school reform policy has failed to produce any significant change 
despite the fact that a tremendous number of reform efforts have been attempted (Fullan, 1991; Hess, 
1999; Murphy, 2010).  Others argue that successful implementation of systemic reform may be affected 
by the complexity of the policy implementation, the politics of the policy adoption, how the policy 
problem is framed and even the language and symbols used to communicate the intent of the policy 
 (Hess, 1999; Honig, 2006; Malen, 2006; McLaughlin, 2006; Hill, 2006 ). The importance of policy and 
its implementation is the common thread that links researchers and ultimately practitioners in the field 
who are held accountable for decreasing gaps in student achievement. Understanding and interpreting 
policies and their intended meaning, what we will define as “sense-making,” can influence the success 
or failure of reform initiatives (Honig, 2006; Weick, 1995). 
In this state under study, the urgency of understanding how to make sense of and effectively 
implement reform policies has immediate and real time implications for educators, communities and 
students. In 2009 the United States Congress passed the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 
which re-authorized funding for the School Improvement Grants (SIG) program, outlining specific 
requirements for chronically underperforming schools. In January 2010, aligning state law to federal 
regulations, this state passed legislation that outlines the steps and timeline required to raise the 
performance of chronically under-performing schools, within a 3-year period. These chronically 
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underperforming schools are now known as “turnaround schools.” The overall goal of this policy is to 
raise the level of school effectiveness so that all students in the school become well prepared for the next 
level of education. With a three-year window in which schools must show significant progress in student 
achievement or risk further corrective action, multiple implementer groups including administrators, 
community members, teachers and parents each have a significant role to play in developing and 
implementing plans to increase student achievement. 
Educators are called upon regularly to implement federal and locally-designed policies and are 
then held accountable for demonstrating that the implementation of the policy has yielded positive 
results. Our assumption is that the implementation of any policy should be aligned with its goals as 
much as possible and that implementation acts as a bridge between realizing the original intent of the 
policy and the policy itself. We acknowledge that the implementation of any policy, particularly school 
reform policy, is a complex and multi-layered endeavor.  Therefore, it is critical to understand how 
reform policy is being implemented and whether there are forces that influence the implementation and 
realization of the original goals. In the case of turnaround policy, where implementers’ actions are 
expected to lead to improved outcomes for students in order to meet the intent of the policy, how they 
understand what they are being asked to do can make all the difference. With this, we turn to the concept 
of sense-making. 
Sense-making considers how implementers interpret such policy to better understand what leads 
to implementation decisions. For example, if implementers do not deeply understand or make sense of 
the policies that are intended to guide the turnaround process, they may misinterpret the policy goals or 
they might not understand how it relates to their day-to-day work. They may dismiss it entirely because 
it does not have an obvious practical application, or worse, they may implement it ineffectively. The 
chances, therefore, of successful implementation are greatly reduced. If those policies are intended to 
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increase student achievement and the policy is sabotaged, ignored, or misinterpreted, student access to 
an equitable and high quality education may be compromised. 
While this research focuses specifically on turnaround policy, it may have broader implications 
about the role of sense-making in the process of turning around a school or an entire local education 
agency. This research may unearth insights about how implementer sense-making about policy can lead 
to school improvement. It may also identify areas of tension or confusion for implementers as they begin 
to make sense of the policies, and those outside factors that influence their understanding and the 
importance of who and how policy is communicated. It may also be possible to determine the amount of 
time and resources each implementer group takes to gain a full understanding of the policy. Sense-
making could influence each implementer's view of their own ability to engage in the turnaround 
process and may shape the decisions they make when faced with the task of turning around a school. It 
may also affect how the policy translates into the turnaround plan, which outlines specific steps to 
inform the work of turning around a school.  This study examined the impact of sense-making on policy 
implementation by focusing on the following research questions: 
1. How do various implementers’ (superintendent/central office, building leaders,       
 teachers, school board members) make sense of turnaround policy? 
2. How does this sense-making influence policy implementation? 
3. What factors influence sense-making? 
In this single case study, we explored how different implementers in a designated Level D 
district make sense of turnaround policy. We begin by presenting an overview of the current legislation 
and the process by which schools are designated underperforming. The research literature on the 
characteristics of chronically underperforming schools and effective practices for turnaround school 
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improvement is discussed (Fullan, 2006; Leithwood, 1994), and we review the current literature on 
policy implementation and why we chose to view policy implementation through a theoretical frame that 
builds upon sense-making as a research construct (Weick, 1995). A number of internal and external 
factors that have been identified through the literature and how they might affect policy sense-making 
are outlined (Honig, 2006; Malen, 2006; Datnow, 2006). Finally, we present a graphic synthesis of the 
theoretical frame, which formed the basis for our study followed by a description of the research design 
and methodology. Four individual studies were conducted that each focused on the unique aspects of the 
sense-making process in targeted implementer groups: school board members, superintendent/central 
office, building leaders, and teachers. 
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Chapter Two: Review of the Literature2 
Federal and State Regulations and Policies 
Federal policy setting the stage. Recent federal and state regulations outline detailed 
requirements about what schools need to do to raise their level of performance. In January of 2002, the 
U.S. Congress approved “An Act to close the achievement gap with accountability, flexibility, and 
choice, so that no child is left behind,” colloquially referred to as No Child Left Behind (NCLB). The 
elongated legislative title makes clear that the goal of the federal policy is to close the achievement gap. 
The law requires a number of actions from state education agencies (SEAs) and school districts, 
including hiring highly qualified educators, notifying parents on the quality of their child’s education, 
and requiring states to adopt challenging academic standards for all students. Perhaps the most important 
part of the legislation is the requirement that all schools and districts make Adequate Yearly Progress 
(AYP), which is the minimum threshold for improvement schools are required to meet each year. A 
school that does not achieve AYP for two consecutive years faces the threat of corrective action. The 
advent of NCLB brought attention to measures of school effectiveness and requirements placed upon 
schools to perform incrementally or face consequences (Ravitch, 2010). 
Analysis of state turnaround policy. With federal policy as a backdrop, legislation enacted in 
early 2010 was this state’s interpretation of the NCLB goal to narrow the achievement gap. The 2010 
law addressed chronically underperforming schools by requiring the state education agency (SEA) to 
designate or level schools within the framework for district accountability and assistance according to 
student academic performance.[1] Designation of level includes a range of factors, such as exclusion and 
drop-out rate, but it is based primarily on student performance on the state assessment. Designation 
comes out of a compilation of data, including the aggregate performance of the school along with the 
                                                       
2 This chapter was jointly written by the authors listed and reflects the team approach of this project: 
Jamie Chisum, Anna Cross, and Jill Geiser.  
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performance of subgroups identified by race and ethnicity (e.g. African American, Hispanic, etc.), 
learning profile (e.g. students with disabilities, English language learners, etc.) and income levels (e.g. 
low-income). This is notable because, similar to NCLB, disaggregating the data forces schools to 
consider the performance of all its students by highlighting how each subgroup is doing academically. 
Once the data is compiled, the state designates schools level C and D based on where they fall relative to 
the other schools in their grade level span. The lowest 20 percent of schools in a grade level span are 
classified as level C. A subset of those schools, not more than 4 percent, is deemed eligible for level D 
status. These are chronically underperforming schools, informally referred to as “turnaround schools.” It 
is this level D designation that triggers the turnaround process that is outlined in the policy. The 
turnaround requirements also apply to schools designated level F, and a key element of turnaround for 
these schools is state takeover. This leveling system is used to determine where state assistance and 
intervention is most needed. 
The process that school districts must undergo upon level D designation, as outlined in the 
turnaround legislation, includes a series of steps to develop a turnaround plan. This process begins with 
a local stakeholder group, comprised of members in and outside the school, which convenes to develop 
recommendations for a turnaround plan that is submitted to the superintendent. This part of the policy 
indicates that the state considers that the community has a role in the turnaround process. However, the 
policy does not require that stakeholder groups participate in the turnaround process beyond the initial 
phase of making recommendations. Once recommendations are submitted, the superintendent is 
responsible for the actual development of the turnaround plan and its implementation. The policy 
appears to emphasize the role of educators in the work of implementing the turnaround plan and does 
not require community involvement in the implementation stage. 
In addition to outlining the process, the legislation dictates specific areas that need to be 
addressed in the plan. These include achievement gaps, alternative English language learner programs, 
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financial planning, social service and health needs, child welfare services and law enforcement, and 
workforce development services. The plan must also include measurable annual goals using a range of 
data points such as the state assessment system (SAS), student promotion, graduation, student 
attendance, student discipline, and family engagement. These requirements reflect a view that there are a 
range of factors that impact student learning beyond what happens in the classroom. The policy requires 
the school to pay attention to other areas of social and emotional health as well as the relationship 
between the school and students’ families. Schools are also compelled to look at different data points to 
gain a holistic view of student performance, which is not only about performance on state assessments. 
Finally, there are optional components of the plan. These include, but are not limited to, 
reallocation of the budget, expanded school day or year, alteration of the curriculum, job-embedded 
professional development, and limiting or changing school district policy. There are other optional 
elements that may be subject to collective bargaining, one example of which is requiring all staff to 
reapply for employment. These elements allow for some flexibility with school structures that are often 
thought of as inflexible. For example, little flexibility is typically seen with budget and scheduling. 
These tend to be fixed processes and structures. Yet, this policy acknowledges that chronically 
underperforming schools may need to have the leeway to adjust school time and budgets in order to 
reach turnaround goals. Similarly, the policy opens the door for districts to engage in collective 
bargaining on areas that are viewed as critical to turnaround success, but that need to be agreed upon 
with the local teachers union. 
State legislation outlines the turnaround process that underperforming schools must undergo with 
the aim to demonstrate higher student achievement within a three-year period through the 
implementation of a turnaround plan. This is aligned with federal funding regulation that imposes 
requirements on school districts in order to qualify for School Improvement Grants (SIG) and Race to 
the Top (RTTT) funding. According to that regulation, schools and districts need to turn around within 2 
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to 3 years, as measured by student achievement data. A key requirement is that schools identified, as 
“turnaround” must implement one of the turnaround models if they want to be considered for a school 
improvement grant. These models are labeled turnaround, restart, school closure, and transformation 
(Race to the Top Fund, 2009, p. 59763). When the turnaround plan is developed and the school 
improvement grants application is submitted, a turnaround model is chosen. The policy or grant 
requirements do not state who is responsible for choosing the model. However, since the superintendent 
is responsible for the development of the plan, as noted earlier, it would stand to reason that the 
superintendent would likely be a primary voice in the selection of the model. What is notable about 
these models is that they all require shifts in staffing, whether that is removal of school leadership and/or 
part of the teaching staff. While these models are not mandated interventions of the legislation, they are 
prioritized through the school improvement grant requirements in that they are tied to funding and are 
not a requirement of the turnaround policy itself. Although this study is not necessarily looking at the 
role of the model, we acknowledge that implementers’ perception of the policy and corresponding 
turnaround work may be influenced by the requirements of the selected model. 
The turnaround policy in the state we studied contains a range of elements that are intended to 
facilitate successful turnaround of level D and F designated schools. Although the policy does not 
explicitly articulate the practices educators need to exercise to raise academic performance of their 
students, its elements suggest that the policy operates on certain assumptions about what conditions 
would help to support turnaround efforts. Whether that is flexibility in structures, attention to a range of 
factors in learning, or community involvement, the policy reflects a view that turnaround schools can 
improve when these elements are addressed. Furthermore, although the policy does not contain language 
around specific turnaround models to use, the state prioritizes the use of the models by attaching it to the 
funding that is available to support turnaround efforts. This is important because the turnaround models 
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involve shifts of staffing that could impact how the educators in and around the school view the 
turnaround work. 
Understanding Turnaround Schools 
The turnaround policy has a specific view of a turnaround school a chronically underperforming 
school as measured by student achievement performance data. Yet, those data points do not reflect the 
challenging conditions that surround chronically underperforming schools. In order to fully understand 
turnaround schools, we look beyond the leveling of schools that emerges from low performance on state 
assessments to the conditions of those schools and their communities. Chronically underperforming 
schools share many of the same challenging conditions regardless of whether or not they are labeled a 
“turnaround school” via the policy. Therefore, we look to the broad range of literature which examines 
conditions in schools that are considered underperforming, challenging, and/or high-need in order to 
fully grasp the nature of the work that is involved in turning them around. 
One condition that appears to be common in chronically underperforming schools is poverty. 
The literature reveals that the low socioeconomic status of the school’s population is often identified as a 
condition of a low-performing school (Duke, Tucker, Belcher, Crews, Harrison-Coleman & Higgins, 
2005; Murphy & Meyers, 2008). High levels of poverty often increase the level of stress on a school 
resulting in a need to provide more services for students (Corallo & McDonald, 2001). In an opinion 
article in the New York Times, Reardon (2013) emphasizes the central role of social and economic status 
in the success of students in school. He notes in particular that while small gains have been made in 
closing the achievement gap between racial groups, there continues to be a gap between students of 
different socioeconomic status, with students living in poverty persistently performing well behind those 
of their more affluent peers. This means that schools serving high poverty communities often face the 
challenge of raising the academic performance of their low-income students. 
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Although the home environment of children living in poverty influences their school 
performance, the low achievement of poor children is not due solely to family background. Their school 
experience also plays a critical role in their academic progress (Gezi, 1990). A number of areas that 
impact student achievement are associated with low-performing schools. Poor teacher quality (Duke et 
al., 2005; Murphy & Meyers, 2008), high teacher turnover (Corallo & McDonald, 2001; Murphy & 
Meyers, 2008) and ineffective leadership (Murphy & Meyers, 2008) are all associated with a school’s 
inability to effectively show high student achievement. Other school conditions include a lack of 
teamwork, curriculum that is not aligned, and discipline issues (Duke et al., 2005). Educator practices 
and beliefs also play a role in low student achievement. Blaming students for failure, which often stems 
from low morale (Murphy & Meyers, 2008) and low expectations of students (Corallo & McDonald, 
2001), is typically found in underperforming schools. From their findings of a study of the Virginia 
School Turnaround Specialist Program (VSTSP), which examined the practices of ten successful 
turnaround leaders, Duke et al. (2005) echo these low expectations by describing the conditions of a 
dysfunctional culture in which educators assume a punitive and reactionary attitude towards students 
displaying a lack of achievement. Low parent involvement is also commonly found in underperforming 
schools where communication and collaboration between school and home is minimal and weak 
(Clubine, Knight, Schneider, & Smith, 2001). This literature illustrates how turnaround schools operate 
in challenging contexts. Rather than view these conditions as barriers to school improvement, we feel 
they need to be taken into account when turning around chronically underperforming schools. 
We look to these descriptions of chronically underperforming schools to understand the kinds of 
conditions that may exist in current turnaround schools designated under current state and Federal 
legislation. These are schools with weak school structures and practices in communities with high 
poverty rates. Although all the conditions described above might not apply to all schools labeled a 
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“turnaround school,” they are common enough to illustrate some of the challenging conditions that 
educators face when embarking on the work of turning around underperforming schools. 
Review of Research on Improving Chronically Underperforming Schools 
Given this characterization of turnaround schools as schools with challenging conditions, we 
examine the research that highlights the practices that have been successful in improving chronically 
underperforming schools. Because research on practices for school turnaround in response to policy 
mandates is lacking, this review is derived from a broad range of research studies of effective practices 
in underperforming schools, many of which may not necessarily have implemented specific policy 
requirements for school improvement. It is our belief that the findings from these research studies could 
aid our understanding of the kinds of practices that educators might draw on when implementing 
turnaround policy. If the goal of the policy is to raise student achievement and to close the achievement 
gap, what educators do to meet those ends is paramount, and research on effective practices can 
potentially inform how they approach the work. These practices have been examined through a variety 
of lenses, including motivation, professional development, development of teacher leaders, vision and 
goal-setting, data, instructional time and programming, and collaboration. 
Motivation. One of these lenses is the role of motivation in the process of change. Albert 
Bandura (1994) defines motivation as the “activation to action.” He argues that people are able to 
remain motivated in stressful situations when they believe they have self-efficacy and the ability to 
overcome their stressors. What school leaders do can influence how educators motivate themselves to do 
turnaround work. Leaders have to instill hope and confidence in the teachers in order for the work of a 
turnaround to even be attempted (Murphy & Meyers, 2008). There is a human element to turning around 
schools and therefore the emotional impact of the reform efforts on teachers must be considered in order 
for the changes to be successful. The school leader must take into account how it feels for people to go 
through change in such a stressful environment (Evans, 1996; Norman, 2010). Motivation is particularly 
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important in light of policy requirements that are imposed on schools from the state. On the one hand, 
they might contribute to the stress that educators feel. On the other hand, mandates that threaten the 
elimination of jobs, the closing of schools, and even the public shaming associated with turnaround 
schools can serve a purpose (Duke, Tucker, Salmonowicz, Levy & Saunders, 2008). The threat of loss 
of employment and school closure serve to introduce a crisis into the turnaround school, particularly if 
the teachers there did not feel it already. This is akin to accountability pressure that comes into play 
when achievement targets must be met in order to show improvement. It is helpful to leverage this 
accountability pressure to compel educators to focus on their performance (Jacobson, Johnson, Ylimaki, 
& Giles, 2005; Fullan, 2006). Turnaround work can be fostered by the school leadership, or it can be 
motivated by policy mandates with consequences for noncompliance. Regardless of the motivation, 
educators’ beliefs about their ability to create sustainable improvement in student achievement are key 
to turning around an underperforming school. 
Vision and goal setting.  Perhaps the practice most frequently cited for raising school 
performance centers on vision and mission. Successful leaders in low-performing schools drive the work 
at hand by communicating and maintaining a highly focused vision and mission that is about student 
learning (Clubine, et al., 2001; Duke, 2006; Gezi, 1990; Jacobson, et al., 2005; Leithwood, Harris & 
Strauss, 2010; Murphy, 2010; Murphy & Meyers, 2008; Picucci, Brownson, Kahlert, & Sobel, 2002; 
Potter, Reynolds, & Chapman, 2002; Salmonowicz, 2009; Duke et al., 2005). While the literature has 
examined this feature in a variety of contexts, it is the one that is primarily noted as having a significant 
impact on school improvement success. Distinguishing between strategies for short-term versus long-
term gains, Corallo and McDonald (2001) note that developing a common vision and mission is one that 
would result in long-term gains. Gezi (1990) articulates this critical role of vision when he says, 
“Leadership seems to infuse the school not only with the vision but with the positive climate, 
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communication and support that are essential ingredients of a sense of ownership, enthusiasm, 
commitment and pride in achievement” (p. 9). 
Similar to establishing a vision, goal setting has a significant role in the work of turning around 
underperforming schools. Establishing clear goals and priorities is an essential component of raising the 
level of performance for any underperforming school (Anderson et al., 1999; Gezi, 1990; Leithwood et 
al., 2010; Murphy, 2010; Stein, 2012) with an emphasis on the use of targets to benchmark progress 
towards goals (Potter et al., 2002). This points to the importance of objectives and targets in outlining 
the improvement goals of the school. Research points to the importance of having an overall vision of 
performance for the school along with specific goals. 
Data. Working in tandem with goal setting is the use of data. Some of the research notes the 
value of analyzing student achievement data to guide instruction in low performing schools (Clubine et 
al., 2001; Corallo & McDonald, 2001; Duke et al., 2005; Stein, 2012). Leithwood et al. (2010) claim 
that the leadership practices most associated with successful school turnaround include monitoring of 
student learning and overall school progress. They write, “School and district leaders constantly monitor 
evidence about the learning of students and the efforts of staff to improve such learning, continuously 
adjusting their own decisions and actions in response to this evidence” (p. 159). Indeed, turnaround 
schools need to engage in a continual process of self-analysis in order to monitor progress and determine 
areas that persistently lag (Murphy & Meyers, 2008). This reflects how data should be used to ensure 
progress towards goals already set, not just in individual classrooms, but also school wide, all of which 
embodies the process of measuring accountability. The literature illustrates that there is a strong link 
between goal setting and using data to measure progress for leaders in underperforming schools and that 
using data has a key role in school improvement. 
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Building capacity. Another key component to improving chronically underperforming schools 
is in the area of capacity building. The work of M. Bruce King and Kate Bouchard (2011) on building 
organizational capacity in schools defines capacity as the “collective power of a faculty to strengthen 
student performance throughout their school” (p. 654). Richard Elmore (2004) addresses the role of 
professional development in bridging the gap between performance and human capacity. An expert on 
the modern school reform movement, Elmore argues for a more robust and targeted professional 
development plan in schools that values the idea of “reciprocity of accountability,” which asserts that 
teachers need to be provided with additional capacity if schools expect them to perform different tasks 
or familiar tasks at a higher level. Indeed, professional development is a common means used to increase 
staff skills and knowledge to improve their individual and collective performance. Newmann, King, and 
Young (2000) further claim that schools that used a comprehensive approach to professional 
development were more likely to focus on the long-term consistency, improving teacher knowledge over 
time, thereby building capacity. They add that professional development for principals must ensure they 
understand the importance of building capacity. 
Bringing in external resources is one way to help build capacity. Due to the difficulty of 
developing capacity in low performing schools, King and Bouchard (2011) provide insight they gained 
from the Wisconsin Idea Leadership Academy (WILA), a hybrid program that combines the resources 
of a university school of education, the state education department, a mid-size urban district, and six 
schools. They note that the success of the WILA model is that it provides leadership coaching for school 
leadership teams, instructional coaching for teachers, cross-lateral networks for sharing of best practices 
between schools, and alignment between WILA coaches and state liaisons. School-university 
partnerships are key external resources as noted by Vernon-Dotson and Floyd (2012) who found in their 
research of three K-12 school partnerships with local universities that external technical assistance 
provided by universities to teacher teams can build capacity in schools. Consistent with past school 
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reform movements, the work of school districts with turnaround schools is to find external resources and 
service providers to help build capacity in schools engaged in the current turnaround experiment (Fullan, 
2006; Zavadsky, 2012). Given the complexity of improving student achievement in turnaround schools 
providing quality professional development for teachers is critical to equipping them for the work of 
school turnaround. 
Teacher leaders. Another aspect that is addressed in the literature is the importance of sustained 
improvement and not just a temporary fix for underperforming schools. One way this improvement is 
sustained is through the identification and development of teacher leaders who will commit to 
continuing the work over time to realize student achievement gains. In their research on teacher 
leadership in the UK, Muijs and Harris (2006) emphasized that being a teacher leader was not limited to 
leading a department or team, but instead entailed having any kind of responsibility for making 
improvements. They found that teacher leadership was a significant factor in school improvement as it 
increased teacher professional learning because they were able to learn amongst their peers. In fact, 
teacher leadership is tied to capacity building as noted by Dinham and Crowther (2011) whose research 
on building sustainable capacity in schools found that the distributed leadership model and the 
relationship between principals and teacher leaders is a key factor in building school capacity. Defining 
what teacher leadership looks like, Vernon-Dotson and Floyd (2012) claim that when teachers become 
immersed in tackling school challenges with a leadership lens, they are inspired to go above and beyond 
their job description and become participants in school-wide change. Furthermore, teachers who 
engaged in collaborative leadership experiences felt valued and were more likely to buy into school 
initiatives because they were a part of the decision-making process.  As a result, teachers were more 
likely to implement commonly developed professional development activities and put strategies into 
action. Spillane and Coldren (2011) further describe distributed leadership in their discussion about 
diagnosis and design for school improvement when they say that it is not only about the leadership 
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actions, but includes how people communicate in schools and how the situation influences their 
interactions.  By employing distributed leadership, turnaround schools can better maximize their 
resources by engaging faculty in deeper and more meaningful ways that will help sustain the work. 
Collaboration and teamwork. Collaboration and teamwork are also areas that research has 
shown to contribute to successful school improvement. Some studies have found that relationship 
building coupled with collaboration between stakeholders is key to raising the level of performance of 
an underperforming school (Corallo & McDonald, 2001; Duke et al., 2005; Fullan, 2006; Harris, 2006; 
Mulford et al., 2008; Murphy & Meyers, 2008). Clubine et al. (2001) found that in successful 
turnaround schools, collaboration took several forms, including common team planning where teachers 
discussed student progress, curriculum, and instructional goals. Indeed, this collaboration has a 
particular role in school reform in that in successful school turnaround, there is a collective sense of 
responsibility for student improvement (Anderson et al., 1999). Yet, collaboration does not always 
naturally occur without guidance. In her examination of change efforts in schools with difficult contexts 
in England, Harris (2006) emphasizes the need for a leader to be open and honest as they build quality 
interpersonal relationships. This lays a critical foundation for teamwork and collaboration. In fact, 
empowerment and a sense of trust are a critical part of collaboration. Once these are infused into the 
organization, a collaborative environment can flourish (Fullan, 2006; Bryk & Schneider, 2002; Harris, 
2002). Educator collaboration can help educators to feel less isolated and more connected to a common 
goal of making gains in student learning. In the end, the value of collaboration is its role in supporting 
educators in the difficult work of school improvement. 
Instructional time and programming. Another significant part of improving chronically 
underperforming schools involves focusing on instructional time and examining instructional 
programming. Studying three high-poverty elementary schools, Jacobson et al. (2007) found that 
successful principals revamped structures, policies, and procedures where needed and refocused 
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conversations on how to improve student learning. While this applies to the operation of the school 
overall, what is suggested is that these structures are needed to support the instructional programming. 
Picucci et al. (2002), in their study of school turnaround, found that schools that showed rapid 
achievement gains helped to maintain instructional quality by reducing any distractions to teaching. This 
included strengthening student management systems in order to increase teachers’ focus on instruction 
and less on managing student behaviors. Leithwood et al. (2010) also discussed the need to eliminate 
distractions, but more in terms of buffering staff from “being pulled in directions incompatible with 
agreed-on organizational goals” (p. 162). With structures in place to support a focus on teaching and a 
reduction of distractions, the time for actual planning and delivery of instruction can be maximized. 
How the Literature Relates to This Study 
Literature on school improvement, particularly for challenging schools, outline specific 
leadership practices that, when implemented effectively, contribute to the success of school 
improvement. These practices include attending to staff motivation, building capacity, developing 
teacher leaders, setting a vision and goals, using data, maximizing instructional time and programming, 
and providing opportunities for collaboration. While literature has uncovered effective practices to raise 
school performance, most of the chronically underperforming schools in these research studies have not 
necessarily been responding to policy mandates of school turnaround. Indeed, new legislation now 
attempts to improve school performance by imposing general requirements around how turnaround work 
is to occur. However, the policy does not articulate the practices educators should use to implement it. 
That is, the general requirements are about the process of developing the turnaround plan and elements 
that must be included. It does not include language around how educators should approach the work of 
school turnaround in order to meet the turnaround goals of raising student achievement. That is left up to 
the educators to determine what practice would most likely be effective in raising student achievement. 
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That is where this body of research comes in. School leaders might turn to these research studies to 
understand what practice they should exercise in order to meet the turnaround goals. 
The research on practices that improve the performance of chronically underperforming schools 
is ample. Therefore, the purpose of this research is not to explore best practices for turning around 
underperforming schools. Rather, we aimed to unearth how turnaround work occurs as a response to 
policy mandates, in light of these proven effective practices. As discussed earlier, educators are 
responsible for implementing turnaround policy and the practices described above might inform how 
they do that, especially given a policy that does not require or even suggest specific practices. With a 
policy that does not suggest educational practices for implementers, and a body of research that reveals 
effective practices in turning around schools, what is missing is research that looks at what practices 
educators put in place to implement turnaround policy. In order to better understand how these 
implementation decisions are made, we turned to how educators interpreted and made sense of the 
policy itself. This may have a great impact on the implementation and ultimately on the success or 
failure of the policy. 
Theoretical Basis for the Study 
Policy Implementation. State legislation requires that turnaround plans lead to rapid academic 
achievement of students. The literature review of best practices outlines what is needed to turn around 
chronically underperforming schools and policy implementers may use these as guides to know which 
actions to take. Whereas the policy articulates the goal of higher student achievement, the literature 
answers the question of what to do to reach that outcome. 
The theoretical basis for this research first looks at policy implementation as a critical factor in 
whether or not practice is aligned with policy goals. Green (1983) provides a theoretical overview for 
the relationship between policy and practice through his discussion of excellence, equity, and equality. 
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He identifies the problem of determining whether the tools of public policy can impact practice, 
questioning the nature of public policy and its limitations. He claims that public policy addresses the 
common good and not the good of individuals, and further argues that the tools of policy are primarily 
aimed to minimize evil, rather than promote benefits. Green’s work is significant to our study because it 
points to the role of policy implementation in relation to changing practice. In turnaround schools 
changing practice is essential to improving student achievement. 
The field of policy implementation research formally emerged during the 1960s. Since then it 
has undergone three distinctive generations or waves of research (Honig, 2006). The first wave focused 
on what gets implemented. Early research studies looked at policies that were intended to achieve wide 
ranging societal goals. The second wave, during the 1970s, focused on what gets implemented over 
time, and included a growing recognition of the fact that policy, people and places mattered to 
implementation. During the 1980’s a third wave of research evolved which centered on concerns with 
what works and the field began to focus on “implementers’ agency as an important avenue for 
implementation research” (Honig, 2006, p. 9). 
Honig (2006) notes that past treatment of policy implementation in research relied on a 
distinction between “successful” policies, those that result in higher student achievement, and 
“implementable” policies, those where implementation closely resembles policy design. She further 
states that research needs to acknowledge that there is significant complexity involved in policy 
implementation and includes the interaction between policies, people and places, and the demands on 
implementers. The critical question is about, “what is implementable and what works for whom, where, 
when and why” (Honig, 2006, p. 2). Included in this complexity are the factors that have a role in what 
implementers do with policy and the actions they take, which may include their belief systems, 
background, knowledge, and the contexts that influence what they can and will do (Honig, 2006). The 
process that individuals or organizations engage in to create “understanding” when faced with complex, 
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dissonant or ambiguous circumstances leads to a more in-depth analysis of the theory base for this study. 
Here, sense-making may have a significant role in policy implementation in terms of how implementers 
understand the policy that dictates turnaround work. This research study looked at how well 
implementers’ understanding of policy support its execution and if there are influencing factors that 
impact the way in which implementers make sense of the policy. Understanding the impact of 
implementer sense-making is not only important and practical for school districts who are engaging in 
turnaround work in response to policy mandates, but it is also high stakes for the success of students 
currently attending chronically underperforming schools. 
Policy Sense-making 
Defining “understanding” requires a further analysis of a body of research which spans multiple 
disciplines and multiple interpretations. Prior researchers from the fields of organizational psychology, 
sociology, management science, social anthropology and more recently education policy implementation 
have defined this process as “sense-making.” Organizational psychologist Karl Weick (1995), a key 
contributor to the development of this theoretical frame, stated simply, “The concept of sense-making is 
well named because, literally it means the making of sense.” Weick (1995) further defined the concept 
by stating, “how they (individuals) construct what they construct, why and with what effects, are the 
central questions for people interested in sense-making” (p. 4). Weick (1995) grounds his version of 
sense-making in seven properties that he argues are most commonly found throughout the sense-making 
literature, including; 1) grounded identity construction; 2) retrospective; 3) enactive of sensible 
environments; 4) social; 5) ongoing;  6) focused on and by extracted cues; and 7) driven by plausibility 
rather than accuracy. He argues that each of the seven properties can be used to define various 
characteristics of sense-making. For example, sense-making begins with the sense-maker (grounded 
identity construction). An individual’s environment as well as their past experiences are used in sense-
making (retrospective).  Individuals can be active participants in constructing the environment they are 
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trying to make sense of (enactive of sensible environments). They can make sense of something either 
individually, or as part of a larger social group (social). The sense-making process has no beginning and 
no end (ongoing). It is an iterative process and can be influenced by the cues individuals chose to focus 
on in the environment around them (focused on and by extracted cues). Finally, sense-making is not 
about truth or getting it right. It is a about creating a story that is plausible and then continually refining 
it with more data and observations so that it can withstand criticism (driven by plausibility not 
accuracy). (Weick, Sutcliff, & Obstfled, 2005). 
In addition to Karl Weick, a number of other researchers have provided their own theories and 
interpretations of sense-making. Dervin (1998), whose research centers on communication and the 
design of communication systems, uses the sense-making frame to investigate the interconnectedness 
between knowledge management and sense-making. Dervin states, “One of the premises of sense-
making is that there is an inherent intertwined connection between how you look at a situation and what 
sense of it you are able to construct of it” (p. 11). 
The focus of this research was grounded in the field of education and policy implementation 
using sense-making as a frame. Weick and Dervin, among others, provide a broad contextual 
multidisciplinary research framework to understand sense-making; however, this research seeks to 
weave a historical understanding of sense-making with a more contemporary understanding of the 
factors that contribute to sense-making in the educational policy implementation context. More 
specifically, the research examined sense-making and turnaround policy through the eyes of multiple 
policy implementers. 
Contemporary implementation research builds on the work of previous decades but has expanded 
the field to include the study of three key dimensions in policy design: goals, targets and tools. Other 
researchers have then begun to offer additional theories such as the role of  “co-construction” in policy 
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implementation (Datnow, 2006), policy implementation and cognition (Spillane, Reiser & Gomez, 
2006), policy implementation as organizational learning (Honig, 2006), policy implementation as a 
political process (Malen, 2006), and the role of social capital in policy implementation (Smylie & Evans, 
2006), all contributing to an evolving definition of sense-making and its role in policy implementation. 
The concept of sense-making is essential to this study, as we hoped to gain insight into how policy 
implementers of the state turnaround legislation make sense of the policy, and what implications their 
sense-making might have on how they go about implementing the policy to reach policy goals. The 
sections below provide further detail about the various components of sense-making as identified in the 
literature. 
Construction and cognition. The frame begins with a look at how implementers receive 
education policy information and make sense of it in light of existing knowledge. Spillane, Reiser and 
Gomez, (2006) talk about sense-making in terms of a “reconstruction” of knowledge for the change 
implementer.  “What is paramount is not simply that implementing agents choose to respond to the 
policy but also what they understand themselves to be responding to” (Spillane et al., 2006, p. 49). 
 When an implementer encounters new research or policy, they combine it with their existing knowledge 
and experience to construct new knowledge. It is this interaction between old knowledge and new 
information where one creates an understanding of the policy. Relating to the effective practices 
described in the literature review above, the role of prior knowledge may be particularly pertinent. 
Educators typically have a knowledge base about what good practice looks like, including best practices 
around instruction and leadership. When they encounter policy that dictates certain ways to turn around 
a school, that prior knowledge would interact with the policy and inform how the implementer makes 
sense of the policy and the corresponding work. Spillane et al. (2006) further describe this as cognition. 
 “From a cognitive perspective, implementation hinges on whether and in what ways local implementing 
agents' understanding of policy demands impacts the extent to which they reinforce or alter their 
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practice” (p. 47).  Spillane et al. (2006) argue that understanding is only one discrete factor. How 
individuals view the world, the beliefs they hold and how their expectations influence their actions also 
contribute to their sense-making. They further argue that learning a new idea may not be sufficient in 
and of itself, particularly in the context of reform and restructuring. New ideas may be in danger of 
being modified or ignored if they are filtered through the same existing knowledge schemas that already 
exist. 
Spillane et al. (2006) offer a caveat about interpretation of policy given one’s preexisting level of 
expertise. If one’s understanding is limited to the superficial aspects of the policy or embodies only a 
rudimentary level of expertise in complex policy implementation, they may miss the core concepts of 
the policy and focus entirely on what is similar to their previous experience, leading to a familiar but 
ultimately shallow interpretation. The expertise one brings to their interpretation of a given policy 
determines their ability to identify key elements of the policy. Because implementation decisions are 
influenced by this sense-making, the interaction between expertise and policy sense-making makes a 
difference in how policy is implemented at the ground level (Spillane et al., 2006). 
Datnow (2006) argues that this knowledge is also “co-constructed” with other members of the 
policy chain. Co-construction relies on multi-directionality, since over time the different implementers 
influence each other during the interactions that take place. While policy implementation tends to 
assume a linear process, in reality, implementation is not so much a linear process but one that takes on 
varying directions. It is the interactions between implementers that lead to these various directions and 
help implementers construct an understanding of the policy. Here, the role of communication is salient 
in that it is through communication that people begin to make sense of what they need to do to 
implement the policy. 
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Another critical part of Datnow’s (2006) co-construction is that one’s understanding of policy is 
not divorced from the context in which they are implementing policy. She puts forth a concept of a 
relational sense of context, explaining that, “by this we mean that people’s actions cannot be understood 
apart from the setting in which they are situated, and reciprocally, the setting cannot be understood 
without understanding the actions of the people within it” (p. 107). When people implement policy, their 
thinking is shaped by the situation or environment that surrounds them, which in turn influences the 
actions they take to implement policy. Important to consider when examining policy implementation in 
education, is how educators make sense of the policy, in the case of this research, turnaround policy, 
given their existing knowledge and their context. 
Political effect. Malen (2006) provides a framework and case study for assessing the role of 
politics on education policy implementation. She argues that implementation is a crucial point in the 
policy-making process because it is the point where it actually impacts various stakeholders. According 
to Malen (2006), there are “political exchanges” that occur during implementation that regulate the 
various interests of stakeholders “because they are value-laden issues that cannot be resolved solely 
through the acquisition of empirical evidence or the application of technical expertise” (Malen, 2006, p. 
83). Relationships amongst various policy implementation actors, although they may or may not 
acknowledge one another, are forged and impact the degree to which policy is implemented with 
fidelity, resisted, or subverted. Furthermore, because education policies are deeply value-laden and may 
require reallocation of resources or question utilization of time, reaching resolution is extremely 
difficult. The author’s framework draws extensively on the idea of “political games” as a metaphor as 
originally proposed by Bardach’s (1977) groundbreaking research. Here Bardach outlined a process 
various policy implementers go through in order to achieve specific policy goals. 
The key components of the educational policy implementation political frame include an analysis 
of the varied interests of actors and their capacity to influence implementation based on policy currency, 
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and the influence of social and institutional context on implementation.  Malen (2006) explains that 
policy implementation literature overwhelmingly identifies “policy dilution” as a major theme. In this 
instance, the varied interests of implementers erode social reform. The author further adds: 
Even at the local level, deeply rooted traditions of incremental decision making and broadly held 
views about occupational survival may prompt district officials to select and enact policies that 
“attract...notice” and enhance legitimacy, but do not alter fundamentally, the orientations and operations 
of the school system (Malen, 2006, p. 97). 
For Malen, the political frame can provide unique insights into policy implementation and, as the 
above quotation indicates, various political phenomena and “political games” played by policy 
implementers can greatly influence policy outcomes. The insights are key in understanding the interface 
between actor’s interests and resources, and policy initiatives, premises and outcomes. 
Social capital. Smylie and Evans (2006) provide insight on the impact social capital can have on 
education policy implementation. While social capital is a broad concept, used in various disciplines and 
contexts, for the purposes of this study we adopt the definition of social capital as developed by Smylie 
and Evans. The authors define social capital an “intangible and abstract resource...[that can act as an 
agent] to promote certain behaviors within social structures and it can be accumulated and drawn on to 
achieve otherwise hard to attain objectives.” (Smylie & Evans, 2006, p. 189). For Smylie and Evans, 
social capital contains three major components, including “social trust, channels of communication, and 
norms, expectations, and sanctions” (p. 189-190). Trust can determine the extent to which individuals in 
organization want to collaborate with one another, based on their confidence in their colleagues, in order 
to achieve policy goals. The flow of communication is essential as successfully reaching any goal 
requires access to new information and furthermore requires individuals to communicate with one 
another. Finally, norms, expectations and sanctions can influence the extent to which individuals are 
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praised or reprimanded for their actions based on intangible predetermined community standards. 
Within these confines, Smylie and Evans argue that social capital can greatly impact policy 
implementation and the attainment of policy goals. 
At the onset the authors note that implementation research has long known that the will and 
capacity of implementers and how they navigate the local context could negatively impact policy 
outcomes (p. 189). The authors argue that social capital can have a positive or negative impact on 
implementation. “Social capital is not social interaction per se. Social capital is ‘produced’ through 
social interaction” (p. 189).  Furthermore, social capital can be divided into two components, “trust” and 
“channels of communication.” These components have implications on policy implementation because 
of the open or closed nature of relationships based on trust can impact whether or not an idea, program, 
or initiative will thrive. 
The authors note that while strong social capital can be key to policy implementation, it can also 
act as a conserving force, where entrenched philosophies developed through shared norms and 
experiences can impede policy implementation (Smylie & Evans, 2006). They reviewed research 
conducted by the Chicago Annenberg Research Institute. The Chicago Annenberg Challenge was a five-
year study of decentralized reform initiatives involving efforts between schools and external partners. 
Smylie and Evans (2006) note that this study was not 37 necessarily on social capital itself, but that it 
can be used as a window through which to understand the role of social capital in the implementation of 
initiatives. Based on the outcomes of the Annenberg Challenge, they concluded that both the initial level 
of social resources and the nature of and ability to sustain relationships with external partners were two 
determining factors indicating strong social capital, which supported implementation. Schools that 
began with a stronger base of social resources valued teacher collaboration and had an orientation 
toward trust, innovation, and owning student success or failure. Some of the external partners in the 
Annenberg Challenge schools found it difficult to sustain relationships and communicate effectively 
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with teachers in some schools, which led to groups of teachers using social capital to inhibit the success 
of reform efforts. The authors conclude their article by arguing that social capital is something that 
researchers should continue to pay attention to, as it can aid or inhibit the success of policy 
implementation. 
The above-mentioned components of policy sense-making each have a unique impact on how 
policy is implemented throughout school districts. Whether at the level of the school board, 
superintendent/central office, principal and leadership teams, or amongst school faculty, construction 
and cognition, the impact of politics, and the impact of social capital can all substantially affect policy 
outcomes. Understanding this is important and helpful for district and school leaders since time and 
resources are limited. The stakes are high and the impact of not carefully considering how all of these 
elements work together and how they shape policy implementation could be a determining factor in the 
attainment of policy goals. This could mean that chronically underperforming schools fail to improve 
within the three-year timeframe as outlined within the State Legislation (2010). Moreover, as we 
outlined in the introduction to this study, for communities and cities that are relying on school and 
district leaders to produce educated and productive graduates, failure to turnaround schools has a large 
impact society. Therefore this study aimed to gain insight into what it takes to “get it right,” which is an 
essential concern of this state’s school and district leaders with Level D schools. 
 
Theoretical Frame Synthesis 
The theory frames outlined above are represented in the graphic below. 
Figure 1.1 Theoretical Framework for how sense-making impacts Turnaround Policy implementation. 
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The turnaround policy acts as the trigger that begins the process that may ultimately lead to the 
goal, improved student achievement. As the policy reaches the policy implementers, a number of factors 
influence how the implementers make sense of the policy. As outlined by Honig (2006), the 
implementers' beliefs, knowledge and perceptions of their own capacity to implement the policy come 
into play. This likely includes prior knowledge about effective practices to turn around underperforming 
schools. Karl Weick (1995) outlines the process policy implementers may go through in trying to 
understand a policy and maintains that this process is iterative. He argues that who, what, why, and a 
person’s past can impact their understanding of policy. Dervin (1998) explains the link between a 
subject’s understanding of a policy and their ability to construct meaning. Spillane et al. (2006) point out 
cognition is dependent upon one’s ability to understand a policy and alter their practice as a result. He 
and his colleagues argue that it's not enough to be able to grasp new ideas because learning new ideas 
using old schemas can be deleterious to success. Datnow (2006) argues that this knowledge is also “co-
constructed” amongst implementers who are responsible for the policy. She further adds that 
implementer actions cannot be divorced from their context, and consequently the context is better 
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understood by assessing the impact of implementer actions on the context. This means that the 
implementers actions continuously changes context and therefore context can be better understood 
through study of implementer cognition. Malen (2006) provides insight into the types of political 
exchanges that take place and the effect they might have on decisions around time and resource. Malen 
argues that actions and decisions can become high stakes and uses the concept of “political games” to 
describe the impact of politics on policy implementation. Smylie and Evans (2006) note that social 
capital has a significant impact on policy implementation. They add that social capital is not defined as 
simple human interaction, but instead intentional interactions between implementers.  In this context, 
social capital can be divided into two categories, trust and communication. Externally the context in 
which the implementers operate, the influence of politics, and social processes they engage in make 
sense of the policy. The perception that there may or may not be external capacity to successfully 
implement the policy all converge and influence the eventual sense-making the policy implementers 
make of the original policy. Their understanding guides how the policy will be implemented in the day-
to-day context of turnaround schools. Policy implementation then becomes an iterative process that is 
ongoing, constantly refined and modified by new knowledge, new emotions and new understanding or 
sense-making (Weick, 1995). 
Research Gap 
Ample literature exists around efforts to turn around underperforming schools. This includes a 
wide range of research studies that look at how schools are able to raise the level of performance of their 
students in challenging contexts. Studies have shown how certain practices contribute to successful 
school turnaround. Yet, not all of these studies look at turnaround in terms of policies that dictate the 
turnaround process. In this state the legislation mandates that schools designated as turnaround schools 
need to comply with specific requirements to raise student academic achievement. This informs 
turnaround work in ways that have not yet been addressed in the literature. A critical part of this 
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research is that turnaround policies dictate turnaround efforts to occur within a relatively short 
timeframe (e.g. 3 years). However, researchers’ descriptions of all the elements that go into making 
sense of any policy suggest this to be a complex and perhaps lengthy process.  This research study not 
only addressed the gap in the literature about making sense of turnaround policy and how it influences 
implementation, but also considered the fact that the policy only allows three years to turn around a 
school. The gap in turnaround research exists at the intersection of practices that are shown to turn 
around an underperforming school and turnaround policy implementation. 
Another body of literature looks at the role of policy sense-making in policy implementation. 
Focused on policy implementers, this sense-making includes internal or individual processes (e.g. 
reconstruction of knowledge) and external influences (e.g. co-construction and politics). Research 
studies have examined how sense-making has worked with specific policies. In these studies, 
researchers were able to get a glimpse into the sense-making process in the context of actual policy 
implementation. However, research on sense-making with this specific turnaround policy is lacking. 
This is a matter of practical and urgent importance to school districts across the state as all stakeholders 
within the school community are concerned with improving chronically underperforming schools. With 
the high stakes nature of this turnaround school reform effort, the way in which district leaders 
understand the legislation will significantly impact the educational success for thousands of students 
throughout the state. 
Successful policy implementation may be dependent upon understanding the policy at face value 
and district leaders ensuring that the political context, shared values, capacity, and colleague sense-
making do not negatively impact implementation. Getting it right could mean positive outcomes for 
students and schools that have chronically underperformed, which would ultimately lead to increased 
student achievement and a change in classification from level D to level C and beyond. The stakes are 
high as unsuccessful implementation could mean schools and districts become level F, and risk state 
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take over. More importantly, unsuccessful implementation results in inferior education, which is 
detrimental to individuals, families, the state, and the nation. 
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Chapter Three: Methodology3 
The Community Context 
The city, which is the site of this research study, is located in the Northeast and its history and 
development has followed a path similar to that of most beleaguered industrial mill towns—intense 
growth and dramatic decline followed by fits and starts at resurgence. Geography and the immediate 
access to both a port of entry and water power from nearby rivers made the community a desirable 
location for bringing in raw materials, manufacturing them into goods, and redistributing them out via 
the port to other parts of the country. At the height of its power, the city employed more than 30,000 
workers. Thousands of immigrants arrived during the boom period between 1865 and 1923, coming 
primarily from Ireland, England, Scotland and Italy as well as Canada, Portugal and the Azores. As each 
immigrant group arrived, they proudly claimed certain parts of the city as their own, most settling in 
triple decker units built by mill owners and usually under the spire of a Catholic church. Portuguese 
immigrants, settled in tight knit communities that allowed residents to maintain their language, culture 
and traditions. In 1920, the population of the community was 120,485, primarily of European descent. 
Not unlike many mill cities throughout the country, the city foresaw a bright and long future for its 
residents and its community. The city’s decline would be dramatic and difficult to reverse. It began with 
the Depression of the 1930s, followed by the closing of mills and manufacturing plants in the 1940s and 
1950s. An attempt at urban renewal in the 1960s and 1970s created housing and infrastructure but 
demolished some close-knit communities in the process. Globalization, economic hardship, rising 
unemployment, crime, drugs and failing schools plagued the city through the 1980s, 1990s and into the 
2000s. 
                                                       
3 This chapter was jointly written by the authors listed and reflects the team approach of this project: 
Jamie Chisum, Anna Cross, and Jill Geiser.  
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The city’s population has steadily declined from its peak in 1920 to 89,220. The vast majority 
(87 percent) continues to identify themselves as having European ancestry, but a growing percentage of 
the population (29.6 percent) report Latin America, Asia and Africa as their region of birth. Based on the 
2010 Census data, 26 percent of the foreign-born population entered the United States in 2000 or later. 
About 34.2 percent of the households speak a language other than English in the home, and 21.4 percent 
of the residents live below the poverty level, double the poverty level for the state. According to a recent 
study, the poverty rate for children under 18 is 33.3 percent, which means that one in every three 
children in the city is currently living in poverty. Many live as renters in multi-unit structures, remnants 
of the housing stock created for mill workers. In terms of educational attainment, 32.5 percent of the 
adults over the age of 25 do not hold a high school diploma, a mere 14.1 percent of the adults over 25 
hold a bachelors degree or higher. This is a city under stress, which has struggled to maintain its identity 
and its pride.  The school system is seen as a key ingredient to improve the quality of life for its 
residents and restore the economic future of the city. 
The LEA Context 
In recent years turning around the city has focused on turning around the public school system. 
The LEA has an enrollment of 10,138 students. Over the last ten years the demographics of the student 
population has changed both socio-economically and racially. This is significant in that the school 
system has had to respond to this rapidly shifting demographic as it has worked to turn around the 
schools. 
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Table 1: LEA Demographic Shifts from 2003 to 2013 
Population Category 2003 2013 
White 77.3% 63.3% 
Hispanic 9.0% 19.9% 
African American 8.1% 7.0% 
Native American 0.6% 0.3% 
Asian 5.1% 4.5% 
Low-Income 50.9% 77.9% 
English Language Learners 5.5% 7.1% 
Students w/ Disabilities 14.8% 22.4% 
 
In 2003 the student population was 77.3 percent white, 9 percent Hispanic, 5.1 percent Asian, 8.1 
percent African American, and .6 percent Native American. Since 2003, the Hispanic population has 
more than doubled to 19.9 percent, the white population has declined to 63.3 percent, and the percent of 
African American, Asian and Native American students has remained relatively constant. The 
percentages of students who are considered selected populations under state indicators has also changed 
over the years. The percentages of students who qualify for free and reduced lunch increased from 60.5 
in 2007 to 77.9 in 2013. Increases are also noted in the percentages of students whose first language is 
not English and of students with disabilities. In 2013, the state added a new category to its annual 
statistics, the percentage of students in the LEA who qualify as “high needs,” who constitute 81.5 
percent of the students who attend the public schools in this LEA. 
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Two other notable areas of demographics were the graduation and drop-out rates which exceed 
that of the state. Interestingly, the largest attrition rate between grades occurs at grade 8 with 32.9 
percent of the students choosing to leave the schools.  
Table 2: LEA and State 2012 4-Year Graduation and Drop-Out Rates 
 LEA  State  
Population Category % 
Graduated 
% Dropped 
Out 
% 
Graduated 
% Dropped 
Out 
All Students 69 17.9 84.7 6.9 
Male 61.5 23.1 81.8 8 
Female 76.8 12.5 87.7 5.7 
ELL 44.1 23.5 61.1 18.9 
Students w/ 
Disabilities 
35.7 34.3 68.6 12.8 
Low Income 64.2 20.6 72.4 13.2 
African American 70.1 14.9 73.4 11.3 
Asian 90.9 4.5 89.5 3.9 
Hispanic 60.8 25.5 65.5 18.1 
White 69.6 17 89.7 4.3 
 
This table shows the 4-year high school graduation rate to be 69 percent. The high school dropout rate at 
17.9 percent is almost double that of the state average of 6.9 percent. The largest groups to drop out of 
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high school are English Language Learners (ELL) students, Hispanic and Latino students, and students 
with disabilities. Males drop out of high schools at more than double the rate of females. These are 
challenging statistics as they reflect a school system that struggles to serve a diverse student population. 
Over the past several years, this LEA has been focused on turning around its underperforming 
schools. Schools have moved in and out of turnaround status, with some showing significant gains in 
student achievement and others not. 
Table 3: 2013 LEA Schools and Their Accountability and Assistance Levels 
School School Type Title I Status Accountability and Assistance 
Level 
School 1 Elementary Non-Title I 
School 
Level A 
School 2 Elementary Title I School Level C 
School 3 Elementary Title I School Level C 
School 4 Elementary Title I School Level C 
School 5 Elementary Title I School Insufficient data 
School 6 Elementary Title I School Level A 
School 7 Elementary Non-Title I 
School 
Level A 
School 8 Elementary Non-Title I 
School 
Level C 
School 9 Elementary Title I School Level D 
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School 10 Elementary-
Middle 
Title I School Level B 
School 11 Middle Title I School Level C 
School 12 
(School was closed 
spring 2013) 
Middle Title I School Level D 
School 13 Middle Non-Title I 
School 
Level C 
School 14 Middle Title I School Level A 
School 15 Middle Title I School Insufficient data 
School 16 High Title I School Insufficient data 
School 17 High Non-Title I 
School 
Level C 
 
There are total of 16 schools in the LEA (with one school that closed in spring 2013). One of the high 
schools listed here is one of the top ten largest high schools in the state with an enrollment of 2276. In 
addition, there are nine elementary schools, three middle schools, one pre-K through grade 7 school, one 
therapeutic high school, and one therapeutic middle school. The LEA is considered a level D system by 
the state, a designation that results from one or more schools in the LEA failing to meet student 
achievement goals relative to student performance on the state assessment system.  Presently, there are 
four level A schools, one level B school, seven level C schools and one level D school. 
State intervention under NCLB began in the LEA as far back as 2004 when two middle schools 
were the first in the state to be designated as “chronically underperforming” based on their state 
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assessment data. Over the next several years, the achievement levels of the schools were in flux, moving 
between periods of growth and decline. When the 2010 state turnaround legislation was passed, those 
two schools, along with a third, the pre-k through grade 7 school, received level D designation, which 
threw them into a rigorous turnaround process. Growth occurred in two of these schools over the three-
year turnaround process and both schools were exited out of turnaround status in 2013. Indeed, both 
schools showed such significant gains that one moved to level B and the other to level A. In the 
meantime, the third school that was originally designated a level D school in 2010, showed a decline in 
student achievement over the three year period. For that school, there was impending threat of level F 
designation, which would have meant state takeover. With that level F designation a possibility, the 
LEA decided to close that school in spring 2013 and transfer its staff and students to other schools in the 
system. While these schools were nearing the end of their turnaround process, another school was 
emerging on the horizon for turnaround status. That school was in level C when it declined to level D 
status in 2013. At the time of this research study, that school had just embarked on the turnaround 
process.  
Research Design 
A qualitative design was chosen for this study because this methodology is best used to address a 
research problem in which the variables may be unknown, the literature may be limited and the 
researcher may need to develop a deeper understanding of the central phenomenon by exploring the 
research questions with participants (Creswell, 2012). Qualitative methodology allowed an in-depth 
exploration into the research questions:  How do implementers’ (superintendent/central office, building 
leaders, teachers, school board members) make sense of state turnaround policy? How does this sense-
making influence policy implementation? What factors influence implementer sense-making? 
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Case Study Design 
Case study design was used to explore the sense-making of various stakeholders implementing 
the turnaround process as mandated by the state turnaround legislation.  Merriam (2009) notes, “the case 
study offers a means of investigating complex social units consisting of multiple variables of potential 
importance in understanding the phenomenon” (p. 50). Yin (2009) explains that the case study approach 
to research is used “...to understand a real-life phenomenon in depth, but such understanding 
encompassed important contextual conditions—because they were highly pertinent to your phenomenon 
of study...” (p. 18). Given the complexity of sense-making as outlined previously, the case study 
approach allowed the researchers to understand how implementation occurred in a specific LEA that 
was undergoing turnaround work as dictated by the policy. Yin (2009) discusses various applications of 
the case study research design, one of which is a description of a real-life intervention and its context. 
As noted in the literature review, efforts to improve chronically underperforming schools have been 
chronicled in many research studies. This research offers a unique view of the role of sense-making by 
looking at this process through the lens of the implementation of turnaround policy with the aim to 
improve school performance. In this case, the intervention was the turnaround policy and the context 
was the LEA where implementers were required to put that policy into action. Here, the context became 
an important part of this research and, given this, we looked to the case study approach as one which 
would produce information that would lead to a deeper understanding of turnaround policy 
implementation. 
Single case study. Having established the case study as the overall design, this study 
investigated the research questions through a single case study method. The research focused on one 
LEA, which was identified through the process described in the Unit of Analysis section below. Yin 
(2009) points out that single case studies may be representative cases, or “typical” cases, of a given 
phenomenon. As a single case study, this research examined the implementation of turnaround policy in 
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an LEA as representative of the process of implementation. We were interested in looking at these 
implementation questions in-depth in one LEA. A single case study allowed for a deeper understanding 
of how each stakeholder group made sense of the turnaround policy and how that sense-making 
influenced their decisions and actions around policy implementation. In addition, a single case study was 
more feasible for this study given limitations in access to turnaround LEA's and time allotted for data 
collection. 
Unit of analysis. Included in a single case study approach was the need to identify the unit of 
analysis as well as the theory development. Where the unit of analysis is defined by your “case,” the 
theory provides a potential explanation of the phenomenon that the researchers use to approach their 
data collection and analysis (Yin, 2009). This research examined how turnaround work was 
implemented according to the state turnaround legislation. This policy identifies turnaround schools 
through specific criteria and designates those schools as level D schools. Local education agencies 
(LEA) that have at least one of their schools designated as a level D school are then designated level D 
LEA's and are required to implement the turnaround policy. For this research, the unit of analysis was a 
specified level D LEA where the process of implementing turnaround policy was in process. 
Sampling 
There were two levels of sampling for this research study: LEA and implementer selection. 
LEA sampling. Because the unit of analysis was the LEA, the one selected for this study was a 
level D LEA that was in the process of implementing the turnaround policy. Therefore, purposeful 
sampling was used in order to intentionally select a site to learn about the central phenomenon of 
turnaround policy implementation (Creswell, 2012). At the time of selection, there were ten level D 
LEA’s in the state. Of the ten, two were eliminated due to researcher affiliation. Of the remaining eight, 
one level D LEA was chosen based on the following criteria: 
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1) Access to implementers in the LEA was available. 
2) The superintendent was willing to participate in and support the research. 
3) The LEA was in the process of implementing the turnaround policy in a level D school. 
4) The LEA had active participation in policy implementation by all four of the stakeholder groups 
identified in this study (superintendent/central office, school leadership, teachers, school board 
members). 
Participant sampling. Participants for interviews in this study were selected to provide data 
about the role of the implementers, which each of the researchers were researching in individual 
sections: superintendent/central office personnel, building leaders, teachers, and  school board members. 
(Interview methodology is discussed below in the data collection section.) Each of the individual studies 
had specific sampling approaches that were impacted by timing and logistics of data collection. In 
general, though, the participant sampling for this study included purposeful and snowball sampling. We 
went into data collection with a preference for random sampling because, as Creswell (2012) states, the 
benefit of random sampling is that those that participate are representative of the population under study. 
However, when we made initial contact with the LEA, we found that time constraints precluded our 
ability to use random sampling. We had limited time to conduct interviews and, therefore relied on 
purposeful and snowball sampling for the selection of interviewees. Purposeful sampling was used when 
certain implementers were chosen because their role gave them a specific perspective on turnaround 
implementation that might have been different from other implementers. Snowball sampling was used 
when educators in the LEA recommended implementers after data collection began. As Creswell (2012) 
notes, snowball sampling is often used when it is difficult to know at the outset of the study, which 
individuals should participate. In this study, it was difficult to know which implementers would be 
willing to participate and snowball sampling allowed the researchers to identify willing participants. 
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For the umbrella group study, purposeful sampling was used to identify the LEA, which the 
researchers did jointly. For each of the individual studies, participant sampling may have involved either 
purposeful or snowball sampling. These sampling approaches are further described in each of the 
individual studies. 
Data Collection 
A key part of data collection in this case study research involved the use of multiple sources of 
evidence. With multiple sources of data, triangulation can be applied, which in turn can bolster findings 
and lead to more convincing conclusions (Yin, 2009). For this case study research, evidence came from 
three sources of data: document analysis, interviews, and observations. 
Document analysis. The data collection methods began with document and video analysis. 
Creswell (2012) lauds the use of documents to provide valuable evidence in qualitative research. Yin 
(2009) echoes the benefit of documents in case studies, stating that they are unobtrusive in that they are 
not the result of the case study itself and that they contain exact details of an event. The document 
analysis in this research started with an analysis of the state turnaround legislation. The policy was 
outlined and dissected to frame the turnaround process that the LEA was implementing.  Further 
document analysis included some of the LEA’s own turnaround plans that were written in compliance 
with the policy as well as state monitoring documents. Historical documents, media reports, and LEA 
demographic and achievement data were included to help gain a deeper understanding of the context. 
Documents reviewed included meeting minutes of school board meetings. Because some of these 
minutes were in the form of a video recording, document review went beyond actual documents to 
include some review of recordings. Any document analysis that pertained to individual studies is also 
described in those sections. 
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Interviews. Interviews were conducted to understand implementers’ interpretation of the 
turnaround policy. According to Yin (2009), interviews help to provide insight into human affairs or 
behavioral events as well as the opinions and attitudes to explain such behavioral events. For this 
research, the behavioral event was the implementation of the policy and interviews aimed to understand 
those events and accompanying implementers’ attitudes and opinions. This allowed the researchers to 
analyze how implementer groups interpreted the policy and used that interpretation to inform their 
implementation decisions. 
This research study used semi-structured interviews. Patton (2002) discusses the various types of 
interviews, noting one structure where an interview guide may be used to provide guidance regarding 
the questions asked, while leaving room for probing. Interview guides provide the same basic lines of 
inquiry for all interviews; yet, interviewers may be spontaneous about how to word questions during the 
interview. A systematic approach for multiple interviews, the interview guide is a framework that 
outlines the questions to be asked, the sequence of questions and the questions to be explored further 
(Patton, 2002). An interview guide (See Appendix E) was used to allow us the flexibility to be more 
personal with our interviewees, which increased our likelihood of gathering valid data. For this research 
study, interviews were semi-structured, which focused on how subjects interpreted the policy and how 
that interpretation influenced how they implemented turnaround. 
Interviews were conducted by each of the researchers using the same interview process. We each 
conducted 6 to 10 interviews for each of our implementer groups, which lasted between 30 and 90 
minutes each. A total of 29 implementers were interviewed across the four groups—central office 
personnel, school board members, school leaders, and teachers. The interview process began with a 
consent form signed by the participant (See Appendix C). The interviews were then conducted using a 
protocol (See Appendices D and F). Interviews were recorded for participants who granted permission 
and then transcribed verbatim.  The research team was sensitive to the fact that the people working in 
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this turnaround LEA were in a potentially vulnerable situation, both professionally and personally, as 
there is often a stigma associated with working in a LEA with a level D designation. The consent form 
for participants in the study included language that allowed individuals to opt out of the study or end the 
interview at any time without loss or penalty. The consent form also gave flexibility for the participant 
to choose not to answer any individual question. The researchers attempted to craft the interview 
questions to be sensitive to the vulnerability of participants. 
Field test. The methodology also addressed the need to ensure the interview questions would 
yield information needed to respond to the overall research questions. As we constructed the interview 
questions, we considered the different domains of our research questions and the kinds of language 
within each question that would allow significant and pertinent data to emerge. Yet, one of the concerns 
was whether the questions would allow this to happen. Weiss (1994) discusses the benefits of piloting 
interviews as a field test, which may indicate where the interview questions are redundant or over 
weighted in one area and lacking in another. It can also show where questions are confusing. With this 
in mind, we tested the interview questions once with a teacher who was working in a Level D school in 
a LEA that was not a part of this study. We then convened to determine if such redundancy or lacking 
existed and, from there, made any needed revisions. We went into data collection with a set of interview 
questions we believed would yield the data we needed to address the research questions. However, when 
we began the interviews, we found that we needed to adjust questions to better elicit information related 
to the research questions. Some of the adjustments depended on the implementer groups and are 
described in the individual studies where pertinent. 
Observations. Another data collection tool we used were observations. Observations are useful 
in research to document information as it occurs in a specific setting and analyzes actual behavior 
(Creswell, 2012). For this research, observations helped the researchers gain insight into how people 
processed the ideas put forth by the policy around turnaround work and how they behaved in terms of 
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implementing these policy ideas. Yin (2009) distinguishes between formal observations and casual data 
collection activities. Formal observations entail observing meetings or other school activities, whereas 
casual data collection may come from site visits in the context of conducting interviews. We used 
observation data obtained casually in the context of interviewing as well as data from formal 
observations. Formal observations took place at school board meetings and one local stakeholder group 
meeting. For these, we followed Creswell’s (2012) suggestion for observation protocol and used one that 
was designed to allow for a description of the chronological order of events along with a reflection about 
themes and quotes. We were non-participant observers and took field notes either during or after the 
observation. Creswell (2012) emphasizes the importance of descriptive and reflective field notes, which 
involve a description of events along with personal thoughts and insights of the observer. Our field notes 
included both descriptive and reflective elements. Field notes were then analyzed alongside the 
transcriptions from interviews. The role of observations in data collection differed for each of the 
individual studies and is described in more detail in those sections where applicable. 
Data Analysis 
When analyzing the data, the focus was on extracting data that pertained to the role of each of 
the implementers of the turnaround policy. For this, we used a coding process that allowed key themes 
to emerge from the data. 
Coding. Coding was the first step in our analysis of the data. We coded the interviews once they 
were transcribed by an outside agency. Creswell (2012) outlines a coding process for interview data that 
includes reading through transcriptions, identifying codes, and collapsing codes into themes. The 
analysis of interview data in this research used this coding process in order to center on key themes, 
which emerged across the interviews. Miles and Huberman (1994) discuss the benefits of using a “start 
list” for coding, which is created prior to fieldwork. The “start list” contains a list of codes that is 
devised from the conceptual framework, research questions, hypotheses, problem areas and any other 
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important variables. Our “start list” included codes such as collaboration, making sense, communication, 
student impact, and reflection, among others, and we used this “start list” (See Appendix B) to begin the 
coding process. 
Once interviews were transcribed, the coding process began by looking at the transcriptions with the 
“start list” as a backdrop. That is, we began our analysis according to which information was consistent 
with the codes on the start list. We quickly realized that while some of the codes on the start list were 
useful, there were several concepts that were not represented on our list. Therefore, we made 
adjustments to the list of codes, adding codes and deleting others. As a group, we established a list of 
parent codes at the beginning. As individual researchers proceeded through their coding, they added 
child codes to the parent codes where needed. We used the qualitative research software, Dedoose, to 
code transcripts and to organize our codes. 
Collaborative coding. The group process utilized in the analysis was key in this research study. 
Hill, Thompson, and Williams (1997) describe the process of consensual qualitative research (CQR) 
where a team of researchers engages in the process of co-analyzing data. CQR “...highlights the use of 
multiple researchers, the process of reaching consensus, and a systematic way of examining the 
representativeness of results across cases” (p. 519). It occurs in three main steps where researchers 
divide the data into domains, then construct core ideas within the domains and finally cross analyze to 
identify consistencies across cases. While the analysis portion of this research study did not necessarily 
follow these steps verbatim, the underlying tenet that informs CQR was pertinent here. 
Team members first examine the data independently and then come together to present 
and discuss their ideas until they reach a single unified version that all team members 
endorse as the best representation of the data. Using several researchers provides a 
variety of opinions and perspectives, helps to circumvent the biases of any one person, 
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and is helpful for capturing the complexity of the data (Hill, Thompson, & Williams, 
1997, p. 523). 
The group process for this research followed a modified version of CQR, which provided a 
structure for the group to code the data together, then to analyze the data individually. As a collaborative 
research study, we analyzed one transcript together to determine how to use the codes from the coding 
list. From there, we made further adjustments to the list of codes and established the use of parent and 
child codes. We agreed that it was possible for individual researchers to use some codes and not others, 
depending on their implementer group. Once we calibrated our coding practices, we coded our 
interviews individually, and then convened to compare our coding and to check our calibration. Once all 
interview transcriptions were coded and individual sections analyzed, we joined together to identify 
overarching themes that cut across implementer groups and drew conclusions and potential implications 
for turnaround LEA's. Because there were four researchers looking at the data, interrater reliability was 
significant. This process of calibrating through co-analyzing the data assisted with interrater reliability. 
Document analysis. As Yin (2009) points out, information from documents should be 
corroborated and augmented by evidence from other sources. Documents were examined for specific 
details that were not obtained through other sources. The state turnaround legislation had already been 
analyzed prior to data collection to gain an understanding of the requirements of level D schools. 
Beyond the policy, other documents that were analyzed were documents related to turnaround work, 
including the LEA Accelerated Improvement Plan, LEA Recovery Plan, and a level D school’s School 
Redesign Grant (SRG) Monitoring Site Visit. We also reviewed media material as well as LEA 
performance data to understand the context within which the turnaround occurred. Consistent with Yin’s 
(2009) description, document analysis in this research was not intended to provide definitive findings, 
but rather to allow for inferences to be made that could lead to further investigation via other sources of 
evidence. In this study, document analysis served to develop further understanding of the LEA, which 
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provided context for the findings. Document analysis beyond the policy itself involved different roles in 
each of the individual studies and is described where applicable. 
Drawing conclusions. As we analyzed the data, one way we tested our conclusions was through 
structural corroboration. Eisner (1976) highlights the importance of structural corroboration in his 
discussion about educational criticism. 
Structural corroboration is a process that seeks to validate or support one's conclusions 
about a set of phenomena by demonstrating how a variety of facts or conditions within 
the phenomena support the conclusions drawn. It is a process of demonstrating that the 
story hangs together, that the pieces fit. (p. 148) 
Although Eisner refers to the process of validating the evaluation of educational practice, this concept 
applies to the analysis of data in this study. Because we were intent on ensuring conclusions were 
substantiated through the data, we compared what interviewees said about the various issues within the 
research topic, with each other, and with observational and document data. Through this comparison of 
data, we were able to understand how individual pieces of data fit together in order to lead to coherent 
conclusions, particularly relative to the overall recommendations. 
Limitations 
The major limitations of this qualitative research were researcher bias, generalizability, and 
reliability. We discuss below how these limitations were addressed through the methodology. 
Researcher bias. The role of researcher bias was a consideration in this study, particularly since 
all of the researchers currently hold positions as practicing educators responsible for the implementation 
of education policy. In at least two cases, researchers were specifically responsible for the 
implementation of school turnaround policy. A key component of qualitative research is that it values 
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direct observation and data gathered from interactions between the researcher and the research subject. 
The researcher becomes a research instrument and therefore brings their own lens to the data collection 
and analysis. Yin (2011) argues that, “No lens is free of bias; every lens has subjective and objective 
qualities” (p. 270). Researchers must maintain a high degree of awareness and self-reflection about the 
qualities of any “lens” that might influence either the collection or analysis of the data. In particular, use 
of interviews as a source of evidence in qualitative research can strengthen the data collection process as 
it allows for targeted questioning. However, it also has inherent weaknesses of bias in self-reporting, 
recalling inaccuracies due to time-lapse, and reflexivity, where the participants report what the 
interviewer wants to hear (Yin, 2009). 
Miles and Huberman (1994) identify two additional sources of researcher bias: (a) the effects of 
the researcher on the case and (b) the effects of the case on the researcher. In the first case, the presence 
of the researcher can serve as a disruption to the relationships and dynamics that exist in an institution. 
In the second instance, the researcher can be seduced by the environment or the participants. As a result, 
they might draw conclusions or inferences that may be influenced by the bias they have developed rather 
than the facts and data they have collected. Miles and Huberman (1994) recommend several strategies to 
mitigate the effects of bias (a) and bias (b) such as: seeking feedback from colleagues on potential areas 
of bias by sharing field notes and observations, purposefully selecting participants who represent 
dissident voices, maintaining a focus on the research questions to avoid becoming distracted by other 
leads, and paying attention to the possible effects the interview location or the interview process itself 
may have on data collection. With these recommendations in mind, through the collaborative coding 
process, we discussed at length the themes we were identifying and where our bias may have filtered in. 
This helped us to keep our analysis as close to the data as possible, without being heavily influenced by 
our biases. In addition, we had dissident voices in our selection of participants, which we incorporated 
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into our analysis. Similar to the data collection methods, bias is addressed more specifically in each of 
the individual sections. 
Generalizability. One criticism of a single case study approach is that external validity is weak 
because the findings may not be generalizable. In comparing single and multiple case studies, Yin 
(2009) cautions that using a single case study could have less weight than multiple case studies and 
perhaps offer less theoretical replication. As we began to design this single LEA case study, we knew 
that generalizability could have been an issue in that the findings may not have been clearly applicable 
to other LEA's going through the turnaround process as required by policy, because conditions between 
LEA’s vary. This dissertation-in-practice research brought in the use of theory to help address this 
limitation of external validity. 
The theory centered on the relationship between policy sense-making and implementation in the 
context of turning around an underperforming school. That is, the complexity of the process of policy 
sense-making, as previously outlined in the theoretical frame of this research, along with the inherent 
difficulties of chronically underperforming schools, challenges implementation of that policy by 
implementers. With this research design, we aimed to understand what it meant to be a school going 
through the turnaround process through the lens of policy sense-making and implementation. The theory 
helped to address external validity because the findings might be generalizable to a broader theory that 
in turn may be applied to other contexts. Yin’s (2011) explanation of analytic generalization highlights 
the importance of the role of theory in the study in terms of generalizing the findings. 
The argument needs to be cast in relation to existing research literature, not the specific 
conditions in the actual study. In other words, the goal is to pose the proposition and hypotheses at a 
conceptual level higher than that of the specific findings (Typically, this higher level might have been 
needed to justify the research importance to study the chosen topic in the first place) (p. 101). 
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Also helpful to the validity question was how the researchers describe the case. Merriam (1998) 
discusses ways of addressing validity, including providing a rich, thick description that shows that 
conclusions are reasonable and make sense. In other words, the more thorough the description of the 
LEA, the more accurate conclusions would be. The aim of the research was to provide a detailed 
description in order to support findings drawn from the data, to allow others to make their own 
connection to the study’s conclusions. In this way, the reader would determine to what extent the 
findings can be transferred based on the thorough description of the context and its findings in the case 
under study (Merriam, 1998). Through a detailed depiction of the case, this study increased the 
likelihood the reader would be able to determine whether or not the findings are transferable to another 
situation where turnaround policy is being implemented. 
Reliability. For case study research, reliability is achieved through specific documentation of the 
research process. Yin (2009) points out that case studies that use a protocol and database have stronger 
reliability. The protocol is the data collection instrument along with a specified set of procedures to be 
followed. A database is developed from the data collection instruments. Both of these help make it 
possible for another investigator to replicate the research procedures. This research study used a protocol 
that outlined the procedures of all data collection instruments, including the interviews, observations and 
document analysis. We also used the qualitative research software, Dedoose, as our database for 
interviews, where we were able to code and analysis transcripts. 
In addition we ensured our data quality through a rigorous assessment of our analysis and 
conclusions. Miles and Huberman (1994) offer a model that involves thirteen tactics that will help 
address this need for a demanding approach to drawing conclusions from the data. These tactics involve 
a process of checking the quality of the data, analyzing exceptions to patterns, and checking with 
skepticism emerging explanations.  For this study, the researchers focused on the following four tactics: 
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1) Checking for representativeness - Ensuring that the data coming from your sources is representative 
of both confirming and dissident voices; 
2) Weighting the evidence - Accounting for the fact that some sources provide stronger data in the 
analysis based on the participants’ roles, knowledge about the turnaround policy, and their level of 
involvement in the work of turning around the school. This weighting of evidence may differ in the 
analysis of each individual section because we each focused on a different implementer group. 
3) Checking the meaning of outliers - Scrutinizing outlying data to make sure that analyses to test the 
generality of the finding and protect against self-selecting biases; 
4) Checking out rival explanations - Keeping in mind a few possible explanations until one emerges as 
more compelling as a result of stronger evidence derived from additional data collection. 
These tactics provided a guide for us to analyze the data, identify themes and draw conclusions. 
Using all of these tactics, along with the CQR collaborative data analysis approach, helped us to ensure 
the validity of our conclusions and alleviate the biases that may have arisen in our analyses. It also 
helped us ensure that the narrative we told in the end fit the data we found. 
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Chapter Four: Superintendent / Central Office As Policy Implementers4 
This study will examine the role of the central office under the leadership of the superintendent 
in turnaround policy implementation, specifically the impact their perceptions have on implementation 
of district and school turnaround as outlined in the state turnaround legislation passed in 2010. With 
school level innovation using one of the four prescribed intervention models being the focus of the 
aforementioned law, most of the research on school turnaround has focused on the actions of school 
level leadership (Duke & Salmonowicz, 2011; Murphy, 2010).  In the last decade, within the larger 
education reform context, educational researchers have increasingly emphasized the essential role of 
school district central offices as a key lever in the improvement of underperforming schools (Supovitz, 
2006; Togneri & Anderson, 2003; Fullan, 2006; Mascall & Leithwood, 2010). 
Statement of Purpose   
The purpose of this study is to learn the extent to which superintendent and central office staff 
perception regarding turnaround policy has an impact on turnaround policy implementation.   It is 
possible that the superintendent, as the primary and initial enactor of turnaround policy as outlined in 
state turnaround legislation at the school district level, takes into account a host of considerations 
including local politics, collective bargaining, cultural context, central office and school capacity, and 
human capital. State regulations require that any school district that has a designated level D or 
turnaround school is also labeled a turnaround school district. This being the case, the superintendent 
has to consider how central office is organized to implement the policy with fidelity, as it has 
implications for his or her leadership. Further considerations for the superintendent include the 
perception of central office staff and their capacity and /or willingness to implement (Honig, et. al, 
2006). The following research sub-questions emerge: 
                                                       
4 Author: Charles A. Grandson IV 
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1. How does superintendent sense-making impact implementation of turnaround policy? 
2. How does central office staff sense-making impact implementation of turnaround policy?  
The first question aims to understand the impact of superintendent thinking on implementation of 
turnaround policy. The second question is directly related to central office staff and the effect their 
thinking has on turnaround policy implementation. A distinction is made between the two questions 
because depending on the size of the school district, the superintendent relies on senior central office 
staff to implement the details of decisions made as a result of turnaround policy. The research questions 
are developed from a growing body of literature on the complexity of policy implementation and the 
impact of cognition and sense-making on policy implementation (Honig, 2006). According to the 
literature, policy implementers consider a number of factors including people, places, and goals when 
making sense of educational policy (Honig, 2006, p. 6). 
    The purpose of this study is to gain insight about how district central office administrators make 
sense of state turnaround policy and to further assess how their sense making influences policy 
implementation. The goal is to learn more about what impact their sense making has on turnaround 
policy implementation, which has implications for central office leaders responsible for school 
turnaround. Ultimately, this would have more practical and immediate implications for schools and 
school districts that are currently in the process of turning around chronically failing schools. 
     For superintendents and school system leaders, system-wide reform may be needed to improve 
the environment in which struggling schools exist. Improving a system’s chronically underperforming 
schools is the most important in which to engage.  A former superintendent and former deputy 
commissioner of a state education agency (SEA) argues, “For us, a district earns the label of its lowest 
performing school – clearly sending the message that each district is only as strong as its weakest 
school” (Kutash et al., 2010, p. 18). This quote refers to the turnaround legislation, which mandates that 
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if a school district has one level D (turnaround) school, the district automatically assumes level D status. 
This sends a clear message that the district is ultimately responsible for improving its chronically 
underperforming schools. For superintendents of level D school systems, improving the turnaround 
status becomes an important goal and success measure. Within the state context, superintendents and 
school committees are being judged, rewarded, or penalized based on their status. 
Review of Literature 
    For the last 40 years scholars, policy makers, and practitioners have grappled with how to 
improve America’s lowest performing schools, particularly its urban schools (Payne, 2010). Within the 
last decade, the advent of NCLB has brought attention to measuring school effectiveness and has 
required schools to improve incrementally or face consequences (Ravitch, 2010). Recently, the Obama 
administration has turned its attention to rescuing the country’s 5000 lowest performing schools, which 
represent 5% of our schools (Bermin & Camins, 2011). The current effort requires districts to use one of 
four turnaround models in order to qualify for School Improvement Grants (SIG) or Race to the Top 
(RTTT) funding. While funding requirements come with many stipulations, including use of one of the 
four-turnaround models, there is a lack of guidance from federal and state agencies in mapping out a 
blueprint for success for school districts to successfully implement the latest school improvement 
strategy. What’s different this time around is the requirement that schools and districts rapidly 
“turnaround” schools student achievement data within 2-3 years.  As outlined at the beginning of this 
study, the state legislature passed state turnaround legislation in 2010, which codified state level 
turnaround policy. 
While there are a plethora of online research reports developed by school improvement and 
social sector organizations that provide insights into the role of school, district, and state actors in 
turnaround efforts (Kutash, Nico, Gorin, Rahmatullah & Tallant, 2010, pp. 25-26; Kowal, Hassel & 
Hassel, 2009; Calkins, Guenther, Belfiore & Lash, 2007), there is a research gap within peer reviewed 
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empirical and theoretical literature addressing the impact of “sense-making” on policy implementation 
within turnaround schools.  Better understanding the impact of sense-making allows LEAs to be more 
thoughtful nuanced about implementing policy and provides them with an opportunity to take into 
consideration what might be necessary to ensure successful implementation. As mentioned in our 
overarching review of the literature, school improvement research, specifically within urban education, 
serves as the basis for federal and state turnaround policy. For this reason we reviewed this literature for 
the overall study; and school improvement literature, as it relates to superintendent and central office 
staff, is also used within this study. This research will help provide context for understanding and 
analyzing a school system leader’s sense-making of federal and state turnaround policy. 
Central office instructional improvement. While school turnaround often focuses on 
individual site based management and improvement, a growing body of literature argues for a more 
centralized approach to improving chronically underperforming schools. Oftentimes, school district 
leaders can improve many areas of operations within the school systems to make them work more 
productively for schools. However, one of the greatest levers for the type of achievement changes 
sought under Massachusetts turnaround policy requires a focus on instruction by central offices and a 
self-efficacy belief system amongst central office staff. Marzano & Waters, Hightower, and Coburn, 
Honig & Stein, as outlined below, make arguments for central office instructional improvement 
initiatives as a key lever to improve schools and student achievement. If the aforementioned is true, the 
ways in which central office administrators make sense of policy can be integral to how they implement 
policy and whether or not they successfully achieve policy goals, which in this case is student 
achievement. 
        Robert J. Marzano and Timothy Waters in their book District Leadership That Works: Striking 
the Right Balance, revealed the research from a study using a meta-analysis to prove the essential role of 
school district leadership in improving student achievement. In the study, Marzano and Waters 
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conducted a meta-analysis of “all available studies involving district leadership (or variables related to 
district leadership) and student academic achievement in the United States from 1970 until 2005” 
(Marzano & Waters, 2009, p. 3). The studies revealed “a correlation between district leadership or 
district leadership variables and student academic achievement.” Looking at fourteen research reports 
regarding 1210 school districts, the authors found a .24 correlation between student achievement and 
district leadership with a .5 statistical significance. Accountable for other variables, such as the quality 
of superintendent leadership, the authors predict that if a superintendent improves their leadership skills 
by one standard deviation (from 50th to 84th percentile), student achievement would improve by 9.5 
percentile points (Marzano & Waters, 2009, p. 5). This research makes clear that there is a positive 
correlation between effective school district leadership and specifically district leadership actions that 
require any superintendent with turnaround schools within their district to ensure that they are 
continuously engaging in leadership development as a strategy for improvement of academic outcomes. 
In a study conducted of San Diego City Schools (SDCS), the district decided to infuse the entire 
system with a “boom” of instruction, using its bureaucracy and adult learning as key levers (Hightower, 
2002). In addition to focusing on long-term professional development, SDCD Superintendent, Alan 
Bersin, also reorganized the central office to ensure that additional resources were aligned to serve the 
instructional units of the organization. For a new superintendent, this meant removing many key central 
office staff and in many cases dismissing them from the organization. Hightower notes that the district’s 
effort was based on Elmore and Burney’s (1997) assertion that the central office can be a force for 
instructional improvement (Hightower, 2002, p. 91). As a result of using the “boom” instructional 
method, the San Diego City Schools were able to successfully infuse the school system with additional 
instructional capacity for improved student outcomes on state assessments.  
In order to facilitate large-scale change incrementally, central offices need to foster an evidence-
based culture to build capacity for progressive and sustainable change (Coburn et. al, p. 21). Coburn, 
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Honig, and Stein uncovered this in their research on the use of data/ evidence by district central offices. 
As encouraged within schools, in order to reach the goal of student achievement, central office leaders 
can successfully improve student outcomes by ensuring that all decisions that affect the instructional 
core are evidence-based. This will increase the likelihood of a focus on instruction and an organizational 
push toward reflective practice and smarter decision-making. 
District capacity to build capacity within schools. Change theorist and former Dean of the 
Ontario Institute for Studies in Education of the University of Toronto, Michael Fullan, in his book, 
Leadership and Sustainability: Systems Thinkers in Action, calls for an increased district role in schools. 
He makes an argument for the need for more accountability and responsibility on the part of the school 
district for school capacity building, although the recent trend within the modern education reform 
movement has been moving towards decentralization.  Fullan states, “We can’t change the system 
without lateral (cross-school and cross-district) sharing and capacity development. It is very much the 
district’s role to help make the latter happen” (Fullan, 2005, p. 66).  Fullan’s ideas about change within a 
school system link to that of many scholars within the review of the literature section of the larger study 
(Zavadsky, 2012 and Leithwood, 1994). 
One year later, Fullan, published the timely book, Turnaround Leadership, outlining a 
framework for capacity building at the district level, which includes instituting the “professional 
learning community model at all levels of the system and beyond the district” (Fullan, 2006, p. 75). 
Fullan reviews research he’s conducted in many school districts, particularly the York Region District 
School Board (YRDSB) where the district has successfully implemented system professional learning. 
He writes: 
  It is a district with leaders who know the deep meaning of capacity building with a focus on 
results. School teams participate in continuous professional development to increase their content 
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(in this case literacy) expertise and their change knowledge as well as skills such as how to build 
professional learning communities. There is plenty of “learning in context” … We deliberately 
use lateral capacity building to enable schools to learn from each other (Fullan, 2006, p. 75). 
 The YRDSB example provides a roadmap for district leaders who have the responsibility for 
developing turnaround schools.  The combination of teacher leadership, expertise development, 
embedded professional development and learning amongst district leaders is key to developing the 
capacity to build capacity in schools. 
        The empirical research reviewed above is supported by research reports from practitioners and 
organizations that support and study school turnaround. Jeff Kutash, Managing Director of Education 
and Youth Practice at FSG Social Impact Advisors, a non-profit organization specializing in strategic 
planning, research and evaluation, in their 2010 publication The School Turnaround Field Guide, note 
that “school turnaround requires a coordinated effort between states and local school districts, arguing 
that they need to move their relationships from being centered on compliance to [working] more 
effectively as turnaround collaborators” (Kutash et. al., 2010, p. 43). They further add that many states 
and school districts, at the time of publication, failed to allocate staff and/or departments with the 
specific charge of school turnaround.  
        The challenge of capacity building in schools, especially persistently low-performing schools, is 
not a simple task. Schools and school leaders need intensive support from district leadership teams and 
central office staff to ensure that teachers have access to the latest research, technology, and distributive 
leadership opportunities that ensure that capacity can be built in schools with the immediate goal of 
increasing student achievement and the long-term goal of developing leadership capacity in teachers to 
sustain student achievement (Vernon-Dotson & Floyd, 2012). As mentioned in the statement of purpose 
above, this is the primary work of school district central offices and district administrators. 
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Understanding the complexities of implementing change, and in the case of this study state mandated 
turnaround policy implementation, requires an understanding of district leadership sense-making. The 
goal of this section of the study is to determine the extent to which superintendent and district leader 
sense-making influences policy implementation. In the context of turnaround as outlined in the state 
turnaround legislation, district leader sense-making is important because they have 2-3 years to 
turnaround their level D schools. Therefore, their immediate actions as informed by their thinking may 
have a great impact on the success of students. As noted by the literature above, this could have great 
implications for success or failure of turnaround policy implementation and student achievement in 
Massachusetts’ chronically underperforming schools. 
Overwhelmingly, a review of the literature on school improvement identifies the need for 
capacity building in underperforming schools, and furthermore that school district leadership and central 
office staff has an essential role in the process. As many school districts prepare to meet President 
Obama’s turnaround challenge, officials will find further need to develop capacity within district central 
offices as they simultaneously build capacity within turnaround schools. 
Methodology 
  The methods section of this component of the study reflects the methods of the larger study. As 
mentioned in the methodology section of the overall study, we will be using a Single Case Study (Yin, 
2009) approach with our unit of analysis being a level D school district within Massachusetts. The 
research gathered looks at the implementation of turnaround policy research as outlined in the 2010 state 
legislation. For this section of the study, the goal is to gain insights into the sense-making of individual 
central office administrators to understand their sense making and policy implementation within their 
district. The major data collection methods include interviews, document analysis, and a few field 
observations. 
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Our group developed an interview protocol for all stakeholders and this protocol was used for 
central office staff interviews. Questions that are particularly relevant for this section of the study 
include: “Who is responsible for communicating turnaround policy to schools/ districts?” and “What 
steps are needed or will be taken to implement the turnaround policy?”  I looked at data across 
stakeholders to gain insight into the sense-making of the school committee, principals, and teachers on 
central office’s implementation of turnaround policy. Therefore, all items on the interview protocol were 
used for analysis within this section of the study. Our unit of analysis is a mid-sized (11,000 students) 
school system. I therefore sought out key central office administrators responsible for turnaround policy 
implementation and then secondary staff who might be indirectly responsible for implementation. This 
included the Superintendent, administrators at the Assistant Superintendent, Chief, and Director levels 
of the organization. No external partners were interviewed, as there were very few cited by interviewees 
as meaningfully impacting the turnaround effort.  
Turnaround practices and requirements of the SEA lend themselves well to document analysis. 
The SEA contracts with a non-profit educational improvement organization to conduct site visits that 
provide formative and summative feedback once per year over the course of the three-year turnaround 
timeline to determine the extent to which schools and districts have met qualitative benchmarks 
established by the SEA. The report outlining findings were analyzed using the lens of key areas of 
inquiry including, politics, culture, policy implementers, context, central office capacity, and 
superintendent social capital. For additional details on the methodology of this study refer to Chapter 3.  
Findings 
In conducting interviews of six central office staff within the local education agency (LEA), I 
gained insight into how the superintendent and central office administrators made sense of the 
turnaround policy, its mandates, and requirements. The findings below represent the analysis of excerpts 
from interview transcripts that provide insight into the thinking of central office administrators. After 
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understanding their thought process, I noted the impact of their sense making in relation to actions taken.  
This will address the research questions because it will help me better understand how their 
understanding of policy goals influenced their actions and the impact their actions had on student 
achievement.  Emergent themes from interviewee responses inform the findings section of the study. 
The following paragraphs contain findings of this section of the study with the aim of answering the 
following research questions:  
1. How does superintendent sense-making impact implementation of turnaround policy? 
2. How does central office staff sense-making impact implementation of turnaround policy? 
 
Finding I: Superintendent Leadership Matters  
 Instructional leadership. The superintendent has aligned professional development and school 
support structures to support the improvement of teaching and learning throughout the school system. 
Internally. One interviewee responded, “One thing I think that [she] has done that is unique is her, the 
relationship, the professional learning community that she has formed with the principals, the central 
office and the principals.” As this administrator noted, this is a “unique” component of the 
superintendent’s leadership in the school system that is different from past superintendents. In gathering 
more information from the LEA, it’s noted that principal meetings take place monthly. The 
superintendent has intentionally decided to personally attend and in many cases lead these meetings, 
which demonstrates to leadership at the central office level and the building level what the 
superintendent values and believes is important. In this case, it’s building a “professional learning 
community” to develop the instructional leadership capacity of principals and school staff. Another 
administrator mentioned: 
Our principals’ meetings are really central to this. What we certainly notice, any kind of district-
wide initiative that we're trying to get done, we get it done if we train the principals first, and we, 
the superintendent and I, Dianne Sims, the Director of Special Education, we run the monthly 
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principal meetings, but we run them like a workshop, like professional development, but we run 
them, we plan them, we get the videos. We kind of set the stage for the instructional work that 
they've got to go back to their buildings, so it's not hands off in the sense. 
Here the administrator outlines the type of work being done by central office to prepare for principal 
meetings, ensuring the success of any district initiative by building the capacity of principals first. It 
provides insight into their strategy to not only improve their Level D schools, but all schools within their 
LEA. This focus on instructional leadership begins with what the superintendent believes to be 
important, their vision and leadership.  
In interviewing administrators throughout the central office and reviewing data from principal 
and teacher interviews, the finding around the superintendent’s focus on instructional leadership is 
underscored by the superintendent’s intentional shift of the vision for central office administrators. The 
superintendent maintained a laser like focus on supporting schools and instruction in classrooms and 
held central office administrators directly accountable for supporting the same. According to the 
superintendent:  
[The role of] central office is to support the work of principals.  That they don’t work for us, we 
work for them.  Now at times I always kind of describe central office work as support, guidance 
and sometimes oversight and we want to be heavy on support.  The majority of it needs to be 
support but there are times when we need to shift into guidance and clearly sometimes a stronger 
oversight model depending on how our monitoring of the school is going and sort of what we’re 
seeing.  And I think that was a shift for our central office is being out in schools, supporting 
principals to build the professional capacity of their staff.  That became the work of central 
office. 
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In this quote, the superintendent reveals the importance of shifting to a service mindset to support the 
district’s schools. While the central office’s work is one of monitoring and oversight, the superintendent 
as the instructional leader is very specific about ensuring that the key function of the central office and 
its administrators is to support schools. The superintendent outlines a paradigm shift from any pre-
existing dominant perception of the role of central office in supporting schools to a new one that makes 
it clear that schools don’t “work for” the central office, but instead the central office “works for” 
schools. The superintendent’s communication to central office administrators outlined their primary 
work as support and induced a change in thinking for them, ultimately paving the way for a new model 
of school support as outlined in the second finding of this study; Support, Monitoring, and 
Accountability.  
Courageous decision-making. Within this study, I found that courageous decision-making was a key 
finding in understanding the impact of superintendent sense-making on turnaround policy 
implementation.  After a few years of trying to turnaround under the new state turnaround legislation, 
the Superintendent made the decision to close school 3 and disperse its students amongst other schools 
throughout the district. A central office administrator described:  
Because of the enrollment at school 3 had been declining because parents had been voting…they 
had been choosing to send their kids elsewhere.  The building I think it originally held like 800 
kids and when we closed it - it had 491.  So then the decision was made.  The superintendent 
recommended to close it and the school committee approved and we moved on from there. 
It was clear that school 3 continued to struggle in spite of interventions to improve student achievement 
outcomes at the school and district level.  Parents were un-enrolling their children from the school and 
the community began to lose faith in the school. Closing a school is a courageous act for a 
superintendent because often communities have emotional ties to schools, their legacy, and the teachers 
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within them.  Many times school board members are against school closure because of the political 
backlash that could occur. For a superintendent to invest time and energy into a campaign to close a 
school, it’s politically important to “win” to continue to have the faith of the school board, district staff, 
and the larger community. Moreover, to explain the state education agency’s (SEA) leveling process and 
to make a decision to close a school based on its continuation in level D status for more than 3 years can 
be a hard sell to parents and the community, especially if there are other schools throughout the school 
system with a similar profile. In the following quote the superintendent explains that she did not come to 
this decision lightly, but believed it was the right decision based on the options available.  
No, they didn’t have the same [resources] but what [school 1] had that [school 2] and [school 3] 
did not have was that they were an expanded learning time school…But yes, [school 3] had the 
same sort of resources.  That school, I mean I often talk in the community about the school 
because it was just so heart wrenching to close it and people were upset.  But that school went 
through three superintendents, five principals and a variety of different strategies and it could not 
turn around.  So again, that yes the simple answer is yes.  They had the equivalent [resources].  
It’s just that they could not make effective use of those resources despite different leaders and 
different strategies.  It just never could gain any traction. 
As the superintendent described above this was not an easy decision and she continues to address this 
issue within the community even after the decision has been made. Understanding that through multiple 
superintendents, principals, and teachers, school 3 was not improving. Not only was this LEA labeled as 
a “level D” district, which means that it was chronically underperforming and contained at-least one 
chronically underperforming school, in this case three. The LEA was also under a Recovery Plan and 
was under close watch by state education department monitors. After three years of trying to turn around 
school 3, the superintendent understood she had to take a bold action, or face intervention by the state.  
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Social capital. Many interviewees noted the impact of superintendent leadership during the interviews. 
On multiple occasions central office administrators reported that the superintendent exhibited strong 
leadership and has been able to galvanize the community around support for turnaround schools. This 
support has included the school committee, businesses, and community agencies. The general 
constituency has also been on board with the superintendent in supporting school turnaround efforts. 
Administrators explain, “What she does strategically is bring stakeholders on board, [including] 
community partners [and] teams at the school level.” This demonstrates that the context to successfully 
achieve school turnaround is provided by the superintendent and she understood her role within 
turnaround policy implementation to effectively frame the conversation with key stakeholders. When 
asked generally about the impact of social capital as it relates to turnaround policy implementation 
throughout the school system, one central office administrator answered: 
I think as far as social capital the superintendent has done a nice job forming some very strong 
connections with the people in the city that have a lot of social capital outside of the district, not 
the school committee but outside really strong influences, businessmen, Chamber of Commerce.  
So she’s been able to bring what little social capital there is in the city to advocate for budget at 
budget time, to advocate for resources and those people end up advocating for her at many points 
in time. 
This quote summarized what many administrators interviewed argued as a key strength of the 
superintendent that has had an impact on implementing turnaround policy within the district. Here, 
social capital is defined as outlined within the previous chapter of this study that describes the 
theoretical framework. As provided by Smylie and Evans (2006), social capital in this context is defined 
as “social trust,” or the extent to which individuals and the community want to collaborate with the 
school system based on their confidence in the superintendent’s leadership.  Having the support of 
powerful community allies including members of the business community not only builds community 
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confidence in the superintendent as one of the city’s largest employers, but also with the ability of the 
school district to educate and produce a skilled citizenry and workforce. This is important to key 
stakeholders throughout the city, including politicians and businessmen, as they will one day interact 
with the LEA’s graduates as citizens and employees.  
 When asked about her sense-making and understanding of the impact of social capital on 
implementation of turnaround policy the superintendent answered as follows: 
I have been doing a lot of thinking about this lately too, because I think we have to really build 
the social capital within schools and within the community to do this turnaround work because 
the turnaround work is not just…I mean you can’t do it alone.  It takes a community to turn 
around a school…. Because I feel like if we’re honest with the community about the good and 
the bad that we build credibility and they will help us as long as they know what the issues are 
and how we are trying to address them and how they can be helpful in that regard too.  The 
social piece of it I mean there is a lot of community building.  We have got to develop and we 
have developed relationships with key community members, social organizations, parents, the 
union … and again I think the relationships are really key in the turnaround work because it’s 
such intense and complex work that the more people that are in it and understand it I think…And 
that’s what we saw with [school 2]. 
For the superintendent, the work of turning around chronically underperforming schools involves the 
entire community. This type of vision and expectation setting requires strong relationships with different 
types of individuals from everyday citizens to leadership throughout the community. While the 
superintendent is very much focused on instructional leadership and supporting schools and classroom 
instruction, she also makes sense of turnaround in terms of the power of relationships to transform a 
community.  Including within the superintendents definition of community are also parents and the 
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union, which is a demonstration of her collaborative and open nature. Finally, she mentions school 2 as a 
school that she can draw a correlation between her ability to galvanize the community around the 
turnaround effort and the successful turnaround of that school within three years. Within this section of 
the study a finding is that the superintendent’s social capital is a factor successfully implementing 
turnaround policy. 
Impact of superintendent sense-making. While there are many factors that impact a superintendent’s 
sense-making of turnaround policy and that influence policy implementation, it’s important to analyze 
key cognitive shifts that unfold throughout the policy implementation cycle. One of those cognitive shift 
moments for our case study district’s superintendent is directly related to supporting instruction. She 
reveals:  
I think [turnaround] is to really focus at the school level.  I mean I think we get caught up in 
central office of when there is policy work or how we’re implementing policy.  I think we often 
talk about you have to focus in on this through line between central office down into the 
individual classroom.  It is having that kind of focus rather than…I don’t know.  I think when we 
started this work it was like, “All right, what does the district need to be doing?”  Well, it’s not 
about what the district needs to be doing.  It’s about what the school needs to be doing and how 
does the district create structures and systems to help schools be effective at what they need to 
do? 
The above quote provides insight into the superintendent’s thinking and helps to understand the shift in 
her thinking and the work of the central office. The idea of focusing on the “through line” between 
central office and classroom instruction is significant for a superintendent, a position probably the most 
removed from daily classroom instruction.  
Finding II: Support, Monitoring, and Accountability 
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 Support. Central office administrators understood their role to be directly responsible for 
providing support, monitoring school progress towards goals, and providing accountability for 
improving student performance. Administrators noted that in the past, before the district was labeled as a 
level D turnaround district, “schools had free reign” and there was a lack of strategic monitoring 
processes for schools. According to one administrator, “I think it used to be like that. Every school could 
kind of do what they wanted in this [system].” Administrators’ interpretation and sense-making of the 
turnaround policy led central office administrators to become more invested in the success of schools, 
especially turnaround schools. They fear a negative public perception by citizens, who may opt to send 
their children to other schools. Additionally, because the school system operated under close watch by 
the state education agency (SEA) under a “recovery plan” prior to its level D designations, many 
administrators feared that one or more of their schools would be more likely to be taken over by the 
SEA. These factors in addition to the SEA labeling the system level D provided the superintendent and 
central office administrators with the understanding that they had to play a key role in influencing school 
performance. According to one administrator, “We're just trying to be a little bit more detailed in what 
we monitor and give feedback on. What we didn’t have, now we're getting better at this constant 
feedback loop, whether it's data, whether it's evaluation, whether it's mini-observations.” This 
administrator and all other central office administrators referenced the recovery plan as their road-map 
and the district’s improvement plan as the new road map. They note that with the help of state monitors, 
they successfully implemented the elements of the recovery plan and this has contributed to achievement 
gains. This demonstrates a cognitive shift for the central office administrators in that they deliberately 
changed their strategies for how they monitor schools to ensure they met policy goals. In the following 
paragraphs, I will review some of the key strategies that came as a result of their change in thinking. 
 To more efficiently support schools, the district central office administrators created a School 
Review Partner (SRP) process, where they assigned central office administrators to provide support to 
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the school system’s most struggling turnaround schools, matching the needs of the schools and the 
expertise of the administrator. A central office administrator noted, “If somebody needs literacy support, 
I’ll put Barbara Turner on there. If somebody needs instructional management support, I’ll put 
somebody else, but the goal is those schools are visited more often, because they’re more high priority 
schools, so we do differentiate support in that way….” This finding gave insight into the thinking of 
central office administrators as they saw their role as being directly invested in student learning 
outcomes in their high priority schools and organized their core work around being able to provide 
support to schools.  One central office administrator who is assigned to a school as a SRP noted that she 
created professional development opportunities for schools and teachers based on the professional 
development plan created by the principal and teachers within that school.  In attempting to further 
understand the thinking that drove these actions, outside of directives from a superior, an administrator 
explained that she believed the SRP process was like a tiered approach to addressing the needs of 
schools: “It’s almost like, not much different than being a classroom teacher and looking at your 
students, but now your students are schools…”  In this assessment of the relationship between central 
office administrators and schools, we are provided with additional supporting evidence that there is 
cognitive shift taking place that is impacting the work of central office administrators. This line of 
thinking is further supported by the thoughts of another central office administrator who provided 
insight into the ingredients that are important to turning around school 3, the school system’s newly 
named level D school:  
Robust data systems, clarity of purpose, which is informed hopefully by a superintendent’s 
vision for the district, strong leadership at the building level, systematic approaches to 
developing action plans [,] and identifying within those action plans any resources that are going 
to be needed to bring them to life.  As I said, that issue of reciprocal accountability where if we 
expect the school to do this thing and we tell them that we need to provide them with the 
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capacity to in fact be successful with that.  That might involve training, it might involve money, 
[and] it might involve time.  If we expect the principal or the team or school 4 to turn itself 
around, we can’t just say that and be done with it.  We’ve got to provide them the supports that 
are going to be necessary to make that happen. 
This statement provides additional evidence of a shift in central office administrator’s thinking around 
how to support the work of school turnaround.  While a purposeful effort is expected from the principal 
and teachers within a building, there is also an expectation that central office administrators hold 
themselves accountable for explicitly and consistently supporting schools in improving student 
achievement.  
 In reviewing teacher and principal interview data from this case study, I found that there were a 
number of stakeholders who corroborated the shift in central office administrator leadership moves. A 
teacher at school 1, the district’s most successful turnaround school, that recently exited level D status to 
level A status, when asked about what changed to allow the school to be successful, the teacher 
responded:  
The district.  We had a strong administration and we have a great group of kids, too.  Our area 
has good kids.  So I think when they heard that, when we were chronically underperforming they 
knew that they had to revamp how we do things here to make it what it could be, what they know 
it could be.  They knew it was going to be a lot of hard work so that meant making sure that the 
school itself had the support that it needed.  
A different teacher was asked a question around whether the school received support from the central 
office and responded as follows: “Absolutely, and they still do.  They still do.  I think it’s important to 
hear.  Yesterday I was in an ILT meeting in the district at the high school. The superintendent was there, 
the leader of instruction for math was there.  The leader of instruction for ELA was there.  We see these 
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people all the time.” An assistant principal within the district underscored the visibility and support for 
central office administrators. She responded, “the district does a good job and our leadership does a 
good job of talking with us about reform and the status of our district and the status of our schools and 
not in a demeaning way.”  The three quotes above demonstrate the intentionality of central office 
administrators providing support to schools throughout the district, regardless of whether they were a 
level D school or not. This support is proving to be key in terms of teacher and building administrator 
perception of support and self-efficacy in improving student achievement. This finding is also supported 
by the fact that the state recently “exited” two of the system’s level D schools and also acknowledged 
that the system met its goals as outlined in the “recovery plan.” Moving forward the district will be 
guided by the district improvement plan.  
 Monitoring. Central office administrators specifically noted the School Review Partner (SRP) 
process, whereby each school in the district is now assigned a central office administrator who serves as 
their SRP and as crucial to providing targeted support and monitoring to schools.  As a level D district 
with high stakes for student achievement and frequent/ close monitoring by the SEA, a robust district 
monitoring system may prove essential to the improvement of schools. A key central office 
administrator noted:  
“Because I'm counting on [SRPs] to provide constant feedback to the schools, to know the 
schools well and sometimes I'll go in with them, and the superintendent will certainly visit the 
schools, but [SRPs] are that sort of a regular presence and they keep me updated.” 
This quote suggests that the district has taken an active role in monitoring the on-going turnaround work 
in schools since designation by the state. Central office administrators are clear that this work is school 
based and belongs to principals and school leadership teams, however they organize their work around 
ensuring that schools meet policy goals and benchmark assessments. Within the SRP process, the school 
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principal communicates primarily with the SRP, providing memos, agendas, and often inviting them to 
key meetings within the school. Teachers are aware of the presence of the SRP and transparency and 
communication are important to the entire process as principals and teachers struggle publicly with the 
SRP to develop solutions and action plans to address student learning.  
 According to a high ranking district leader, schools were supported over the past few years in the 
creation and development of teacher-made and system vetted common assessments that are used to 
monitor academic progress periodically throughout the year. The data from these assessments are key in 
monitoring the progress throughout the year. The administrator explains:  
We just finished our first benchmark and I just yesterday gave [the superintendent] the report 
which looks like this. It's all the benchmarks for the District and she's texting me this morning 
that we're going to follow up with this, this and this, and so we'll go to that school. One of them 
is a level D, well, one of them was a level D, and one of them is not. Our first [school to visit] 
based on the data [we are seeing] we have a conversation, and we'll bring the school review 
partner into that as well, and we'll look at all the stuff we've been collecting and try to sort of 
figure it out. 
This component of the monitoring system is a collaboration between school leadership and central 
administration. Another administrator described the monitoring process as follows: “We have to make 
sure that we have the systems to track the efficacy of our efforts.  So if we’re putting interventions into 
place or we’re putting plans into place or we’re making curricular decisions, we need to ensure that we 
have ways of tracking and that those are in fact having the intended outcomes.” This quote demonstrates 
that as the district continues to improve, it is reviewing its processes and systems to determine what 
other systems need to be built and what other programs need to be monitored.  Essential to the success 
of a collaborative monitoring between building leadership and central office leadership is ensuring a 
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level of transparency that is appropriate, to allow all parties to feel safe about buying-in to the process. 
The following quote by a central office administrator captures this idea:  
What we didn’t have when I was a literacy coach, I don't ever remember us having a partner, so 
now we have a school review partner, and so the school review partner, we monitor [the 
principal’s data]… I shouldn’t say monitor because it's not like that. The principals would hate 
you. You're constantly reading the memos, because they send it to you. You're reading their 
agendas, the [common planning time] agendas and so you know the teachers in the building are 
aware that you are that school's school review partner, because it's transparent, right? I think that 
communication helps tremendously.  
In reviewing this finding, support to schools is only usual if on-going monitoring tracks, as one 
administrator says, “the efficacy of our efforts.” At the highest levels of the organization, including the 
superintendent, data is being reviewed and acted upon when it doesn’t meet expectations that appear to 
be on track. Various central office administrators were cited as identifying their monitoring systems as a 
key component of their sense-making and therefore of their implementation of turnaround policy. 
Accountability. Accountability is also a major finding, as it recurred throughout excerpts of 
interviews we analyzed.  Interviewees reported that central office developed its own accountability and 
performance system. Initially, central office administrators prioritized the district’s schools using a red/ 
yellow/ green system to prioritize schools by performance data to determine the level of support needed. 
This process also entailed having conversations around school data between central office administrators 
and school leadership teams. They identified strengths and weaknesses and developed joint priorities to 
focus their short-term and long-term actions. In the quote below, a central office administrator describes 
the new level of accountability and transparency during a school data review session: 
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For the next two months, all my memos, your feedback, your walkthrough data, it should really 
be around this, right? We didn’t do that before. We had a data system. We certainly have worked 
more on putting benchmarks in place, but there wasn’t accountability at the school level. So now 
that we do this, the other thing we'll do is this has everything, our data is transparent among 
schools, so we share, not just your data, but everybody's data. It's out there. 
This quote supports the idea of a shift in the LEA and for central office administrators. They employed a 
targeted and focused approach to data analysis and action planning to provide for clarity of direction to 
and follow-up by school leadership. This is crucial to implementation of the turnaround policy because 
there are clear expectations from the central office that there will be thorough follow-up on the part of 
school leadership.  
Additionally, administrators reported that if central office staff, principals, or teachers are not 
performing and not meeting district expectations, the superintendent will remove and replace them. One 
administrator reported, “It's really a team process that happens, but she is a strong superintendent in the 
sense that if there are people in those buildings who aren't able to do the work or ready for the work, 
she'll remove them; she has no problem with that.” This is a key leadership factor that three central 
office administrators identified in district support to schools.  Accountability started at the top with the 
superintendent and trickled down throughout the organization. Monitoring and accountability systems in 
the district are led by the superintendent, which sends the message that student achievement is 
important. One central office administrator reported:  
I think because we are so focused and targeted, that unlike before, if people were doing their own 
thing, they sort of flew under the radar, because [they] wouldn’t be so noticed,…but now it’s 
being addressed. When we look at that data, those schools in the red, those are the schools that 
are going to get called in by the superintendent. Those are the schools that [Sally] is going to say 
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‘Let me see all of your school review reports. Let’s have a discussion with the principal. What’s 
going on?...because we’re seeing the data is low in ELA…’I think it is so open now that if you 
wanted to do your own thing that didn’t go along with the district, then you will most likely be at 
another district, because this is where we’re going.” 
The above quote provides a rich description of the expectations, specifically the intersection between 
monitoring and accountability. Assessment data is used to measure student skills and if the data trends 
negatively, the school review partner is addressed by the Assistant Superintendent and Superintendent, 
who may also bring the school principal into the conversation. Moreover, while schools are provided 
with support to help them improve, the administrator acknowledged that in the past there might have 
been principals, teachers, or central office administrators who did not buy into the vision established by 
the superintendent for the district. If educators in the district are not aligned with the vision, they are 
directly or indirectly asked to leave their position or the district.  
 Central office administrators self-identify their role as one of “support, monitoring, and holding 
[schools] accountable and providing feedback.” Administrators described the ultimate brunt of 
accountability coming down on them from school committee members if the data is not where it should 
be.  Consequently, central office administrators find it important to give feedback to ensure that schools 
continuously improve before the stakes are high on state assessments. State assessments being one of the 
key measures that will determine whether or not a school and district exits level D status, the district has 
aligned benchmark assessments and feedback cycles around the state assessment to ensure schools are 
on track to prepare students for success. As described by one central office administrator:  
We actually begin every year, every school gets a data think tank session and we’ll review the 
MCAS data and the goal is I will have the school analyze the data and then I’ll have analyzed the 
data, and then we’ll come to, a ‘come to Jesus’ kind of meeting and say, “What are you looking 
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at? What did you notice? I’ll tell you if I noticed the same thing.” But the purpose is for the 
schools to set short-term high priority goals, so this is what I really need to work on. 
As the administrator above described, the district has established structures and routines across the 
district’s schools that promote accountability for student achievement and school performance. Central 
office administrators led this effort on behalf of the superintendent and this work is continuous 
throughout the school year. Central office administrators organize their work around supporting, 
monitoring, and holding schools accountable for student achievement.  
Finding III: Distribution of financial resources and human capital management   
Distribution of financial resources. When discussing what it takes to turnaround a school and 
all of the district’s chronically underperforming schools, central office administrators in multiple 
interviews stressed that school turnaround was building level work. Additionally, they saw principal 
leadership as the primary ingredient to school turnaround. It was clear that their sense-making around 
how to, and why schools improved, was the result of the actions of a strong school leader. When asked 
about why school 3 was not successful at making rapid dramatic change, central office leaders cited turn 
over in principal leadership as the primary reason. Moreover, central office administrators understood 
principal leadership to be essential to successful turnaround efforts in school 1 and 2, in comparison to 
school 3. In response to a question about whether or not all turnaround schools had the same access to 
resources the superintendent responded as follows:    
No, they didn’t have the same [resources] but what school 1 had that school 2 and school 3 did 
not have was that they were an expanded learning time school…But yes, school 3 had the same 
sort of resources.  That school, I mean I often talk in the community about the school because it 
was just so heart wrenching to close it and people were upset.  But that school went through 
three superintendents, five principals and a variety of different strategies and it could not turn 
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around.  So again, the simple answer is yes.  They had the equivalent [resources].  It’s just that 
they could not make effective use of those resources despite different leaders and different 
strategies.  It just never could gain any traction. 
What the superintendent describes encompasses a combination of building leadership and resource 
utilization. Her assessment was that the only resource that all three schools did not have in common was 
the Extended Learning Time (ELT) grant. Outside of the grant, the impression of the superintendent was 
that the schools were provided “equivalent” resources. When the question of equal distribution of 
resources was posed to another central office administrator, he responded: 
A lot of resources have been put in those schools. I mean, we put a lot of resources in [school 3] 
too, it just didn’t work, for a variety of reasons, but like extending the time. One of the huge 
initiatives in the District, which we want all [level D] schools, actually we only have one, [school 
4], just got designated, but as many as possible, with the extended learning time, so we did pay 
for that. 
This quote supports the superintendent’s quote above that additional resources were also provided for 
schools 2 and 3, specifically in the area of extended learning time. It is not clear to what extent and 
whether or not this was equal. While the ELT grant provided potentially a minor difference between 
access to resources at various schools; the superintendent, teachers and principals who were interviewed 
voiced a different perspective. A teacher at a turnaround school within the district provided the 
following assessment of salary differences amongst district schools.  
Initially the principal wanted us to work for free for an hour and a half every day.  Free.  When 
right up the street at [another] school to work two hours extra a day they were getting $18,000 a 
year and [school 1] as well.  They have an ELT grant.  They’re getting like between, if you’re a 
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younger teacher you’re getting like $12,000 and if you’re a veteran teacher probably getting like 
$18,000.  So I was going to work for free but my colleagues are getting, you know what?  
The above teacher described the differences in teacher compensation across schools for working an 
additional 90 minutes daily. This aligns with the superintendent’s statements around the ELT grant 
providing additional resources to school 1 unlike schools 2 and 3. The disparity in resources appears 
vast as we learn more about the amount of financial resources provided to school 1 to sustain its 
improved student achievement.  
 A school board member interviewed provided a different perspective on resource allocation to 
turnaround schools within the school system: 
There’s been a lot, the school that has received the greatest amount of money for [turnaround] is 
[school 1]. They’ve received a lot of money for this…Now, I’m glad they went from a level [D] 
to a level [B]. However, their level [B] is just slightly above the minimum. I wish I had brought 
my data because of the fact that the overall scores that schools have is from 1 to 99. And, 20, 
below 20 you’re a level [C], above 20 you’re a level [B], of which case, and that’s a percentile of 
all of the schools of similar size and whatnot in the state. Well, fine [school 2], I think is 
something like 26. So, yes, it’s a level [B] school. Congratulations, I agree. A lot of money was 
put in to achieve this. 
The school board member explains that school 2 was expected to improve due to the many resources 
allocated to the school. In-fact, she went so far as to say that school 2 received the greatest amount of 
financial resources from the district. This demonstrates the lack of consistency in terms of the message 
throughout the school system about which schools were allocated what amount of funds and for what 
purposes. A principal within the district provided comments along these lines in addressing resource 
allocation. She explains, “there’s not a formula out in the district that says oh if you have 800 kids these 
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are the supports you get.  If you have 600 kids these are the supports you get.  That’s a struggle for me 
because I came from a system that was very structured like that so that it was equitable in terms of 
supports.”  This principal suggested the creation of a resource allocation model to provide a district 
policy that’s transparent to ensure equitable resource distribution.  
 The school board as a whole is charged with the task of hiring and evaluating the superintendent, 
creating and approving district policy and providing schools with resources by approving the budget. In 
interviews of school board members, they also provided some ambivalence around resource allocation 
and raised concerns around not having enough resources.  
What are we going to do with that one? [School 4], on the scale of 1 to 99, it’s a [level B], no I’m 
sorry it’s a [D]. I mean you can’t get much lower than that. It’s a one, right? The [school], 
another elementary school, a brand new building, with all the bells and whistles that it needs, 
they’re a [level B]. The [school], which is in my neighborhood, another new school, a [level B]. 
These schools need an influx of funds. Now, there’s only so much money available of which 
case the amount of money that is being expended for wrap-around services in there, although if 
indeed we had endless amount of money, that would be fantastic, but we don’t. Now, where do 
we get the biggest bang for the buck? In my opinion, that money is coming from Race to the Top 
funds, of which case I would rather see that money being used to have more teachers in the 
classroom, to have those classrooms, even though you might have 25 kids in the early grades in 
there, but it’s still difficult to get the 25 students. 
Here the school board member questions how to address the challenges at it’s most recently designated 
turnaround school, school 4. Additionally he questions whether or not the “wrap-around zones” that 
were funded at schools 1 and 2, were the best use of funds to address the needs of the school in order to 
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improve student performance. He raises the question about whether not wrap-around zone funding might 
be better spent on providing additional teachers within each school.  
 In reviewing the data collected, it’s clear that there are concerns across the implementer groups 
within the larger study with resource allocation to support school turnaround. While the superintendent 
and central office administrators may be more clear about how district priorities are funded and 
prioritized. Principals, teachers, and school board members have various takes on how these decisions 
are made and some requested the creation of equitable systems of resource distribution and/ or the 
realignment of resources based on the needs of various schools throughout the school system.  
 Human capital management.  Human capital management was another area of finding that was 
impacted by superintendent and central office administrator sense-making of state turnaround policy.  
The context for the LEA is important in this finding, because the school system did not have a human 
resources chief prior to the 2013-2014 school year. The superintendent therefore exercised authority 
over and carried-out many of the human resource functions. While this structure may not have been an 
intentional move to support the implementation of turnaround policy, it allowed the superintendent to be 
intimately involved with the provisioning and development of human resources.  
 A part of the superintendent’s human resources strategy was to give building principals hiring 
and staffing authority.  Principals were given autonomy for the most part with choosing and opting out 
of teachers who they believed were not working toward the school goals and supporting the initiatives. 
The principal of school 1 noted:  
A huge thing, and it was a huge bad thing in [another LEA], OK? Was that [the superintendent] 
said that no one could bump into the level [D] schools. OK? And that was particularly good 
because as [school 1] developed the extended learning time, the teachers made more money. And 
so people that weren’t any good wanted to come in. And she gave me the power to say no.  
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As the principal described, she was given the ability to choose who taught in her school. If there were 
lay-offs or level D excising from other turnaround schools within the system, she could choose who was 
assigned to the building instead of hiring to follow the seniority system created by the local collective 
bargaining unit. This proved helpful in ensuring that quality teachers were in the most needy schools. A 
teacher at [school 1] interviewed also appreciated this practice: 
I know the funding aspect of things and providing resources in terms of professional 
development.  I think giving our administration the latitude to hire and fire was key.  It might not 
be a popular opinion but I think that was important.  I really do because otherwise there were 
teachers that shouldn’t have been here and probably shouldn’t have been teaching to begin with.  
They went off to other schools in the district.  It just got too difficult for them.  I make it sound 
like [the principal] was, she was a hard taskmaster but she was warm and fuzzy underneath all of 
that.  You just didn’t see it unless you needed to see it, I guess.   
The teacher admits that providing principals with the latitude to hire and fire, although most would not 
agree with him, was one of the best tools provided to principals to rapidly improve academic outcomes. 
At the school 4, the new Human Resources director assisted the superintendent with implanting the 
process. A teacher below describes:  
So basically the way that they’re handling it, because it was done during like the school year had 
already started, we had already had classes and stuff, they’re allowing teachers to opt out. So if 
the teacher opts out, they will be placed somewhere else in the district. The day that we found 
out that we could opt out or that half of us were going to be fired, or all of us were going to be 
fired, immediately the tone changed. It was negative. Everybody, a lot of the older teachers that 
had been here for a long time were talking about well maybe I should opt out, and immediately 
they were checked out, and I don’t think they ever came back.  
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The teacher above describes the method by which teachers were informed of potential involuntary 
transfer from level D turnaround schools. It also appeared to have a negative effect on staff morale 
during the middle of the school year. The superintendent described the same process as it took place in 
school 2. She notes:  
Well this was the principal was very strategic and this was at [school 2].  I loved the way she did 
this and we have replicated since that time. So when [school 2] was first declared as a [level D] 
school she pulled her staff together and said, “What do you think is necessary from staff in order 
to turn around a [level D] school? Let’s put up the characteristics of a staff and the characteristics 
of an individual teacher that would work in a [level D] school in a way that would turn it around 
again rapidly.”  So they did that in a faculty meeting and so she had this chart paper of okay here 
are the characteristics.  It is really defined.  You have got to give it all you’ve got…So then she 
met with each individual teacher with that chart paper hanging up in her office and said, “Is that 
you?”…So some teacher said, “No, that is not me.  So those teachers felt selected out because 
they realized…And then some other teachers she had to really kind of counsel through, “Are 
you…?  “Oh yes, that is me.”  So really let’s take a look at this.  Is this really you?  And it was a 
couple of meetings.  So she was able to effectively transition 50% of her staff out through that 
process who ultimately fell selected out.  And I just thought that was a really…Because there 
were no hard feelings in that.  It was sort of a self-discovery process for teachers that no, this 
isn’t…I am not going to be able to do this work.  It didn’t mean they were ineffective or bad 
teachers.  There is just something we have found very unique about a teacher, the skill set of a 
teacher that works in a level [D] school.   
As the superintendent explained this was a more effective way of notifying teachers of the involuntary 
transfer procedures because it allowed teachers to engage in self-reflection about their own readiness for 
turnaround work. This is a practice that could be made uniform across schools, as it would provide 
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principals with an effective strategy to allow teachers to feel as if they are apart of the process and less 
like turnaround is something that is happening to them.  
 Financial and human resources allocation and management are integral to turnaround policy 
implementation and superintendent and central office administrator understanding of resource allocation 
and management impacts how they implement turnaround policy.   The findings including concerns 
raised by multiple implementers around use of financial resources to support and sustain school 
turnaround and managing human resources to ensure effectiveness throughout the organization.   
Discussion 
Impact of sense-making on policy implementation. Weick (1995) describes sense-making as  “how 
(individuals) construct what they construct, why and with what effects” (p. 4). The research questions 
within study sought out to answer how superintendent and central office administrator sense-making 
impacted turnaround policy implementation. More specifically, Spillane et al. (2006) discusses that 
sense-making and cognition requires individuals to understand a policy and then alter their practice as a 
result. They further argue that learning new ideas using old schemas can hinder policy goal attainment. 
Therefore in understanding the impact of sense-making on turnaround policy implementation within this 
case study, the discussion section will seek to provide more context around implementer actions and 
outcomes and furthermore provide implications for successful turnaround policy implementation within 
other contexts. 
superintendent leadership/ instructional leadership. State turnaround legislation provides the 
superintendent with key actions that must take place on a timeline throughout the 
implementation process. While these are more technical guidelines, it does provide that the chief 
officer of the SEA has the right to reject the superintendent’s plan for the turnaround schools and 
return it to the superintendent for further consideration. Inherent within the policy is the 
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understanding that while this may be school level work, the superintendent is ultimately 
responsible for ensuring that the policy is implemented well and meets policy goals through 
executing the turnaround plan submitted to the SEA. Instructional leadership, courageous 
decision-making, and social capital were the three major areas of finding within the realm of 
superintendent leadership. For instructional leadership, the findings revealing of the various 
ways the superintendent served as an instructional leader helped set the context for a results 
driven culture focused on student achievement. Within schools 1 and 2, this had an impact on the 
focus exhibited by and support perceived by the principals. Based on her own prior knowledge 
and back ground in the same school system, the superintendent understands what was needed to 
move turnaround work forward. Consistent with Spillane et al. (2006), the superintendent 
combined her existing knowledge with the understanding of policy expectations. If what Spillane 
et. al. (2006) argues holds, that understanding of the policy hinges on whether not implementers 
alter their practice as a result of implementing the policy, it could be argued that this 
superintendent understood the policy. One of those shifts in practice is her message to central 
office administrators that central office exists to serve schools. This was a change in thinking that 
led to a support and monitoring model as described in findings section II above.  
courageous decision-making. While this finding did not have as much data support as others, 
the severity of the action to close a school taken by the superintendent deserves attention since 
it’s not often the route chosen by superintendents who are implementing this policy throughout 
the nation.  School closure can be politically messy and difficult for all citizens within a 
community, however the superintendent also understood the real threat of having the SEA take 
over a school and the negative perception that could come along with having to take on a 
managing partner. For a superintendent who spent at least ten years in the district previous to 
being named superintendent, courageous decision-making, or making potentially politically 
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contentious decisions like school closings or removal of ineffective principals and teachers could 
be difficult leadership moves. In some ways, making a courageous decision is making a political 
decision in the best interest of students. Malen (2006) points out that in some instances the 
influence of politics on policy implementer sense-making can alter the methods taken by the 
implementer and result in policy dilution. While dilution may be difficult, it could “erode social 
reform.”   Malen adds, 
Even at the local level, deeply rooted traditions of incremental decision making and 
broadly held views about occupational survival may prompt district officials to select and 
enact policies that “attract...notice” and enhance legitimacy, but do not alter 
fundamentally, the orientations and operations of the school system (Malen, 2006, p. 97).  
Application of Malen’s theory to the decision of the superintendent to close a turnaround school 
as a strategy to address chronic underperformance could be viewed as “occupational survival.” 
While the federal regulation and state regulation does allow the superintendent to make this 
choice, it could be argued that school closure is not transformative and is not sustainable or 
replicable. While the superintendent may have met policy goals by decreasing the impact of 
underperforming schools by SEA standards, it could be argued by some that this action did not 
fundamentally alter the overall system. The teachers and students were simply moved to other 
schools. On the contrary, it could also be argued that the schools that teachers and students were 
moved to are no longer turnaround schools and therefore can provide a better education for the 
students as well as a better professional learning environment for teachers.  In a recent news 
article, I learned that the school that was closed at the end of the 2012-2013 school year (school 
3) will be re-opening under the same name in the fall of 2014- 2015. While it’s too early to 
determine what the population and make-up of the school will look like, the SEA has decided 
that it will not be leveled using the SEA accountability system because of the absence of data the 
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year it closed. Again, I note that the act of closing the school itself serves as evidence that the 
superintendent is willing to alter practice and make bold decisions in order to do what has not 
been done before to reach policy goals.  
social capital.  Another area of significance to be noted is the superintendent’s social capital and 
ability to bring key stakeholders on-board in the process of getting the school system and greater 
community to think differently about turnaround schools. Multiple central office administrators 
interviewed noted the respect the superintendent has amongst the community and how she has 
tried to leverage her social capital at various points, including during the closing of school 3. A 
December 2013 article recognized the superintendent as “Person of the Year,” within the local 
town and specifically recognized the courageous decision that she had to make in closing 
chronically underperforming school 3. As mentioned in the findings section within this chapter, 
as well as in the theoretical framework of previous chapters, an important component of social 
capital is social trust, which in this context is the extent to which school system staff and 
community organizations want to collaborate with the superintendent to achieve policy goals. 
The continued partnerships and the recent “Person of the Year” article serve as soft evidence that 
the superintendent still remains popular amongst key community stakeholders, which is essential 
for continuing to reach policy goals. 
support for schools. Practice was again altered, in keeping with the definition of sense-making 
provided by Spillane et al. (2006), when the superintendent and central office administrators 
created and implemented a system for providing support to schools. Findings data from teachers, 
principals, and central office administrators demonstrated that there were a number of areas that 
improved as result of turnaround policy implementation. Curriculum development, benchmark 
assessments, and data analysis support were amongst some of the key areas identified by 
implementers of areas of support provided by central office. 
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monitoring schools. The school review partner process was probably one of the most explicit 
examples of central office administrators altering practice to implement turnaround policy. As 
one administrator described the ineffectiveness of all administrators visiting each individual 
school together, now they have adopted a more targeted approach as School Review Partners 
(SRP). They also noted the creation of data review sessions to identify weakness areas, allowing 
them to problem solve with central office administrators and school leadership all within the 
same room. The sense-making theoretical lens that applies to this finding is identified by Datnow 
(2006) as “co-construction,” allowing implementer interactions to influence one another over 
time and co-construct” meaning of the policy. The periodic data review sessions and having 
SRPs review meeting minutes, memos, benchmark data and other information with school 
leadership helps facilitate the co-construction process not only for school based staff, but also for 
the central office administrators involved.  
accountability for schools. The superintendent holds central office administrators, principals, 
and teachers accountable through rating schools using the red/ yellow/ green system, 
continuously analyzing data and having difficult conversations when needed. Again, Datnow’s 
(2006) co-construction theory factors into how implementers make sense of turnaround policy, 
as the superintendent and central office administrators hold them accountable.  
financial resource allocation and human resource management. For financial and human 
resource allocation and management, respectively, the major concerns from the findings were 
around transparency of the resource allocation and decision making processes. School committee 
members and teachers specifically expressed a lack of clarity around how decisions were made 
to resource some schools more so than others, and the ways in which staff would be removed or 
involuntarily transferred from schools.  This relates to Malen (2006) and the political frame of 
sense-making and policy implementation in that there are decisions that have broad ramifications 
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and impact on the lives of individuals. Since resource allocation, like politics, often come from 
belief systems, are “value-laden,” and impact the livelihood of implementers, the superintendent 
and central office administrators may find it difficult to be completely transparent.  
Contribution to theoretical knowledge. This set of findings will contribute to the theoretical 
frame by providing insight into the ways in which politics and other factors contribute to superintendent 
and central office sense-making as they attempt to implement policy.  An analyses of the preliminary 
qualitative data and findings demonstrates that the political ramifications and perception of the 
community, school committee, and DESE all impacted the way in which central office administrators 
made sense of implementing turnaround policy. Malen (2006) draws on Bardach’s (1977) framework 
that presents the idea of “political games” as a metaphor for how stakeholders interact to achieve policy 
goals within the political arena.  
In my analysis of the findings, it does appear that sense-making is impacted by a number of 
factors and that it influences how policy is implemented. The findings demonstrate a link to the 
theoretical research on the impact of politics on sense-making in policy implementation. Interviewees 
noted that the threat and fear of SEA takeover of their schools and system in being named level F was a 
major impetus to ensuring dramatic interventions and in some cases rapid improvement in the system’s 
chronically underperforming schools. There are three schools that were level D turnaround schools from 
2010-2013, referred to here within as schools 1, 2, and 3. While school 1 was labeled chronically 
underperforming in 2003, school 2 was labeled in 2010 when  the state legislation was enacted. School 1 
began to continuously improve, while school 3 showed no improvement and was plagued by 
inconsistent leadership. Each year school 3 did not meet its annual student achievement goals on state 
assessments in English Language Arts and Math.  School 2 improved within the three-year timeframe 
prescribed by the policy. The fear of having the school and/or district labeled as level F with direct state 
intervention was enough to compel the superintendent and central leadership to close school 3. Central 
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office administrators reported, “Of course we ultimately do not want any of our schools to be managed 
by a [educational management organization] or the SEA, and we ran out of time, so the superintendent 
decided to close the school.” This demonstrates that dramatic action was taken based on the aggressive 
timeline and the threat of state takeover or level F status. The enduring understandings are that there is a 
link between sense-making and understanding of the turnaround policy and successful policy 
implementation. Successful policy implementation is defined as meeting policy goals. If this is true, it 
becomes important for future studies to consider what implementation models might be appropriate to 
test to create a body of research in this area. 
Contribution to practical knowledge. Overall this study will provide superintendents and 
district administrators with an understanding of the importance of sense-making on implementing new 
policies. This study will argue that being aware of all of the factors that influence sense-making in high 
stakes situations is crucial to overall success, as the case study LEA was intentional in some key ways 
that contributed to their success. Additionally, this study will provide district administrators with 
strategies that have proven successful in a school district that struggles with many challenges faced by 
urban school districts and other “gateway” cities that serve recent immigrant populations. The School 
Review Partner process is one best practice for superintendent and central office administrators if they 
are looking to implement policy on turnaround or other areas where they will be responsible for schools 
accomplishing dramatic and rapid gains in a short time period. Finally, the study confirmed what 
research says around central office leadership moves and it’s potential impact on improving outcomes 
for students. What’s unique about this particular case was the leadership and willingness of the 
superintendent to not just remove ineffective leaders at the school and central office level, but to remove 
them from the district all together.  
Limitations. The limitations of the study include time available for research, central office 
administrator sample size, and lack of access to follow-up interviews and research. In searching for the 
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LEA to research, there was a one to two month delay in being able to locate the appropriate school 
system in which to conduct this study in addition to getting the LEA respond in a timely manner. From 
the time we had our initial meeting with the superintendent to the point of receiving the letter of 
commitment from the district took a month. Additionally, waiting for approval from the Institutional 
Review Board (IRB) added time to the process. After IRB approval, the LEA it took a few weeks to 
schedule the interviews and complete them. These obstacles add to the limitations by shortening the 
research window and curtailing the length of time needed for collecting more data.  
The LEA had eight viable central office administrators that were appropriate to interview based 
on their position and assignments. Only six responded and there was not a major push from the 
superintendent to require administrators to interview. With the scarcity of time, this also made it difficult 
to have more data to collect for analysis. To compensate for have a sample size of six, this study draws 
on the interview data collected within the larger study, including teacher, school administrator, and 
school committee member interviews. Moreover, there was little follow-up from the superintendent or 
central office administrators when asked for additional interviews or documents for analysis and data 
triangulation. These areas provided in the research collection and analysis process and therefore serve as 
limitations to the study.  
Recommendations 
Superintendent leadership. Superintendent leadership is essential to the turnaround policy 
implementation process. It is recommended that the superintendent engage in dialogues with teachers to 
build social capital amongst this group of stakeholders, as it appeared to be an underutilized stakeholder 
group. Additionally, this will help with changing the perception of there being a lack of transparency by 
the central office. This transparency and trust building process can begin at the top of the organization 
between the superintendent and the school committee, as multiple qualitative data points revealed this an 
area were there are pockets of distrust (specifically as it relates to transparency and resource utilization). 
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This can be accomplished through frequent Board of Education retreats and a public strategic planning 
process that culminates in a systemic strategic plan that goes beyond the LEA’s current School System 
Improvement Plan. This would allow for continued implementation of turnaround policy, but could also 
began to shift the conversation from the LEA being a “chronically under-performing district,” to a 
district with a clear vision and plan of execution to provide students with 21st century skills.  
Support, monitoring, and accountability. The LEA is encouraged to ensure that clear 
communication channels are established between central office administrators, teachers and principals 
regarding the purpose and procedures behind the School Review Partner (SRP) process. While the 
current SRP process is helpful, some teachers were unaware of it and it was not clear that principals 
fully understood it to be connected to monitoring and accountability.  Additionally, it also may be 
possible to make meaningful connections between the SRP process and other monitoring systems 
throughout the district including principal evaluation or school improvement planning. The support, 
monitoring, and accountability systems can also be placed on a digital dashboard and be made available 
to principals so that they can have ready access to the same data that central office has to make informed 
real-time decisions.  
Financial and human resources. It’s recommended that the LEA provide clear and transparent 
communication around resource allocation and human resource management practices/ strategies. The 
LEA is encouraged to provide all school system and community stakeholders with a clear picture of 
resource allocation to schools, especially chronically underperforming schools. While this may add 
amore political layers onto to the work of leading schools, it could also promote trust amongst 
stakeholders, central administrators and the superintendent, ultimately providing greater transparency 
and implementer understanding of the LEAs turnaround strategy.  
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It is also recommended that the LEA develop a model for equitable resource distribution across 
schools to be re-assessed annually based on the change in school population, demographics, and 
programming by building. This is specifically recommended regarding assignment of full time teaching 
positions, grant funding, additional financial commitments that translate into and impact resources 
available to schools to improve student achievement outcomes. This would result in a more transparent 
process that is known by stakeholders in advance of resource allocation.  
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Chapter Five: Discussion5 
Our study looked at sense-making of policy implementation from the perspective of four 
different implementer groups in a single LEA’s chronically underperforming schools. Sense-making 
involves the understanding and interpretation of policies and their intended meanings and it can 
influence the success or failure of reform initiatives (Honig, 2006). We wanted to understand the role 
sense-making played in what the implementers actually did and what they thought was effective as a 
result. Each of the four implementer groups (School Board, superintendent/central office, school 
leadership, and teachers) identified the goal of turnaround as sustainable improvement in the LEA's 
chronically underperforming schools. Each of the four researchers in this study examined a different 
group of implementers and produced individual findings for the group studied. By looking across our 
findings from the different levels of implementation within the same local education agency (LEA) we 
were able to come up with important recommendations about communication, the importance of data, 
and the use of resources to support turnaround. 
        In this chapter, we present the following three broad recommendations to help the LEA reach its 
stated goal of sustainable improvement from its turnaround policy implementation. First, there needs to 
be a focus on improved communication between implementers. By researching four different 
implementation levels we were able to identify areas where increased communication could aid this 
process. Our second recommendation involves the need for the LEA to specify a process for resource 
allocation. The implementers we studied experienced frustration over what they perceived as 
inconsistencies in how resources were distributed across the LEA. Building a consistent and transparent 
system of resource allocation would increase trust and effectiveness. Our third recommendation involves 
developing the capacity of implementers to work with data. Over and over again our findings pointed to 
                                                       
5 This chapter was jointly written by the authors listed and reflects the team approach of this project: 
Jamie Chisum, Anna Cross, and Jill Geiser.  
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the value of data to communicate progress of the school and to inform instruction in the classroom, 
however the capacity to understand and work with this valuable tool was inconsistent across 
implementers. An increased focus on professional development for all levels of implementers in the area 
of data use would aid the process of turning around the failing schools of the LEA. 
 
Recommendations 
Recommendation One: Communication Between Implementers 
Communication is a broad term that encompasses many important findings from our individual 
studies. Because increased communication helps to facilitate sense-making (Datnow, 2006; Honig, 
2006), we looked at how facilitating communication between all parties increased their capacity to make 
sense of what they were being asked to do. We also examined the importance of adaptive 
communication to promote sense-making (Heifitz, Grashaw, Linskey, 2009). Adaptive communication 
leads to adaptive behaviors and centers more on implementer beliefs and behaviors rather than merely 
on the technical requirements of the policy. Finally, the four of us identified some specific areas where 
communication can be strengthened. 
A finding in each of our four studies involved the need for the turnaround policy to be 
communicated on a continual basis throughout the implementer chain from the school board, 
superintendent, school leaders, on to teachers and back again. Some of this communication involved the 
requirements of the plan and what it meant for a school to be named as chronically underperforming. 
There were simply things that had to be done for compliance and the superintendent needed to 
disseminate that information up to the school board and then down to principals and teachers. We found 
traditional structures such as school board and principal meetings and staff meetings in local schools 
were in place where this communication might happen. In the early part of the turnaround 
implementation this took on a very directive flavor. Teachers and principals who feared for their jobs 
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were not in a position to debate the merits of the turnaround plan. Their perceived job at the introduction 
of this crisis of designation was to hear the directive communication from their bosses and to perform 
the task they were being told to do. This was also true in the case of the superintendent’s communication 
of the plan to the school board, even though the board was clearly tasked with hiring and firing the 
superintendent. According to the turnaround legislation, the superintendent of the education agency is 
the person responsible for writing and communicating the plans to everyone else in the system. Oddly 
enough, the superintendent’s communication to the school board in this LEA was also directive. 
 Members of the committee understood their role in the turnaround process to be merely doing what the 
state and the superintendent told them they needed to do. This was clearly efficient in the early stages of 
the process. With the need for local education agencies to complete their turnaround in under three 
years, the pressure to begin the action phase of any plan is immense and pushes leaders to spend less 
time discussing and more time trying to make gains in student achievement. Directive communication 
appears to be the most effective way to enter the process quickly. 
Our research suggested that the communication became more complicated during the next steps 
of the implementation process. Once the plan for turnaround was communicated, different implementers 
confronted the realities of putting that plan into action. Inevitably more communication became 
necessary. For example, the school board needed to reach out to the community and begin 
communicating with people about how they were responding to the new designation. The superintendent 
needed to hand off the work of implementation to the members of the central staff and the building 
principal in order to be able to attend to all her other tasks. Finally, building principals needed to enable 
teachers to change the work they had been doing in order to improve student results. In the action phase 
of implementation, communication needed to be multi-directional and sense made by each implementer 
(Datnow, 2006; Honig, 2006). Community members wanted their questions answered and their concerns 
heard. Principals needed access to resources from central office to train staff or purchase materials 
TURNING AROUND SCHOOLS: A VIEW FROM IMPLEMENTERS 
  98 
necessary to follow the plan. Teachers needed to be engaged in what Datnow calls "co-construction" as 
they discussed with each other their interpretation of the turnaround process. 
The difference between the type of communication needed for an understanding of the turnaround 
designation and the communication necessary for an effective implementation of the plan are essentially 
the difference between technical and adaptive communication (Heifitz, Grashow, & Linsky, 2009). 
Heifitz et al. (2009) define adaptive leadership as, “the practice of mobilizing people to tackle tough 
challenges and thrive.” ( p. 2). Our studies found that technical communication between and among the 
implementers had already been accomplished. The LEA knew it was designated as chronically 
underperforming. From the school board to the teachers, implementers understood the need for raising 
test scores. Principals and central office staff helped to communicate the formal process of how teachers 
might opt out of working in a turnaround school. Staff at all levels had a functional understanding of 
what the turnaround designation meant and what the school needed to do in order to be successful. 
However, from our research we identified two areas of need involving adaptive communication. The 
first was the need to establish the new beliefs and culture of turnaround. The second was to answer two 
essential questions for the individual implementer engaged in turnaround work: 1) What is my role in 
turnaround?; and 2) What are the expectations of that role? 
During the beginning phase of turnaround the superintendent and building leadership drafted 
plans that became the shared vision of the work. This phase relied much more on the dissemination of 
information rather than discussion between implementers. The second phase of implementation relied 
more heavily on ideas involving co-construction, where implementers made sense of their role by 
talking to people in similar roles (Datnow, 2006). They came to a new understanding of their role in the 
turnaround process by contextualizing and interpreting directives by the superintendent or the building 
leadership through their own experience and prior knowledge (Spillane et al., 2006). When success was 
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achieved in different places in the LEA, we found that implementers next needed to create a culture with 
norms that internalized the wisdom of this newly formed knowledge. Communication at this stage 
became far more complicated because the people who were involved in the work of turnaround were 
now more knowledgeable. School Board members saw what worked and what didn’t and began to 
question where efficiencies could be found. Central office personnel began to understand patterns in 
data and behaviors as a result of their work. Principals spoke about removing themselves to the 
background as teachers began to lead improvement initiatives without being asked. 
From these findings the research team has derived three ways we believe communication can be 
strengthened in this LEA to improve the turnaround process and it's sustainability. Our 
recommendations focus on using existing structures and developing better communication processes that 
can take place within them. The first recommendation is the use of the building principal meetings with 
central office staff to develop a common language around what it means to turn around underperforming 
schools and to help schools change before they are designated as underperforming. The second has to do 
with use of the broad representation of implementers present in the original local stakeholders group to 
provide an ongoing planning board throughout implementation phases. A third way communication can 
be strengthened is through an effort to ensure the school board understands the work of turnaround and 
their specific role in it. 
Within the local education agency we studied, since 2009 there have been four schools 
designated as chronically underperforming. Two of these schools have successfully exited and become a 
level A and level B school respectively. A third school was closed by the LEA rather than be allowed to 
fall to level F status, and a fourth school was newly designated as chronically underperforming in the 
fall prior to the beginning of our study. There are lessons to be learned from all of these cases. Both 
successful schools have stories to tell about what made a difference in their turn around efforts. 
Principals at those schools should be used to offer wisdom to other schools in the LEA about how to 
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succeed on an ongoing basis. Certainly all school turnaround contexts have unique elements to them, but 
within a single education agency there is wisdom to be shared across schools. 
Central Office Principal Meetings. The common language and wisdom gleaned through 
communication at these principal and central office meetings would be valuable for the principals of 
schools who are not yet designated as chronically underperforming. Principals of all schools we 
observed were tracking closely their student performance data and several of the schools designated as 
level C were working hard to find ways of avoiding an eventual level D designation. Explicit 
communication about how two schools succeeded and how a third failed would be invaluable for these 
level C principals. Central Office staff can develop an understanding about these different scenarios by 
looking across what happened at all three schools and sharing the information at these meetings. This 
data should form the basis of the agency’s plan to support not only the newly designated level D school, 
but also other schools who are struggling to avoid such a designation. 
Wisdom gained from these principal and central office meetings would also benefit 
implementers on the opposite ends of the chain (teachers and school board members) by communicating 
plans to improve student learning prior to a chronically underperforming designation. Opportunities 
could be created for teachers from turned around schools to share experiences with the staff in newly 
designated schools as well as schools that are in danger of falling to this designation. Principals at the 
level C schools could begin creating shared visions for student success and hopefully improve the 
academic experience of their current students before an intervention was demanded from the state. 
Communication should not only focus on the best (and worst) practices but also on helping teachers and 
school board members to better understand the purpose of turnaround as well as the expectations of their 
role within the policy. 
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Local Stakeholders Group. Another recommendation is that the composition of the Local 
Stakeholders Group (LSG) should be replicated on the school’s redesign team. The LSG is composed of 
members of the community at large, the school board, teachers, and administrators from the school and 
central office. Some LEA's also include students where developmentally appropriate. The purpose of the 
LSG is to come up with a list of recommendations for a superintendent as he or she develops the 
turnaround plan for the local education agency. Once the recommendations are made, however, this 
group is disbanded. All of the stakeholders on the group continue to be concerned about the well being 
of their school, but often the school’s redesign team does not include anyone from outside the school’s 
staff. Including a representative group of stakeholders similar to the LSG composition would help to 
increase communication between the different stakeholder groups. Consistent meetings about the 
progress of the school will help keep everyone informed and could possibly aid in the procurement of 
resources from the members of this group. Ongoing input and communication within a redesign team 
with this type of constitution could pose a challenge to the building principal’s authority and 
accountability without a clear understanding of norms, protocols, and expectations for how these 
meetings should be run. The central office representative and the building principal should be in 
constant communication over how the group is functioning and revisiting the norms and expectations 
whenever necessary to ensure the effectiveness of the team. 
Building School Board Capacity.  The need for clearer expectations about the role and 
responsibility of the school board in an agency's turnaround. This is a specific recommendation for this 
education agency despite the fact that there are multiple board members who have witnessed the 
turnaround process in three schools in the LEA. School board members have four areas of authority: 
budget, policy, evaluation of the superintendent, and collective bargaining. Turnaround legislation has 
clouded the board’s responsibilities. Making sense of the committee’s current role requires direct and 
explicit conversation. We recommend there be dedicated time for a school board workshop on 
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turnaround. Professional development for school board members in turnaround LEA's should be 
explicit, ongoing, and focus on how they support turnaround efforts in the local context. Not only does 
the board need to be clear on what the policy requires of the local education agency, but they also need a 
clearer understanding of what their role will be in the turnaround process moving forward. A lot of 
attention is provided to the other implementer groups to make certain they understand their roles and 
expectations. We believe giving similar attention to the school board would also help facilitate the 
process of turning around the agency’s underperforming schools. 
Support for Teacher Collaboration. Collaboration and teamwork are areas that research has 
shown to contribute to successful school improvement. Some studies have found that relationship 
building coupled with collaboration between stakeholders is key to raising the level of performance of 
an underperforming school (Corallo & McDonald, 2001; Duke et al., 2005; Fullan, 2006; Harris, 2006; 
Mulford et al., 2008; Murphy & Meyers, 2008). A teacher at the turned around school described how 
teamwork contributed to school improvement this way, “There were horror stories at first, when we all 
first began… but then as the years went on, there were more success stories rather than horror stories. 
There were supportive conversations, I mean, we got a good laugh, no doubt about it, from all the 
craziness that did occur, but in the end it was supportive because it ended up making us a family.” This 
aligns with what literature on effective school leadership says about building teamwork as an essential 
element in any school striving to improve (Marzano, Waters, & McNulty, 2005; Scribner et al., 2011). It 
is important to recognize that people are the most important resource in an LEA, and that they are not 
merely vessels to hold new information about data use or new student discipline programs. They need 
time together to get to know each other so that they can provide internal support for one another as 
things get hard and then continue to be hard in the turnaround process. We know a turned around school 
benefits any neighborhood it is in, but it cannot fix all the ills faced by today’s urban and rural poor. 
Problems will persist well beyond improved student results. The only way the people in these schools 
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can also persist is as members of a committed team who continually communicate with each other. Staff 
must constantly be given time and opportunity to work together so they don’t feel isolated while 
working in this difficult environment. 
Recommendation Two: Specify a transparent process for allocating resources 
It is our hope that ensuring a transparent process for school resource allocation will result in 
increased equity and fairness and thereby increase trust between implementers. By building trust 
implementers can work together more cooperatively and effectively, further ensuring that the capacity 
and collective efficacy developed during the turnaround process can be sustained. Additionally, further 
development of resource support by pre-identifying struggling schools and perhaps preempting them, 
may prevent the number of level D schools in the LEA and the need for drastic interventions. 
Key Elements for Implementing Recommendations. As limited resources are available in the 
LEA, the criteria and priorities about how resources are distributed to specific programs and schools 
needs to be developed. By establishing a baseline for best practices for school improvement, all 
implementer groups, including school board, superintendent/central office, principals, and teachers can 
self-assess the impact of their actions and decisions in relation to student achievement. The LEA should 
consider the individual needs of schools and school context to identify how each school implements 
these baseline practices using the school review partner process. After implementers come to a 
consensus about the needs of the school and the next steps for intervention, the LEA should consider a 
way to measure school resource usage after they are distributed, and how to incorporate a research 
function in the process of deciding how to allocate resources. 
Funding. The LEA, like many others throughout the state, is grappling with maintaining services 
for students in the face of dwindling tax revenues, increased student needs and services, and the funding 
cliff derived from the expiration of Race to the Top (RTTT) and other grant funds. All implementer 
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groups interviewed acknowledged that they did not believe they had enough resources to meet the needs 
of students. To sustain student achievement gains and teacher efficacy, the LEA should develop a 
comprehensive plan that prioritizes programming and initiatives that will remain or be curtailed when 
current funding streams diminish. Additionally, multiple implementer groups interviewed discussed that 
funding support is only available to Level D schools, thereby unintentionally incentivizing Level D 
status. Define a framework for resource allocation based on school level, programming, and student 
needs. This framework should include details of funding streams for academic and extracurricular 
programs, additional pay for teachers, full-time equivalents, and other areas essential to effective 
implementation of turnaround policy. 
Human Resources. It is recommended that the LEA streamline and replicate the most successful 
process for teacher “opt-out” of level D schools to ensure consistency of implementation across schools. 
This would include providing principals with explicit professional development on assessing the “fit” of 
instructional staff members utilizing pre-determined LEA best practices from past “opt-out” rounds. 
Implementing a consistent process across schools that fosters trust, facilitates transparency, and 
diminishes misalignment between policy implementer groups may assist with the goal of keeping all 
implementer groups ultimately focused on achieving LEA and school goals. 
Time. We recommend that the LEA provide a plan for sustainability to ensure continuity of 
teacher common planning time and extended learning time services to students. Teachers in level D 
schools interviewed feel that they can successfully effectuate change and meet the needs of students due 
to the additional collaboration and extended learning time (ELT) opportunities. While complete 
replication and scalability may prove challenging, provide educators with opportunities to learn from 
ELT schools to develop best practices that can be adapted in schools lacking resources to pay all 
teachers for ELT. 
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The LEA should assess the delivery of support and monitoring across high priority (level D, and 
C) schools by Central Office administration. A system to monitor school-level support from central 
office administrators will ensure clear and equitable support and monitoring. This would assuage the 
concerns of teachers and principals that level D schools receive the most attention and support and 
counter their stated view that they have to let their schools become “worse” before they receive attention 
and support. 
Recommendation Three: Increase the capacity of implementers to work with data. 
An area identified in our findings across implementer groups was the use of data. How data was 
used (or not used) was one of the most talked-about areas for school improvement by teachers, school 
leaders, central office personnel, and school board members. In this LEA, data use goes beyond merely 
examining assessment results to know what schools are eligible for turnaround support. Rather, 
educators used the data to tell them what areas of school improvement need focus and how to improve 
instruction. This is consistent with literature that says data is a key in school improvement efforts. 
Specifically, data is needed to guide instruction, which is essential to improving performance in 
underperforming schools. It allows educators to measure student progress towards goals, and it helps to 
pinpoint instructional strengths and weaknesses (Clubine et al., 2001). Indeed, the use of data to guide 
decisions is considered a condition for successful school improvement (Potter et al., 2002; Corallo & 
MacDonald, 2001) and this LEA makes data an integral part of their turnaround efforts. The data use in 
this LEA rests on implementers’ ability to make sense of, or analyze, it, and it is that analysis that guides 
improvement efforts. For teachers, improvement is about their instruction. For principals, it is about the 
school as a whole, and for central office personnel, it is about the LEA as a whole. The implementer 
group that is not directly involved with this level of data analysis is the school board. In fact, the school 
board seems to have significantly less interaction with the data, which eclipses their ability to engage in 
understanding improvement efforts in the LEA. 
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Although data is a significant part of school and LEA improvement planning, findings point to 
inconsistencies with the level of comfort and ability of different implementers to analyze data. For 
example, whereas some teachers have facility with data analysis, others feel less comfortable working 
with it. This seemed to relate to the phase of the school's turnaround efforts. At the school that 
successfully went through the turnaround process, teachers typically were adept at using the data to 
inform their practice. On the other hand, in those schools that were at the beginning of turnaround, 
teachers tended to have less experience with data analysis. Similarly, school board members appeared to 
have minimal experience with looking at school achievement data and often expressed the desire for 
better understanding. The implementer groups who worked the most with the data were school leaders 
and central office personnel. This is notable because it marks key leverage points for increasing capacity 
to use data across the LEA. Our recommendation is to increase capacity so that there is more 
consistency in terms of how implementers understand and use the data. 
Ways to Develop Capacity to Work with Data. The LEA has strengths they can build on to increase 
the capacity of implementers to use data. Building and LEA leaders, along with numerous teachers, 
understand the importance of using data and prioritize its role in school improvement. There is at least 
one school in the LEA where data was made central to its improvement efforts and in the end, was 
successfully turned around. There is an understanding among school board members that data is relevant 
to school LEA improvement and recognition of the need to use it in their role as representatives of the 
community. While this LEA has already begun paying attention to data in its LEA improvement efforts, 
there are a few key actions that can help to increase the capacity of all implementers to use data that is 
consistent across schools and across implementer groups. Central office administrators would need to 
take the lead in providing opportunities for implementers of the turnaround process to engage in quality 
data analysis in order to lead to more informed and strategic decisions about school improvement. 
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School leaders and teachers collaborating around data. One opportunity to build capacity for 
analyzing data among teachers is to bring them together to share data analysis practices. While teachers 
interact with other teachers in their own schools, and perhaps informally with teachers in other schools, 
more formal structures could allow this to occur more frequently. Collaboration is a key element in 
turnaround. That is, successful turnaround often depends on the level of collaboration by teachers 
centered on instruction and problem solving (Harris, 2002; Picucci et al., 2002; Leithwood et al., 2010; 
Duke et al., 2005; Clubine et al., 2001). Providing teachers with opportunities to collaborate across 
schools around data would increase their contact with other teachers around best practices and provide 
new ideas and ways of using data to inform their instruction. 
Sharing of best practices can also occur among school leaders. Currently, school leaders in the 
LEA meet with LEA personnel, along with members of their faculty, to analyze data in their data review 
meetings. In addition, there are LEA level meetings that occur with central office, including the 
superintendent, and principals of all the schools in the LEA. Findings suggest, however, that there is 
some inconsistency in how school leaders in this LEA lead data analysis with their staff and use that 
analysis to improve practice. There is an opportunity here for school leaders to work together to develop 
their own skills not only about data analysis for school improvement, but also about how to lead their 
staff through the turnaround process.  
    Increasing community understanding of the data. Developing better understanding of the data 
in this LEA also involves the community. This begins with the school board to promote their sense-
making of the data. Findings suggest that school board members have little interaction with data and less 
experience than the educators in the schools with making sense of data in a way that helps them 
understand the turnaround work. School board members could be provided with more opportunities to 
examine the data to increase their understanding. These conversations do not need to be overly 
cumbersome in detail. Rather, they might give an overview of what the data is saying about the LEA and 
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why designations occur. This would put school board members in a better position to communicate with 
their constituencies about the turnaround work that is happening in the LEA. With a greater 
understanding of the data, they can dialogue with community members about why some schools are 
designated as turnaround schools based on their academic performance. Furthermore, the LEA can work 
in tandem with the school board on outreach to the community. Working together, they could provide 
settings for dialogues to take place between the LEA and the community about the data. While school 
board meetings is perhaps a likely place for this, and our research indicated that indeed discussions 
around data have occurred there, opportunities offered outside the context of a school board meeting 
may be beneficial. In the end, this may lead to a more informed community who understand what the 
data means in terms of the LEA’s performance. 
Recommendation Four: Communicate a clear vision of leadership for the LEA 
As we listened to what each of the implementers were saying about turnaround, it became clear 
that they were looking at turnaround differently and focusing on different aspects of the turnaround 
process. They were also expressing different priorities about what needed to be done to improve the 
schools. At times, they noted their own lack of clarity about how to turn around their schools. There 
appeared to be a lack of interdependence among the different implementer groups. That is, they tended 
to operate in silos, distinct from each other, and often not in tune to what other implementers were 
thinking or doing with the turnaround work. 
 There were several places where this lack of interdependence was apparent. The interviews 
conducted brought out the most pressing questions and understandings of each of the implementer 
groups and at times showed little consistency or connection between each group. Central office directors 
spoke about the importance of their monitoring role and how they worked with school leaders to put 
practices in place to improve school performance. Yet, school leaders did not talk much about this and 
were more focused on how they were working with their staffs. Teachers described a style of leadership 
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in their schools at the beginning phase of turnaround that was directive, whereas, when school leaders 
described their approach, it resembled more of an instructional leadership approach. The school board 
was knowledgeable about the responsibilities given to them under education reform but they were less 
clear on their role in turnaround. The other three implementer groups rarely mentioned the school board, 
indicating that the school board leadership role was not prevalent in their view. These are examples of 
how the different implementer groups were operating within their own spheres of turnaround work with 
little connection to each other. 
This lack of interdependence may be attributed to the fact that a clear vision from the LEA about 
what implementers should be thinking and doing to raise school performance was absent. This became 
apparent when implementers expressed concern about their ability to sustain school success after the 
turnaround period ends. Their concern was twofold: that they would not be able to continue the work 
without the additional resources that came with turnaround status and that they did not know their next 
goal when their turnaround status ended. This suggests that at least some implementers were relying on 
the policy to set their vision for them. That is, upon designation, their vision was about doing what was 
necessary to exit turnaround status within a specific timeframe. Implementers did not speak about any 
kind of long range vision that the LEA set about turnaround. When asked to articulate the LEA’s 
turnaround philosophy many could not identify one with any specificity. Without that vision articulated 
by the LEA, the vision many implementers adopted seemed to be to reach the policy goals of higher 
student achievement within a 3-year period. Once that 3-year period ended, some implementers asked 
“what now?” This is consistent with the finding that the LEA leaders saw the work of turnaround as 
occurring at the school level, coming from the recognition that the heart of the work is where the 
students are. However, they did not talk about how they saw the schools as connected with each other as 
part of a larger LEA network. They did not describe whether they saw the LEA as a system whose parts 
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should be working together towards a common vision or how they envisioned the system supporting 
learning at the building level. 
For this LEA, a clear vision of leadership is needed to help guide and sustain school 
improvement. Although turnaround is a focus of some schools, non-turnaround schools are going 
through school improvement, some with the aim to avoid level D designation. Therefore, all schools 
throughout the LEA would benefit from a more clearly articulated vision of leadership.       When 
talking about turnaround leadership at the school building level, Leithwood et al. (2010) emphasize the 
importance of vision when they recommend turnaround leaders engage their staffs in developing the 
vision of a school as a source of motivation to commit to the work of school turnaround. They also 
suggest using that vision to help guide planning and to ensure that all decisions align with school goals. 
In implementing this suggestion at the LEA level, this LEA would bring implementer groups more into 
alignment with each other and with the LEA in terms of how they implement turnaround. Fullan (2006) 
who also focuses on turnaround leadership at the building level, discusses the need to implement 
systemic reform by using a “tri-level development solution” that includes alignment between the state, 
LEA, and school. 
What has to happen at the school and community level? The [LEA] level? The level of the 
state...? the idea is to ‘cause’ developments, along lines of this book, within and across the three levels. 
It is not so much seeking alignment as it is experiencing permeable connectivity—lots of two-way 
horizontal and vertical mutual influence (p. 74). Establishing this connectivity and alignment requires 
conversation, face to face interactions and the co-construction of meaning that are integral to the sense-
making described by researchers (Weick, 1995; Datnow, 2006).  This connectivity needs to happen 
between all three levels Fullan describes above and requires the state and the LEA to monitor progress 
on a case by case basis. 
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This tri-level development solution aptly describes the importance of connecting the different 
levels of turnaround, school, community, LEA and state, in terms of how to approach turnaround work. 
For the purposes of this recommendation, the focus is on the relationship between the LEA, community 
and the school in that all three need to be working in concert with each other. A vision of leadership in 
this LEA would strengthen those relationships and help to create the interdependence needed for 
implementers of turnaround policy to be working in the same direction. Strengthening the 
interdependence between implementer groups can also be reinforced by making sure that all voices are 
represented including dissenting voices. Creating a common vision would not be about merely exiting or 
avoiding turnaround status. Rather, it would be about the kinds of educational experiences that 
leadership would create for students that transcend what the turnaround policy mandates. In fact, 
creating a common vision for the entire LEA would benefit schools at all levels of designation and not 
just those who have been deemed chronically underperforming.  A vision of leadership would help 
implementers speak the same language about what they need to focus on and what they need to do to 
increase the quality experiences that result in higher student learning in the entire system. 
Conclusion 
This research generated insights into what educators in this LEA think and do as they implement 
turnaround policy. Emerging from these insights are recommendations that are intended to enhance the 
turnaround work that is already happening across schools in this LEA. Because sense-making relies so 
heavily on communication, increasing communication is suggested here as a way to facilitate 
understanding of turnaround policy. Yet, this understanding goes beyond knowing the policy 
requirements. Communication can help educators in the LEA better understand their role and 
expectations, which are not necessarily outlined in the policy. This enhances the process of co-
construction as implementers' communication with each other helps them to make meaning. Also 
recommended is to specify a transparent process for allocating resources. This LEA makes decisions 
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about how resources are distributed across schools and programs. Yet, the findings from this research 
study suggest that there is some confusion as to how those decisions are made. Clarifying these 
decisions would help to alleviate confusion and increase trust in the process, which can then help to 
guide implementers' decisions about turnaround implementation. The third recommendation about data 
use comes from a major theme which emerged across the individual studies about the prevalence of data 
in school improvement planning and implementation. This LEA already uses data, but there are some 
inconsistencies in the capacity of implementers to analyze and use data. School leaders, central office 
personnel, and teachers, would benefit from collaborative opportunities for work with data. School 
board members may need more experience with data in order to communicate with their constituencies 
about what the data says about the schools in the LEA. Providing more opportunities for implementers 
to work with data would not only help with school improvement efforts, but it would also help the 
community of this LEA to better understand the data that informs turnaround work in their schools. 
These recommendations aim to outline how this LEA can increase its capacity to exercise 
successful turnaround of its chronically underperforming schools. Increased communication can lead to 
more sense-making, which can help to guide turnaround implementation decisions. More transparency 
about the way resources are distributed can offer guidance to implementers throughout the LEA about 
how to approach turnaround work. Increasing capacity to analyze and use data would inform decisions 
that successfully leads to school improvement. As with most advice about school improvement, this is 
not offered as a universal remedy to this LEA's turnaround challenges. Rather, these recommendations 
are intended to enhance the thinking that goes into school improvement planning and implementation. 
That is, these suggestions can help implementers make sound decisions about what they should do when 
taking on the immense task of turning around a chronically underperforming school. 
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Appendix A: Definition of Terms 
 
 
NCLB - No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, which is the reauthorization of the Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act of 1965. 
Blueprint for Reform - The Blueprint for Reform is President Obama’s 2010 reauthorization of the 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965. 
RTTT - Race to the Top is a grant program designed to spur innovation and reform in the nation’s K-12 
schools. It is funded by the Education Recovery Act, which is part of the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009. 
SIG - School Improvement Grant. This is a federal grant program authorized under the Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act of 1965. They are grants to State Education Agencies (SEAs) used for 
competitive grants to Local Education Agencies (LEAs) that demonstrate the greatest need and the 
strongest commitment to use the funds to provide adequate resources in order to rapidly and 
dramatically improve student achievement in their lowest-performing schools. 
Turnaround legislation - State legislation from 2010 whose stated purpose is to provide innovation in 
schools and to turnaround underperforming schools. It was written in part to respond to the federal 
requirement that states wishing to qualify for RTTT funds needed to have their own legislation outlining 
school improvement requirements that was in line with President Obama’s Blueprint for Reform. 
SRG - School Redesign Grants is a SEA program from SIG that offers competitive grants to intervene 
in the lowest performing local LEA's in the state. 
Level C and D and F School Designation - State schools in the lowest 20% relative to other schools in 
their grade span are designated level C. Schools that are the lowest performing from the level C group 
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are those eligible to be designated as level D schools. Not more than 4% of the total number of public 
schools in (the state under study) can be designated as level D. Level F schools are designated for state 
takeover. 
Local Stakeholder group - Upon being designated a level D school the Superintendent has 30 days 
within which they must convene a stakeholders group whose task it will be to make recommendations to 
the Superintendent for the Turnaround Plan. 
Turnaround plan - written by the Superintendent of the LEA based on the recommendations from the 
Local Stakeholders group, this plan must be submitted to the SEA for review by the Commissioner who 
may choose to approve the plan for up to three years. The plan must include specific steps and timelines 
outlined by the state. The plan is designed to be a template for applications for SRG application. 
School redesign team - the job of the school redesign team is to use the Superintendent’s turnaround 
plan to create a three-year redesign plan that will serve as the day-to-day roadmap for implementation. 
The redesign team is also tasked with overseeing the operation of the plan and making adjustments 
based on data and results as needed. 
School redesign plan - is the plan written by the school redesign team to serve as the actual 
implementation of the Superintendent’s Turnaround Plan. It may include applying for an SRG and 
serves in place of the School Improvement Plan (SIP). 
Policy implementers - for the purpose of this research study the policy implementers studied will be 
limited to members of the school board, central office, the building principal, and teachers. 
Four Models of the Federal Redesign Grants 
1) Turnaround - Up to 50% of the staff is excised and a new principal is  brought on 
board to turn around the underperforming school.  
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2) Restart - school composition is changed by the LEA and may be taken  over  by an 
External Management Organization (EMO), often a charter school. 
3) School Closure - the school is closed and the remaining students are  dispersed to 
other schools within the LEA. 
4) Transformation - the LEA attempts to meet the demands for improved student gains 
under its current staff and student configuration. 
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Appendix B: Code Lists 
 
Start List of Codes 
Assessments (ASM):  
Central Office (CO) 
Challenge (CHA) 
Collaboration (COL) 
Communication: (COM) 
Context: (CON) 
Equity (EQ) 
Factors: (FAC) 
Implementer Responsibility and Roles (IMRR) 
Making Sense (MS) 
Policy Implementation Results (PIRE) 
Political (POL) 
Principals (PR) 
Prior Knowledge: (PRK) 
Reflection (RFLC) 
Relationship (REL) 
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Resistance (RES) 
School board (SC) 
Social (SOC) 
Student Impact (SIM) 
Support (SPT) 
Sustainability (SUS) 
Teachers (TCH) 
Trust (TRU) 
Use of data (USD) 
 
 
List of Actual Codes (Parent and Child Codes Included) 
Communication between Implementers 
•     Superintendent to Central Office 
•     School Leader to Teacher 
•     School Committee to Superintendent 
•     Superintendent to School Leaders 
•     Between Implementers  
Culture/values and beliefs 
• Culture change 
• Trust 
Resources 
• Lack of resources 
• equity of distribution 
• use of resources 
• resources to support turnaround 
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Leadership Behaviors 
• instructional leadership 
• distributed leadership 
• hiring/staffing 
• directive leadership 
• shared vision 
• support/guidance 
 
Collaboration  
Sense-making turnaround process 
sense-making of … 
• policy requirements 
• data 
• chronic of underperforming contributing factors 
• state intervention 
• expectations 
• directives 
• roles 
 
 
Attitude about turnaround 
• motivation 
• perceived barriers to implementation  
• perceived support for implementation 
Policy Implementation Results 
Political  
Capacity 
• community 
• internal 
Co-construction 
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Context 
Data use 
• data to inform PD 
• to assess educator performance 
• to initiate change 
• to inform instruction 
• to identify strengths and weaknesses 
• to understand designation 
Re-construction 
Social capital 
Implementer voice 
• dissenter voice 
Sustainability  
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Appendix C: Consent to Participate in Interview 
 
Boston College Lynch School of Education 
Informed Consent for Participation as a Subject in: Turning Around Schools: A View From the 
Stakeholders: A study that examines how stakeholder sense-making of turnaround policy influences the 
planning and implementation of turnaround goals. 
Investigators: Jamie B. Chisum, Anna Carollo Cross, Jill Geiser, and Charles Grandson. PSAP Ed.D. 
Class of 2014 
 
Introduction: 
You are being asked to participate in a research study of the process stakeholders in turnaround LEA's 
go through to make sense of how to implement turnaround policies. You are being asked to participate 
because you have a role in the LEA that is directly involved in the implementation of LEA policies in a 
turnaround LEA. Please read this and feel free to ask any questions you may have before agreeing to be 
a participant in the study. 
 
Type of Consent: Adult Consent 
 
Purpose of study 
The purpose of this study is to examine how stakeholders (school board members, central office 
personnel, principals and teachers) in turnaround LEA's understand and make sense of their roles in the 
implementation of turnaround policies. 
The total number of participants in the study is expected to be 10-20. 
Members of the research team do not have any financial interest in the study. 
 
Description of the Study Procedures 
If you agree to be a participant in this study, you will be agreeing to participate in a 1-1 ½ hour on site 
in-person interview or in a location that is mutually agreeable. In addition, if you choose to do so, you 
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will be given the opportunity to review the interview transcript for accuracy; it is estimated that this will 
take approximately ½ hour. 
 
Risks/Discomforts, Benefits of Being in the Study 
There are no reasonably foreseeable risks to participation. There are no direct benefits to you from 
participating in the study. However, the findings may be useful to LEA personnel, school board 
members, and members of the State Departments of Education responsible for communicating or 
implementing turnaround policies. Understanding the factors that influence the implementation of 
turnaround policies may raise awareness about how different stakeholders view their roles in the 
process. You have been selected to participate in this study as an implementer of turnaround policy. 
 
Payments/Costs/Voluntary Participation 
Your participation in this study is completely voluntary. There is no penalty for not participating. There 
are no payments to you, nor costs to you to participate in the study. 
 
Confidentiality 
The records of this study will be kept confidential. If any published reports are produced as a result of 
this study, researchers will make every effort to omit or disguise information that may be used to 
directly identify a participant. All researchers will keep electronic information in a password protected 
computer file. Audio tape recordings will be held by the individual interviewer until a transcription has 
been completed and confirmed for accuracy.Those interview recordings will then be destroyed. 
Access to the records will be limited to the researchers; however, please be aware that the Institutional 
Review Board and internal Boston College auditors may review the research records. 
 
Voluntary Participation/Withdrawal 
Your participation is voluntary. If you choose not to participate, it will not affect your current or future 
relations with the University. You are free to withdraw at any time for whatever reason. There is no 
penalty or loss of benefits for not taking part or for stopping your participation. If any significant 
findings emerge during the course of the research study that may affect your continued participation you 
will be notified immediately and the decision to withdraw or continue will be yours. In addition, you 
may refuse to answer individual questions but continue with participation in the study at any point 
during the interview process. 
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Dismissal From the Study 
The investigator(s) may withdraw you from the study at any time for the following reasons: (1) 
withdrawal is in your best interests, (2) you have failed to comply with the study requirements, or (3) the 
study is terminated. 
 
Contacts and questions 
The researchers conducting this study are current doctoral students in the PSAP Ed.D program at Boston 
College: Jamie Chisum, Anna Carollo Cross, Jill Geiser, Charles Grandson 
For questions or more information concerning this research you may contact a member of the research 
team:   
Anna Carollo Cross (508) 875-7851 anna.cross@bc.edu 
If you have any questions about your rights as a research subject, you may contact: Director, Office for 
Research Protections, Boston College at (617) 552-4778, or irb@bc.edu 
 
Copy of Consent Form 
You will be given a copy of this form to keep for your records and future reference. 
 
Statement of Consent 
I have read the contents of this consent form and have been encouraged to ask questions. I have received 
answers to my questions. I give my consent to participate in this study. I have received (or will receive) 
a copy of this form. 
Signatures/Dates 
Study Participant (Print Name)______________________________________________ 
Participant Signature______________________________________Date____________ 
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Appendix D: Semi-Structured Interview Questions 
 
We will be interviewing policy implementers in our single case study LEA. We will focus on our 
stakeholder groups (Teachers, Principals, Central Office Administrators, School board Members). 
The interview process will begin by having the interviewer go over the consent form and give a brief 
biography of him or herself in order to disclose any areas of potential biases. 
 
Background Questions: 
1. How long have you been in the LEA? (member of the community) 
2. How long have you been at this school? (serving as a school board, central office) 
3. How long have you been in your current role? 
4. What is your role? 
 
Sense-making 
5. What was going through your mind when you first learned that the school/LEA was  designated 
level D? 
      Probe: Did you see any specific concerns or advantages? 
6. Did you know it was a possibility? Why?  
7. What does the “turnaround plan”(redesign) mean to you? 
        Probe: Why do you think that? Where did you get that from? 
                    How did you find out about the turnaround plan or planning process? 
8. What do you think the LEA is being asked to do to implement the turnaround plan? 
        Probe: What steps has the LEA taken to implement the turnaround plan? 
                    To implement the turnaround plan what have the principal/teachers/school 
  board members/superintendent done?          
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9. Who do you think is responsible for communicating the requirements of the turnaround  plan to 
you? 
        Probe: Who actually has communicated it to you? 
10.Who do you talk to when you have questions about school turnaround? 
        Probe: Where do those conversations take place? 
        Are there any other places you get information? 
        Do people share common understandings about the plan? 
        How does that make you feel? 
11. Did you have conversations with colleagues about data before the designation? 
        Probe (if yes): Can you describe those conversations? What did you talk about? 
 How did you talk about it? 
12. What is the school/organization turnaround philosophy? 
        Probe: what does that mean? 
 
Policy Implementation 
13. Who do you think is responsible for understanding the turnaround plan? 
 Probe: How does that understanding look for teachers, principals, central office  and school 
board? 
14. What is your role in the turnaround process? Is this role different now than it was  before your 
school became a turnaround school? 
        Probe: If new to the school or new to the role adjust the question. 
15. Has your thinking about your role changed since pre-designation? 
16. What changes have you observed since the LEA/school was designated a level D  school? 
        Probe: Changes in teachers, leadership, community, staff, culture? 
 How would describe the leadership strategy here now and how that is different  from before? 
17. How have these changes affected you? (personally, behavior, professionally) 
        Probe: What changes have you seen in other people around you? 
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Appendix E: Interview Guide 
 
Notes to Interviewer 
 
This interview guide is meant to provide tips for effective interviewing based on the work of Seidman 
(2006).  “Listening is the most important skill in interviewing. The hardest work for many interviewers 
is to keep quiet and to listen actively” (Seidman, 2006, p. 78). 
Listen for: 
●   substance: pay attention to the details of what you are hearing to make sure it is as complete as you want 
it to be 
●   inner voice: probe for the thoughts or feelings that may be expressed under the words that are being 
spoken 
●   process: listen for substance but remain aware of time, nonverbal cues, pacing and participant fatigue 
●   Be flexible, ask questions in a different order or skip if the area has already been discussed. 
●   Focus on collecting data that answers the research questions 
●   Stay on topic 
●   Ask follow-up questions that enrich or clarify 
●   Explore topics if they will add to understanding 
●   Ask open ended questions, ask participants to “reconstruct” rather than to remember the situations 
exactly 
●   Trust your instincts 
●   Value silence for participant reflection and thoughtfulness 
●   Don’t rush 
●   Don’t answer questions for the interviewee. 
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Appendix F: Interview Script 
 
 
Thank you for participating in today’s interviews. 
My name is ______________ and I am one of four Boston College Doctoral students working on a 
research study for our final dissertation. 
I’d like to explain the study before we begin. 
 
 
 
We are researching the question of how individuals in turnaround LEA's make sense of the policies they 
are being asked to implement. 
 
 
 
At the end of this study we will be preparing a report that will be made available to you if you would 
like.   
Would you like to receive a copy? 
YES/NO 
Your email?__________________________________ 
 
 
 
We will be conducting interviews as a team. We will be interviewing principals, central office staff, 
teachers and school board members, approximately 30 individuals. 
We will be asking 24 questions of all participants. It will take about 55-60 minutes. 
The information you share with us today will be confidential. If we do use a quote in the report, it will 
not be attributed to any particular person.  If there are any questions you would like to skip or you would 
like to stop the interview at any time please let us know. If you have any questions or concerns that you 
would like to share before we begin the interviews we can stop at this point. Any questions? 
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One of us will be taking notes during the interviews. We will also be taping the interview to make sure 
we can transcribe your words and comments as accurately as possible. Again we want to assure you that 
all your responses will be confidential. Shall we begin?  
Thank you. Let’s begin with the first question. 
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Appendix G: Observation Protocol 
 
Observational Field Notes 
Setting: 
Role of Observer 
Time: 
Length of Observation: 
 
Description of Event/Object 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Reflective Notes 
 
